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PREFACE
This translation is a severely abbreviated version of the 
1,200-page Chinese original text. The principles I have followed 
in deciding what to omit and how to summarize the author's original 
argument are set out in the translator's introduction. Professor 
Chou may not, of course, be held responsible for the infelicities 
of style, distortions and errors which must inevitably appear in a 
work which has gone through the double process of translation and 
abridgment.
I have assumed that readers of this text already have some 
basic knowledge of Chinese political and cultural history. Hence 
I have pruned rather drastically from Professor Chou's original 
text material not directly relevant to economic phenomena. 1 have, 
however, appended a dynastic table keyed to Professor Chou's peri­
odization of Chinese economic history.
Special Chinese terms for economic institutions have, where- 
ever possible, been translated into English equivalents and ex­
plained at their first occurrence in the text. The English terms 
are cross-referenced to their Chinese originals (with ideographs 
placed next to the transliterations) in the glossary-index. I have 
also appended a separate list of Chinese weights and measures.
Given the wide variation in Chinese measures with identical names 
over space and time, the English equivalents of these terms should 
be taken only as approximations.
Though not included in Professor Chou's original text, I have 
added what 1 hope is a representative selection of traditional 
style woodblock illustrations of economic activities, taken from 
Ming and Ch'ing dynasty illustrated encyclopedias, so as to provide 
a pictorial equivalent of the kind of Chinese perspective on
Chinese economic history given by the text.
Finally I would like to thank Professor Chou for graciously 
consenting to the publication of my translation. My thanks also to 
the undergraduate students in my senior seminar at Western Washing­
ton State College during the last two years who have given me 
highly useful comments on earlier drafts of this translation.
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1TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
Given the paucity of works in English on Chinese economic 
history, particularly for the earlier periods, there is perhaps no 
particular need to offer elaborate justification for a translation, 
even in abbreviated form, of a work which has for more than a dec­
ade enjoyed so wide a popularity on Taiwan and among many foreign 
students of Chinese economic history. It is, however, necessary 
to indicate the several audiences to which this translation is ad­
dressed and the limited uses to which it may prudently be put.
The first draft of this translation was made in sections week 
by week for my undergraduate seminar in Chinese economic history 
during the fall of 1972. It was to serve in lieu of a current 
textbook survey which did not at that time exist.' I also hoped it 
could illustrate one of the modes of understanding China's economic 
history now current within the Chinese Intellectual sphere, as op­
posed to one of the Western points of view toward non-Western eco­
nomic experiences which are all too accessible to students in our 
part of the world.
Subsequently, it occurred to me that such a work might also 
serve as useful supplementary reading in my own, and perhaps in 
other people's, survey courses in pre-twentieth-century Chinese 
history, introducing Chinese economic history from a particular 
Chinese perspective in a way similar to what Derk Bodde's transla­
tion of Fung Yu-lan's Short History of Chinese Philosophy does for 
Chinese intellectual history, though on a considerably more modest 
scale.
This translation may perhaps also be of some use to students 
of the Chinese language who are interested in learning the vocabu­
lary of economic history through reading all or part of the
2original Chinese text. I hope that this greatiy abbreviated ver­
sion preserves enough of the substance of the original to serve 
as a guide to or at least as a set of detailed hints as to the 
original's content, and that hence it can ease the student's 
path through it without doing so much of the work for him as to 
tempt him completely away from the original Chinese version.
Finally, this translation may be of interest to economists 
and economic historians who, for linguistic reasons, lack direct 
access to the original and who wish, in some of their reading 
at least, to minimize the inevitable distortion of Chinese 
perspectives which takes place when Chinese works are filtered 
through alien sensibilities in monographic works by Westerners.
All three of the above potential audiences should, however, 
be aware of the limitations of this translation lest they judge 
Professor Chou's work as inadequate on the basis of its short­
comings. I trust that the subtitle, A Translation in Precis, 
adequately indicates these limitations. The order and the major 
elements of Professor Chou's argument have been preserved, and all 
of his chapter headings have been retained. In the process of re­
ducing the 1,200 pages of the Chinese original to about one-sixth 
of that amount, however, literal or close translation (at least to 
the degree that any translation can be considered literal) much of 
the time had to give way to summaries. Even in these summaries,
I have attempted to preserve something of the idiosyncratic flavor 
of the original and nearly all of its judgments and the mode of 
understanding on which they are based. I have also left out most 
of Professor Chou's bibliographic apparatus, for the most part con­
sisting of lists of books at the end of each section, except for 
general indications of whom he is quoting at certain points. In 
almost all cases a reader would have to know Chinese to effectively 
exploit these sources. For those readers it should, however, be 
relatively easy to use this translation as a key to Professor Chou's
3The two-volume'^ original on which this translation in precis 
is based has been virtually the standard work in the Republic of 
China on Chinese economic history since its publication in 1959.
It was reprinted in 1970, and a one-volume abridgement appeared in
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1973. Its preeminence is, no doubt, partly due to the quasi­
official standing of its author and to the somewhat delicate status 
of its subject, it being necessary for writers on Taiwan to avoid 
even the appearance of using Marxist interpretations, particularly 
in economic matters. The work, however, is quite capable of 
standing on its own merits, and its quasi-official status renders 
it sufficiently archetypical to be in itself of interest to the 
foreign student who wishes to discover the range of viewpoints ex­
tant within the modern Chinese intellectual community.
It will be evident from the very first page that Professor 
Chou is actively committed to the system of political economy built 
around Sun Yat-sen's concept of People's Livelihood (i^^itmin 
sheng), the third of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles 
san min chuyi). Such an attachment must seem almost quaintly ar­
chaic outside of the Republic of China on Taiwan. How seriously, 
after all, are the economic principles of Henry George (the inspir­
ation, unacknowledged in this work, for most of Dr. Sun's own eco­
nomic ideas) taken in the West these days? Indeed on Taiwan it­
self, avowal of the Three Principles has, especially in recent 
years, become for most people, a pro forma exercise designed to 
show one's political respectability rather than evidence of a 
deeply held ideological position informing the whole of a writer's 
viewpoint in whatever he writes. To some extent this is true even 
of Professor Chou's work, though he appears to make more whole­
hearted use of Sun's worldview than do most contemporary serious 
Taiwan scholars. Nevertheless People's Livelihood is not suffi­
ciently profound a concept to dominate a work so wide in scope as 
Chou's and, whever necessary, he simply rises above principle so
original and the bibliographic apparatus it contains.
4as to do justice to a particular topic. He is in this respect 
more fortunate than his compatriots within the People's Republic 
of China who are obligied by their governing authorities to apply 
the Marxist“MaoiSt orthodox ideology deeply to the whole course of 
their studies. Because Marxism-Maoism is far more ambitious than 
Sunism, this results in distortions far more severe than do the 
more eclectic nineteenth-century liberal doctrines of Dr. Sun.
In particular, Chinese Marxists have far greater difficulties 
than does Professor Chou in accepting the very considerable accom­
plishments of the traditional Chinese economy, and while this at­
titude of acceptance occasionally leads Professor Chou into a per­
haps excessive complacency,^ this is not necessarily to be des­
pised. It is likely rather nearer the truth than many of the 
libelous statements made during the last generation about even 
China's more remote past by respectably patriotic Chinese Marxists. 
At heart it is also psychologically healthier than the Marxist 
position and hence more likely to lead further toward the truth in 
future investigations. Most schools of psychology tell us that a 
patient cannot begin to plumb the truth of his own nature until he 
has fully accepted a priori his own worth as an individual. As 
for the individual, so for society. Whatever else is right with 
it, Marxist China has yet to accept, in its own terms, the worth 
of China's pre-Marxist past. Whatever else is wrong with it. 
Nationalist China has so accepted its past.
To be sure, neither Chou nor his mentor Sun sees China's tra­
dition entirely in that tradition's own terms. Both must ulti­
mately be placed in the camp of the Westernizers in that most 
agonizing of nineteenth- and twentieth-century China's intellectual 
dilemmas, the clash between Westernizers and Purifiers of the 
Chinese tradition. But even in their own terms, the Western 
economists' and economic historians' very claims to universality 
prevent any serious assertion by either Chinese or Westerners that 
a Chinese economic historian is in some sense betraying his own
5culture if he applies the "laws" of economics to its history.
There is nothing peculiarly Western about these laws except for 
the historical accident of the region where they were discovered.
As one of the greatest of modern economists, Ludwig Von Mises, 
asserts, "the a priori sciences," among which he includes econom­
ics, "aim at a knowledge unconditionally valid for all beings en­
dowed with the logical structure of the human mind."^ At this 
level there is no room for what Von Mises dismisses as the "poly- 
logical" approach, there are no more grounds for asserting a 
peculiarly Chinese economic science than there were for Hitler to 
assert the existence of (and cruelly persecute) a pecularly Jewish 
science or, for that matter, for Marxists to assert the existence 
of (and, when they can, persecute) a peculiarly bourgeois econom­
ics.^
Economic history and what for lack of a more currently fashion­
able term must be labeled political economy are, however, quite an­
other matter. It is evident that there must be an idiosyncratical- 
ly Chinese economic history, though the narration of its course and 
the analysis of its inner logic must never contradict the laws of 
valid economic science. It may initially be less or not at all 
evident that there can be one or more idiosyncratically Chinese 
versions of political economy, but to deny this would be to assert 
that political science and political philosophy are sciences in 
the same a prioristic sense as are logic or economics. The range 
of behavior in the realm of politics, the range of variant values 
that underlies the many varieties of political philosophy alone 
guarantee at least the potential existence of many political econ­
omies in all but the simplest of human cultures. Of course, a 
particular political philosophy may require use of modes of eco­
nomic activity which economic science determines cannot achieve the 
ends at which they aim. All this means, however, is that not all
things are possible to attain within any given political system no
8
matter what its partisans may claim.
6It is in his political economy that Professor Chou may justly 
be labeled idiosyncratically Chinese and Chinese of a particular 
sort for which the label “neo”traditiona1" is appropriate. It is 
unfortunate that such a label in these times carries with it an 
aura of the “reactionary." I should have preferred to use the 
words “radical" or “revolutionary," or at least have substituted 
the word “new" for the prefix “neo-,“ but the former would have 
been inaccurate and the latter would have been awkward. Though he 
is in many respects a man of the twentieth century. Professor Chou 
shares with the mainstream of traditional Chinese political econo­
my an abiding concern with the ethical norms of equality (or at 
least equity) and harmony^ and the assumption that it is the duty 
of a wel1-organized state to attempt to realize these ideals in 
the life of the society it governs. This traditional benevolent 
statism is in some measure accentuated by Professor Chou's alle­
giance to the Kuomintang's ideal (typical of most of the left- and 
right-wing movements aiming at national liberation and development 
which have characterized our century) of using the power of the 
state to make or at least encourage the creation of a modern in­
dustrial society.
Hence Chou applauds Emperor Wu of Han for the purity of in­
tent of his statist policies, but while Chou deplores their ex­
cesses he does not ascribe them to this inherent statism. He 
clearly implies that the Kuomintang would not have gone so far, 
particularly in frustrating the legitimate activities of merchants. 
A disciple of the “Austrian" school of economists might deny the 
economic efficacy of even the more limited Kuomintang interven­
tionism, but in doing so he would simply be exposing one of the 
differences between his own and Professor Chou's political economy. 
For Chou state intervention is an ethical imperative.
Chou's statism is, however, also balanced or at least rendered
ambivalent by its logical opposite: an attraction toward laissez-
faire. Of course, something akin to laissez-faire seems actually
7to have been present within both the Confucian and Taoist tradi­
tions, and this trend is faithfully reported by Chou. This tradi­
tional anti-statism appears to have been reenforced in Professor 
Chou's mind by his exposure to the Western classical economic tra­
dition. Hence he depicts the early Confucians, particuarly Menc­
ius, as overt advocates of laissez-faire and concludes that philo­
sophical statism is a Han and post-Han distortion of this aspect 
of the original Confucian tradition.
This tendency to view the thinkers of the classical period as 
more "modern" than their successors during the imperial era is, of 
course, an old habit among modern Chinese intellectuals, conspicu­
ous at least since K'ang Yu-wei, and was, as Joseph Levenson has 
argued, a stage in modern Chinese intellectuals' transcendance of 
their tradition.Chou's tendency to occasionally take too liter­
ally such putatively early literary sources as the Chou Li 
(The Rites of Chou) is another aspect of the earlier stages of 
this transition but one which appears, particularly among scholars 
on Taiwan, to be coming (with some justification) back into fashion 
in recent years.
Also reminiscent of the traditional historiography is Chou's 
tendency on occasion to practice "appropriate concealment" ( 
hui),^ ^ as by separating discussion of some of the key flaws of 
Wang An-shih's reforms from his narrative of them and celebration 
of their and Wang's virtues. Of greater significance, though much 
of it is lost in this necessarily abbreviated version, is Chou's 
retention of the traditional practice of knitting the narrative 
together with extended quotations from all relevant primary 
sources.
Giving due weight to its weaknesses, Chou's neo-traditional 
point of view nevertheless retains the virtue of enabling him and, 
through him, us to see the past in terms more nearly congruent with 
its own values than can be done through currently more fashionable 
points of view. If he misses insights obvious to the latter, the
8converse is also the case, and in many situations he allows us to 
see the same seeming novelties as does the latter, but domesti­
cated into the normal fabric of Chinese history. A good example 
of this sort of shift in perspective is the issue of land tenure. 
Mark Elvin asserts that manorial ism and serfdom were key aspects 
of the Sung land system. These two labels seem to jar us with 
their novelty when placed in an explicitly non-feudal context.
The institutions which these terms represent seem less odd and 
can be more easily accepted as normal parts of the Chinese economy 
during certain periods in Chou's treatment. Chou's treatment of 
manors and their tenants thus helps us place Elvin's view of these 
phenomena within a fully Chinese context.
Of the limited number of general economic histories of China 
available in English, only Mark Elvin's book is comparable in cur­
rentness, scope and detail of treatment to even this translation 
in precis of Chou's work. Though it is a highly controversial 
work, based largely on only one of the two main opposing schools
of thought among Japanese students of key aspects of Chinese 
12economic history and has so far met with a mixed reception among 
economists and economic historians of China, Elvin's book is never­
theless an important addition, and indeed the only one in English 
since E. Stuart Kirby's I95A work, to the literature in the field. 
In many respects, including its most controversial conceptual inno­
vations, it represents a significant advance from Chou's work, and 
thus at least its main ideas ought to be available to readers of 
this translation, particularly undergraduates for whom this is 
their first sustained exposure to Chinese economic history. Hence 
I have appended a precis of the main line of Elvin's argument. 
Particular attention ought to be paid to Elvin's view of the nature 
of Sung-Ming "manorial ism" and "serfdom," the most controversial 
elements in his work, and his concept of a "high level equilibrium 
trap" which he asserts kept late Ming and Ch'ing China from break­
ing through to an industrial economy.
9To complete the survey of the range of contemporary views of 
China's economic history, I have also appended a translation in 
precis of a Chinese work contemporary with Chou's and typifying 
an orthodox Chinese Marxist view of the course of economic history 
of the imperial era. To place this work within a larger frame­
work, it should be noted that the currently orthodox Marxist view 
of ancient China's economic history makes Shang and Western Chou 
the Marxist Slave Society stage of development; the Spring-Autumn 
period of Eastern Chou considered the transition between Slave 
Society and Feudalism; the Warring States the first, fragmented 
stage of Feudalism; and Ch'in-Han the beginning of the two-milienia 
long epoch of Centralized Feudalism, within which "sprouts" of 
capitalism eventually appeared well before and independent of the 
intrusion of Western capitalism into Chinese economic life.
Detailed comparison of the views of Chou, Elvin, and Fu and
Li is an exercise perhaps best left to the reader.
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NOTES TO THE TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
1. Last spring saw the appearance of Mark Elvin's The Pattern of 
the Chinese Past (see Appendix A), the first book-length eco­
nomic history of China in English since E. Stuart Kirby's In­
troduction to the Economic History of China in 1954. As will 
be argued below, however, Elvin's work reflects somewhat mon- 
olithically the point of view of only one school of Japanese 
historians of the Chinese economy and hence cannot be viewed 
as preempting the field.
The few other extant English-language general economic histo­
ries of China were all either out-of-date or too limited in 
scope or concept to merit consideration as texts in such a 
course. Mabel Ping-hua Lee's The Economic History of China 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1921) is out-of-date 
both factually and conceptually, giving little sense of China's 
continuing economic development after classical antiquity. Chi 
Chao-ting's Key Economic Areas in Chinese History (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1936) was a fundamentally new contribution in 
its time and is still well worth read.ing but, given its focus 
on hydraulics as the determining factor in both economic and 
political change, it is a monograph rather than a general eco­
nomic history. E. Stuart Kirby's book, cited in note 1, is, 
as its title avows, merely a bibliographic introduction to its 
subject rather than the general' economic history he promised 
(p. 14) to eventually produce but which has never appeared.
2. Some sub-chapters have been compressed, some are rather closer
to the length of the original. I have also compared my text 
with Professor Chou's own one-volume Chungkuo chingchi shih 
kang f j^j (Out 1 i ne of Chinese Economic History)
(Taipei: Huan-yu ch'upanshe, 1973).
3. Four paperbacked volumes, two volumes in hardback.
4. Cf. note 2 above.
5. In his preface to Chou's Chungkuo chingchi shih kang Chang
Kuo-wei^|_^ fairly summarizes the moral underlying Chou's 
narrative: One may judge the health of a society's economy by
its results. "For the last thousand years or so the land of 
China has nourished an incomparably large population, and 
there has been a somewhat equal distribution of wealth. This 
demonstrates the ta 1 ents and wisdom of the Chinese people" (p.
4).
n
6. Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 19^9), 57.
7. Von Mises, 5, 6, 75"89.
8. HsUn Tzu aptly made this point: "When men acquire something,
they never get only what they desire and nothing more; when 
men reject something, they never rid themselves only of what 
they have and nothing more." Burton Watson, tr., Basic Writ­
ings of HsUn Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)>
153.
9. The Chinese terms are chUn p'-^ and ho;^t? respectively. Yang
Lien-sheng has argued that these two Ideals underlie all legi­
timate traditional Chinese economic statecraft. Cf. his Excur- 
sions in Sinology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I969),
231-233.
10. Cf. his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. Vol. II: The
Problems of Historical Significance (BerkeTey: University of
California Press, 1965).
11. Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, "The organization of Chinese official 
historiography," in W. C. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank, eds., 
Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961), 49, 51. One example of perhaps unconscious "appropriate 
concealment" practiced by Chou is his treatment of Wang An- 
shih's field survey and equal-tax law. In the section dealing 
with Wang's reforms, Wang is praised for spending only twelve 
years on the field survey as compared with eighteen years re­
quired for a similar cadastral survey in Napoleonic France,
but only in the later section on Sung taxation is it mentioned 
that only half of the land had been in fact surveyed during 
those twelve years.
12. Cf. the discussion of these schools in Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, 
Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 2^0, n. 68.
13. Originally prepared for a panel on Elvin's work which I led at 
the Northwest Regional Seminar on China, held at the University 
of British Columbia on November 3"^, 1973. I should note that 
the consensus of the participants was considerably harsher to­
ward Elvin than the judgment expressed here.
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Section I 
PREFACE
An Overview of China's Economic History
Subjective idealism, whether Chinese or European, boils down 
to spiritualism. Pre-Marxist materialism boils down to the reduc­
tion of man to a thing, as it fails to recognize that not only does 
the natural environment (sunspots, China as a continental rather 
than a seacoast-dominated geographic entity) act on man, but that 
man reacts on his environment too. The same is true of the school 
of social or economic materialism founded by Marx. At best, ma­
terialism provides the objective element in history; the spiritual 
element must remain history's motive force. Mind and matter must 
interact in history. In earliest times the material forces predom­
inated in man's history, but the trend has been for the immaterial 
forces to grow in strength with time until now they can (as in the 
accomplishments of modern science) reshape the material forces 
themselves. Only the historical viewpoint of Sun Yat-sen's 
"People's Livelihood" adequately synthesizes the strong points of 
spiritualism and both varieties of materialism, making them in­
separable facets of itself, the center of human history. It sees 
human progress as a spiritual process, but one inextricably linked 
to continuous improvement in material production.
According to Sun, mankind's search for its livelihood is the 
basis for social progress and is the center of history. Men first 
seek sustenance. Government arises to assure just distribution of 
scarce sustenance. With sustenance assured, culture can appear. 
Hence economics is the foundation for both government and culture 
and determines their nature. Marx erred in not noting that tools, 
though the basis for economics, are themselves the products of
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human volition in the search for the People's Livelihood. Hence 
only Sun's philosophy avoids the partiality of the other three 
Views.
The Stages of Chinese Economic Development
All economic development rests on the interaction of natural, 
social, and technical factors. The natural factor, predominant in 
earlier epochs, steadily yields to human intervention. Environment 
determines a people's character. Social organization is linked to 
the political structure, which in turn affects the economy. Hence 
all economics is in some sense political economics. Technology is 
what has put men above the animals. Werner Sombart judges economic 
ideas, economic organization, and technology to be the three most 
important factors in studying economic history,
China is somewhat unusual for its physical isolation, not only 
from the rest of the world, but from some of its own frontier re­
gions, like Sinkiang and Mongolia. Hence its economy, like other 
aspects of its culture, evolved in isolation. Its economic center 
has tended to shift south and east from the Wei River-Yellow River 
area to the Yangtze.
Exploitation of mineral deposits has not been important until 
the recent industrial age. Given a static technology, population 
has tended to vary in proportion to the dynastic cycle. Only 
technological progress offers hope of escape from this Malthusian 
trap.
Since ancient times the Chinese impulse has been to organize 
society in accord with what was viewed as the dictates of nature. 
Confucianism reenforced this. Confucius himself was misinterpreted 
by later generations. When he said righteousness was for the 
"gentleman" (chiintzu) and profit for the "mean fellow" (hsiaojen) , 
he meant "ruler" and "common man," respectively, not "good" and 
evil man. Mencius' statement that producers must nourish rulers 
has been similarly distorted by later Confucians who have also 
formally discriminated against "secondary" merchants in favor of
15
“primary" farmers. The Confucian motto was to use the past to 
transform the present, as in their perpetually unsuccessful ad­
vocacy of a return to the well-field system. Not until Chiang 
Kai-shek put Sun's land reform proposal into practice in 1952 was 
the two millenia old land question finally solved.
Chou feudalism was organized on the model of an enormously 
extended family. So too, with some differences, was the imperial 
system since Ch'in-Han times, though the trend was to centralize 
power in the hands of the emperor and his non-related personal 
servants, like the eunuchs. There has also been a tendency for the 
official class to become the greatest landed and commercial capi­
talists and to perpetuate their power through the various examina­
tion systems.
Chinese science, though now backward, was quite developed 
through the middle ages. Chinese thought was most fertile during 
the late Eastern Chou and Han whose writers also forged many works 
purporting to belong to high antiquity. Astronomy and medicine 
were founded then. Metallurgy, hydraulics, salt manufacture showed 
great progress in the epochs of the Warring States Ch'in and Han. 
T'ang saw mathematical advances, and Sung built much on them. In 
addition to obvious contributions to world culture like the compass 
and gunpowder, Han China exported silk cultivation, and Sung and 
Yuan contributed porcelain and movable-type printing.
Progress halted only in Ming and Ch'ing. Since then the 
scientific and industrial revolutions have come at the initiative 
of the West. Economic development is now a function of man's so­
cial initiative, and henceforth we must look to man's efforts as 
the key to future progress.
There are various ways to periodize Chinese economic history. 
One is to start with high antiquity (everything up to Spring- 
Autumn), move to middle antiquity (Spring-Autumn to the coming of 
the West in the nineteenth century)and conclude with modern times 
(since mid-nineteenth century). Another method is: prehistoric
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to Hsia (founding period); Shang-Western Chou (feudal monarchy); 
Spring-Autumn and Warring States (monarchical period); Han-Ch'ing 
(imperial period) .
This book treats the prehistoric through Hsia as the mythical 
period; Shang-Western Chou as the founding period of the Chinese 
economy; Spring-Autumn and Warring States as the metamorphosis of 
the economy; Ch'in-Han up to Wang Mang as the period of its flour­
ishing; Eastern Han, Chin, Northern and Southern Dynasties as the 
age of troubles of the economy; Sui, T'ang, and Five Dynasties as 
the period of reestablishment of the economy; Sung as the period of 
the economy's renewal; Liao, Chin, and Yuan as the period of the 
economy's destitution; Ming as the period of the economy's revival; 
Ch'ing as the period of the modern economy's fermentation.
An Outline of the Evolution of the Chinese Economy
The Chinese people have been welded together from diverse 
local groups over the past five thousand years but largely by 
peaceful means rather than conquest. Though nomads have had to be 
fought off in the north since Ch'in-Han, there has been steady ab­
sorption of agricultural peoples to the south, and these southern­
ers have become fully integrated with the Chinese people. Nomad 
invaders of the north have also been assimilated.
Internal migration from north to south China usually proceeded 
gradually and for economic reasons to take advantage of favorable 
conditions for agriculture in the south. External migration to 
the northern frontiers was usually artifically induced by govern­
ment policy, and such emigrants were on the front lines of the 
mi 1lenia-long process of assimilating nomadic peoples, as, for 
example, the three centuries of struggle with the Hsiungnu in 
Ch'in-Han times. But by the time the Hsiungnu were driven off,
Han was too weak to repopulate the northern frontier and there­
after until Sul-T'ang, successive waves of nomads engulfed much of 
northernmost China.
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The T'ang reunification was based on an agriculturist-nomad 
alliance, T'ang soon broke with and defeated its Eastern Turkic 
allies and, like Han, filled empty areas in the north with farmers. 
T'ang weakness after the An Lu-shan Rebellion allowed the Khitan to 
enter the north like the Turks and others before them. The Khitan, 
like the Jurched after them, were soon sinicized, even though they 
conquered much of north China.
The trend toward greater scope of barbarian conquests, which 
began in 755, was not reversed until the founding of Ming in 1368. 
The Mongols were expelled before they had been much sinicized. Th i s 
allowed them to remain nomads confronting China from their original 
homeland right through the Ming period. Subsequently the Manchus 
were able to take advantage of late Ming decadence to conquer 
China, obliging the Chinese agriculturists to devote two centuries 
of time and blood to absorbing them. This absorption, however, 
was eventually all but complete; only a few thousand now remain 
who call themselves Manchus. The great size and long tenure of 
the Ch'ing finished the job of politically absorbing frontier 
peoples. Most remained culturally unassimilated. The long peace 
and consequent great growth in population during Ch'ing removed 
the necessity for official pressure to induce migration; natural 
forces now made people move.
It has taken five thousand years since the Yellow Emperor 
founded our civilization, but in blood and culture all nomads have 
now been absorbed into our agricultural people.
As Chiang Kai-shek has written in Chungkuo chihmingylin 
(CHINA'S DESTINY), after the Three Kingdoms period China's
This formula which ignores the existence of nomadic and 
sedentary non-Chinese within China and which furthermore asserts, 
contrary to common knowledge, that "all nomads" (what about seden­
tary non-Chinese?) have lost their identity within the Chinese 
majority is typical of but not unique to the Kuomintang world view. 
(EHK)
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economic center moved from the Yellow River to the south and east. 
The closure of Central Asia after the fall of the Yuan ruined the 
cities of the west, and the coming of the Europeans eventually 
raised the power of the cities of the east. Until the Republic, 
the tendency was for the wealth of the southeast to nourish the 
soldiers of the northwest. Now all parts of the country patrioti­
cally support the entire nation.
The earliest period saw the basic techniques (stone, then 
copper tools, animal domestication, sericulture, agriculture, fi­
nally building of palaces and walled cities) established. The 
founding period (Shang-Western Chou) began with the natural economy 
of feudalism, evolved to the beginning of the use of iron tools, 
saw the evolution of the first monetary systems and the beginnings 
of monarchical methods of government. The age of metamorphosis 
(Spring-Autumn and Warring States) was characterized by intellectu­
al freedom, political conflict, the influence on all aspects of 
economic life of extensive use of iron tools, replacement of the 
well-field system by private property in land, hydraulic works, 
rise of commerce, commercial urbanism and increased use of money.
In the flourishing epoch (Ch‘in-Han), the first stages of a 
national economy appeared once feudalism had been more fully tran­
scended by the Ch‘in-Han imperial system. Constant warfare during 
the age of troubles (late Han through Northern and Southern Dy­
nasties) retarded the economy. North Chinese agriculture weakened; 
the money system was thrown into disorder. The barbarian invasions 
of the north shifted the economic center to the south, while econ­
omic influence gradually sinified the northern barbarians. The 
Equal Fields systems and shifts in forms of private ownership which 
appeared during this period were to have varying consequences for 
the future.
The age of reestablishment (Sui, T'ang, and Five Dynasties)
saw a broadening of the economy as compared to that of Ch'in-Han.
Population increased, cities grew bigger, hydraulic projects were
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of wider scope, new handicraft industries appeared (e.g., cotton 
weaving), coal came into use as did new metallurgical techniques. 
There was increased use of porcelain, tea, and sugar to improve the 
everyday standard of living. Fiscal resources increased. Print­
ing developed. Increasing the reach of the national culture. The 
Grand Canal united north with south. Seaborne commerce with India, 
Arabia, Annam, Korea and Southeast Asia became important as it had 
never before been. The tea and salt trades were tied to the govern­
ment's fiscal system. Ever-normal granaries were established. The 
An Lu-shan Rebel 1 ion was only a temporary setback midway through 
this period.
The age of renewal (Sung) saw difficulties in the north, but 
under Sung seaborne trade was encouraged to make up for this. 
Navigation by the stars, sun, and compass came into use. Gunpowder 
played a role in the Sung-Chin wars. Movable type printing ap­
peared. Wang An-shih's policies affected the economy to no small 
extent. It is one of the great tragedies of Chinese economic his­
tory that the innovations of this period did not bear consequences 
similar to those of modern Europe's economy.
The fiscal policies of the Mongols had grave effects on the 
economy of the age of destitution, but technological innovations 
continued, especially in methods of warfare (the cannon), paper 
money was broadly used, and overseas and overland commerce with the 
outside world continued to develop.
The age of revival (Ming) saw the return of Chinese control 
over the economy and the end of the previous era's state management 
of the economy. That taxes were now paid in cash and salaries to 
aristocrats were no longer paid in land, shows the growth of the 
money economy. Overseas trade continued to develop.
The age of fermentation (Ch'ing) made little contribution to 
the economy. But for the Manchu conquest the Chinese economy might 
have continued to grow. In the West, the age of the industrial
and democratic revolutions eventually tied the whole world together, 
but the Western pioneers retained their initial advantage while the 
Manchus stagnated until loss of the Opium War in 18A2 began to 
rouse the Chinese people to catch up.
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Section I I
THE MYTHICAL PERIOD: FROM THE PREHISTORIC TO THE HSIA
Outiine
Details of the history of the 2,000 years from the Yellow Em­
peror to the founding of Hsia are obscure, but this period set the 
stage for the later feudal order. Material life was characterized 
by hunting, fishing, herding and the use of stone tools. Economic 
organization was based on family ties. The division of labor had 
begun and warfare occurred, but the economy was localistic and 
elaborate government had not yet appeared. Various animals, like 
the elephant, now restricted to the south, were then common in 
north China.
Evidence for Economic History from Mythical Accounts
Evidence is derived from excavated artifacts (usually fragment­
ed) and from literary sources (often recorded in distorted form 
much later). Stone tools found in association with Peking Man 
(ca. 400,000-500,000 B.C.) and elsewhere in northwest China indi­
cate that Paleolithic life was very primitive. Though the use of 
fire was known, early man's life appears to have been barely dis­
tinguishable from that of the animals. Neolithic stone tools are 
found widely in China. Pottery appeared. The site of Yangshao, 
in Kansu, yields the most notable artifacts. The earliest Neo­
lithic remains apparently date ca. 5,500 years ago, a few hundred 
years before the Yellow Emperor.
Literary sources permit little to be said about political or­
ganization. Even in Confucius' time little was known of the myth­
ical period. Many border peoples of later times claim descent 
from one or another of the tribes mentioned in literary accounts 
of mythical times. This shows that despite differences in ways of
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life, all the peoples of modern China are blood relatives. The 
China of mythical times constituted present-day Shensi, Shansi, 
Honan, southern Hopei, eastern Kansu, and northern Anhui.
Society and Economy
Society was organized collectively along clan lines and econ­
omic life revolved around nomadic gathering, fishing and hunting, 
especially in the hilly and wooded west. To the east, in the cen­
tral plain, a more settled agricultural existence was possible on 
the fertile loess soil. Literary accounts permit only a vague gen­
eral account of the life of these times, as in the various later 
accounts of culture heroes like Shen Nung, who was said to have in­
vented agriculture to make up for the growing scarcity of wild 
animals.
In the process of inventing material culture, culture in gen­
eral was evolved, thereby distinguishing man from the animals. 
Agriculture not only produced a larger and more stable population 
but reverence for the ancestors who pioneered this more profitable 
way of life was also engendered, and this characteristically Chin­
ese trait further distinguished our ancestors from the surrounding 
peoples.
Bronze appeared early. Tradition ascribes it to the Yellow 
Emperor. This is probably too early, but bronze had likely appear­
ed by Hsia times. Some unadorned bronzes excavated in Kansu (tra­
ditionally the Hsia homeland) may be of Hsia origin. Tradition 
holds that Yii, Hsia's founder, had nine bronze tripods cast.
Commerce, Science and Technology
Tradition ascribes the first markets to Shen Nung, and estab­
lishment of weights and measures to the Yellow Emperor. Yao is 
said to have regulate dthe division of labor and consequent barter 
among practitioners of the trades. Salt was easily manufactured 
along the east coast and would have been ideal as an object of
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trade. The calendar was said to have appeared by the Yellow Em­
peror's time. Writing, already well developed by Shang times, must 
have appeared earlier.
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Section I I I
THE FOUNDING PERIOD: YIN-SHANG AND WESTERN CHOU
Out!ine
The thousand years of Shang and Western Chou constitute the 
founding period of Chinese economic history. The feudal economic 
institutions then established were influential long after.
Feudal Polity and Economy
Shang's economic influence much exceeded its political reach 
(centering in northern Honan), covering much of the area of modern 
China. Western Chou more or less controlled politically much of 
North China. Traditional sources estimate its population at 
13,700,000. Though its political capital was in the Sian area west 
of the great bend of the Yellow River, Western Chou's cultural and 
economic capital was in the Loyang area, amidst the fertile loess 
plain. Under Chou feudalism, Shansi concentrated on agriculture. 
Hopei and Shensi, dominated by non-feuda1 I zed barbarians, saw de­
velopment of commerce.
Pre-Shang feudalism was more an ethica1-political bond among 
local leaders than an economic institution. Shang's feudalism, 
based on conquest, was (according to the literary sources) a cen­
trally directed militarized hierarchy. It served as the model for 
the later more extensive Chou conquest-feudalism. Western Chou had 
a systematic hierarchy of fief and sub-fief holders. Each lord's 
land was divided into his personal land and that parcelled out as 
sub-fiefs. The whole system was organized as a complex family, 
each lord owing allegiance, tribute and service to the king as the 
family's head. The king was to periodically check up on the lords 
and punish them for various offenses. In Chinese feudalism, the 
king had more power than in the later European variety.
JL
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Shang's initial clan-based society evolved toward a private- 
property-holding family system, especially after P‘an-keng's reign 
(tr. 1403“1373 B,C.). This was because of the greater complexities 
introduced into the system of property distribution by the increase 
of wealth.
The Land System and Agricultural Labor
Before P'an-keng's reign there were frequent shifts of the 
capital because agriculture was still not fully evolved and was 
still somewhat mixed with pastoral ism. Late Shang had a more pure­
ly agricultural economy. Because of the ubiquity of omen-casting, 
the pr iest shaman' s power in some ways was greater than the king's. 
Priests were the chief repositories of knowledge, and their posi­
tion the most conspicuous example of the beginning of the complex 
division of labor characteristic of a high civilization's economy.
During Western Chou the status of agricultural labor was some­
where between that of tenants and slaves. The class struggle be­
tween them and the lords which Marxists postulate was somewhat 
mitigated by ethical norms limiting the degree of their exploita­
tion. The only full slaves were prisoners of war, criminals, 
certain palace servants, artisans (who held a special position as 
valuable "property") and certain officials (e.g., minor aristocrats 
undergoing punishment by being enslaved to particular official 
roles). But slaves were of minor economic importance.
Though aristocrats did not directly participate in production, 
they supported it through government, war and religion. The values 
embodied in these activities, later to be systematized by the Con- 
fucians, were the prerequisites for a settled high civilization.
There seems to have actually been a well-field system, but it 
must have varied considerably by area and time as agriculture 
progressed, even though the original name for the system was re­
tained. The classics affirm that the original well-field system 
operated to assure economic justice for the cultivators. Some
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modern scholars, like Hu Shih, assert that the well~field system 
was simply an invention after the fact by utopian Confucians.
Others, like Hu Han~min, assert that it was in general use during 
Western Chou. It is most likely that even originally only some of 
the land was divided to resemble the character for “well" ( ^ 
ch_in£), with a commonly-cultivated public field in the middle. Some 
arrangements lacked the public field. Others simply divided the 
land according to the logic of irrigation channels.
Han dynasty Confucians* detailed descriptions of the system as 
the basis for an elaborate social security network are merely exer­
cises in imagination designed to protest against the unsatisfactory 
systems of tenancy of their own time. Sung and Ming writers of 
various political persuasions made similar use of the well-field 
system as a utopian ideal. As such, the concept of the well-field 
has remained an imperishable part of Chinese economic thought.
Given the fact that oxen were extensively used in sacrifices, 
Shang probably did not make frequent use of them as agricultural 
draft animals. Early Shang agriculture was likely based on the use 
of fire to clear land. Irrigation techniques were probably lacking. 
Hence, until P'an-keng's time, cultivated lands had to be frequent­
ly shifted, as their fertility was quickly exhausted. In Shang 
times most peasants were still organized within a clan framework.
Some captured agricultural peoples may have had a servile status 
vis-a-vis their conquerors, but probably retained their clan organ­
izational base among themselves. The large numbers of animal 
sacrifices and oracle records of large-scale hunts show that pas­
toral ism and hunting were still important parts of the Shang econ­
omy.
That Western Chou was more exclusively agricultural is shown 
by surviving documents outlining their ceremonials which followed 
the seasonal rhythms of agriculture. Specific officials, accord­
ing to works like the Chou Li, were assigned to supervise specific 
aspects of agriculture.
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In Western Chou times man's domination over nature was more in­
tensive than earlier. More use was made of the loess plain of the 
middle Yellow River valley which is exceptionally fertile when as­
sured a reliable water supply. Hence, despite its successes. West­
ern Chou agriculture was more vulnerable to drought, as frequent 
references in the Odes aff!rm. Initially, Western Chou's impulse 
was to respond to such disasters by blaming them on human sins and 
to pray for relief. Eventually, other methods were added to this; 
it became the ideal goal to attain one year's surplus out of three 
years' production. Irrigation began to be introduced. It is pos­
sible that bronze agricultural tools began to be used, but there 
were still no draft animals. Insect plagues were met by lighting 
fires at night, a method still used in north China.
In general, according to such sources as Kuan Tzu, agricultural 
labor discipline was much tighter than earlier. Common cultivated 
crops were various kinds of millet, rice, wheat, beans and hemp. 
Sericulture was highly developed. Herding, fishing and hunting were 
in decline. Judging from references in the Odes, the peasants' life, 
though harder than the lords', was still relatively free. Even when 
taxes in kind were blurred into the traditional labor dues, a por­
tion of the harvest remained with the cultivator, thereby distin­
guishing him from a slave.
Division of Labor and Scientific Techniques
Division of labor only began to grow fixed in Shang-Chou times. 
Feudalism tended to make various callings hereditary. Government 
used and hence supervised a variety of artisans.
According to literary sources, mathematics was one of the sub­
jects in an aristocrat's education in Western Chou times. A math­
ematical treatise attributed to the Duke of Chou (but probably no 
earlier than the Warring States), uses an approximate value (three) 
for £j_ in calculating a circle's circumference. Iron, of revolu­
tionary import in all phases of life, was (as in other civilizations)
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a logical outgrowth of the higher stages of bronze technology. There 
are casual indirect references to iron (implying that it was already 
common) in the Odes and Tso Chuan, hence it must have appeared dur­
ing Western Chou.
Eastern Chou recognized seven distinct alloys of bronze, each 
used for different purposes. Shang and Chou both had carved jade.
The invention of wine is traditionally ascribed to the chief 
minister of the Hsia's founder. Wine became more common later as 
the development of agriculture yielded more abundant raw materials 
for its manufacture. Wine vessels are the most common surviving 
Shang bronzes. The Shang is traditionally said to have been de­
posed because of the last emperor's excessive drunkenness. By Chou 
times many varieties of wine (all grain based) are listed in surviv­
ing sources.
Shang was capable of constructing large palaces in cities with 
an area of ten square 1i. By Eastern Chou large buildings were 
found even in the capital cities of local states. Weaving and pot­
tery were well developed by Shang times. Western Chou introduced 
bricks and tiles for building.
Commerce and Communications
Contrary to popular etymology, the dynasty name Shang is 
not the source of the word merchant ( shang), even though the 
characters are the same. The potential for international trade was, 
however, present by Shang, given its connections with surrounding 
peoples. Shang used cowrie shells for money and later carved stone, 
bone cowries and cast bronze cowries were used to supplement the 
money supply.
According to the traditional sources. Western Chou had strictly 
regulated markets under constant official supervision to keep 
prices honest and quality high. This ethical bent is ascribed to 
the Duke of Chou's influence. Money was still relatively scarce in
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what was still a largely natural economy. Cowrie shells continued 
to be used as money. By at least 52h B.C. cast metal money is re­
liably reported to have been in existence but not in significant 
amounts.
Even traditional accounts seem to limit pre-Shang Chinese cul­
ture to just southeastern Shansi and northwestern Honan, an area 500 
to 600 from west to east and 300 to AOO from north to south. 
Shang's territory was somewhat broader. Its founder was said to have 
moved some 1,000 J_i_ from the east to defeat Hsia. Shang's cowrie 
shell money came from the coast.
Western Chou's territory was wider still. The Chou conquests 
extended to the east coast, though not much farther to the north 
and south than Shang's territory. There were quite a few military 
campaigns through this territory thereafter and even in peacetime 
many hunting expeditions and royal progresses through the realm.
There was also regular trade with allied states. Legends exist 
describing a visit by the ruler of Ylieh in the south to the Duke of 
Chou and later a visit by King Mu (1001-946) to the "Queen Mother of 
the West" in Persia. Trade is said to have had a part in the latter 
expedition. There may after all be something to these stories, 
though they are unverified by other authorities.
One motive for building the eastern capital near Loyang was to 
establish a center of political control at a center of communica­
tions. The Odes describes Chou's roads as being arrow-straight.
There may have been post stations established along them. Chou made 
more extensive use of chariots than Shang. There were road and war 
chariots as well as goods carts used by the common people. Road 
chariots were highly ornamented, much more so than Shang's. The 
sedan chair was also used. Chou boats were larger than Shang's and 
a new use was found for them by joining them together to make float­
ing bridges.
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Western Chou's system had five taxes placed on the lands within 
the king's own territories, with local lords having analogous ar­
rangements:
(1) The field tax was apparently an adaptation of the Shang 
public field tax to meet a situation where the public field itself 
no longer actually existed. It was supposed to total 10^. It was 
linked to a labor tax. There was also a market tax and miscellane­
ous taxes on non-agricultural activities. All of these were appar­
ently subsumed under the category of field tax. Unlike the Shang 
system, an attempt was made to collect a nearly constant amount each 
year, rather than a fixed percentage of a year's production (which 
was impractical with the disappearance of the public field). Local 
officials were supposed to strike an average of several years'yield 
as the base for a constant tax.
(2) Labor service tax. This continued to be levied until Sung. 
In Chou times this was supposed to be three days per year in good 
years, less in bad crop years (one man from each family to serve). 
Except for aristocrats, all able-bodied men were liable from age 
twenty to sixty (fifteen to sixty-five in rural areas). Not very 
burdensome in Chou times, it became so when commuted to a capita­
tion tax in Han times and thereafter.
(3) The pass (or gate) and market taxes were levied on mer­
chants. The former varied in rate in different areas. It was a 
type of transit tax on goods. According to Mencius, the market 
tax began as a way to finance government supervision of mercantile 
activities in the market so as to prevent conspiracies in restraint 
of trade. Market stalls rather than goods were taxed. In addition,
Taxation and Fiscal Institutions
According to traditional sources, Shang also used the well-
field system, with the produce of the public field, amounting to one-
ninth, being given to the government. In addition, a “tribute" in
kind of various special products was also levied.
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the government's fiscal needs were also served.
(4) The military tax was in addition to the others and was 
levied at all levels of the feudal hierarchy in chariots, supplies 
and men. The size of the levy varied by time, locality, and size of 
state. There were exemptions based on age, size of family, number 
of dependents, etc. The garrison fields system of later eras de­
scended from this system.
(5) Fines. These were assessed for breaking various rules, 
e.g., for leaving fields uncultivated, for not sticking to one's 
hereditarily assigned task, or for failure to pay any of the above 
taxes.
Tradition ascribes direct supervision of agriculture and trade 
to specific categories of officials as far back as Hsia. The Chou 
gives detailed lists of central and local officials of this type, 
including supervisors of currency, tax collectors, etc. Perhaps 
the most important of these was the ssu-k'ung ^ ^ , a jack-of-
al1-trades local official in charge of public works (waterways, 
roads), whose existence is certified for Eastern Chou by contempor­
ary accounts. The central bureaucracy supervised the collection 
and storage of tax commodities, and had a corps of accountants to 
keep track of income and outgo.
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Section IV
THE AGE OF METAMORPHOSIS: SPRING-AUTUMN AND WARRING STATES
Outiine
Politically this era witnessed the transition from monarchical 
to imperial organization; economically from feudal to national 
forms; socially, intensified dominance of Chinese over barbarian 
culture.
Economic Thought
Economic thought flourished as in no other era, influenced by 
and influencing economic reality. The Confucians advocated the 
limitation of desires and hence demand but also called for measures 
to fulfill legitimate demand. The 
state should also limit itself, 
making sure thereby that the 
people would have enough. No 
ascetic despising "profit," Con­
fucius (K'ung Tzu) simply subord­
inated it to the drive for sage- 
hood, at least for the ruling 
class. Commoners had to seek 
profit to earn their living. The 
Sung Neo-Confucians misunderstood 
this distinction and thereby 
hindered the further development 
of economic thought. Nor did 
Confucius despise merchants, 
numbering several among his 
disciples. Denigration of mer­
chants dates only from Han. Fig. 1 Confucius (Ming illus­
tration)
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Confucius argued that the state's wealth was based on assuring 
wealth for the people. Hence taxes should be low, equitable, and 
remitted in bad years. Not only should taxes be equitable, but 
wealth should be equally distributed. This has remained a constant 
ideal of Chinese economic thought ever since.
According to Confucius' disciple, Tseng Tzu, labor applied to 
land in accord with each piece of land's nature will yield suffi­
cient wealth for a man to support his parents, if all concerned also 
practice frugality. This, he judged, was the common man's version 
of filiality. The early Confucians, like most of their contempoi— 
aries (except for the Taoists), affirmed the dignity of labor and 
hence the basic equality of all the divisions of society. It was 
only after Han that manual labor was no longer viewed as having 
dignity.
Meng Tzu's (Mencius') economic 
ideas were more extreme than Confu­
cius' because of the more critical 
situation of his generation. It 
was now more necessary than ever to 
enrich the people so that the state 
might survive. To do this, mer­
chants should be encouraged, and 
only conspiracies in restraint of 
trade should be punished by the 
state. Contrary to his later repu­
tation, Mencius was actually a 
strict free-trader. In refuting the 
agrarian collectivist Hsu Tzu (Hsti 
Hsing) he also worked out the inner 
logic of the principle of division 
of labor. In saying that the ruler 
is fed by the farmer and the farmer 
ruled by the ruler he was
Fig. 2 Mencius (Ming illus­
tration)
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illustrating this principle and not (as later commentators make it) 
setting the ruler in a position morally superior to the farmer.
Hsun Tzu's economic ideas differed somewhat from Mencius'. He 
emphasized that human desires are innate, are not moral and are 
insatiable. Strife is caused by the fact that goods are scarce and 
desires many. Strife leads to disorder and poverty. Desires must 
be tamed and limited by ritual (1 i) to avoid this. Hence rulers 
and commoners both seek profit but by different and equally natural 
routes. It is appropriate for rulers to let commoners follow the 
division of labor. If farming and trade are encouraged, both state 
and people will be enriched.
Taoist economic thought was entirely negative, an unqualified 
laissez-faire based on the doctrine of wu-wei, as opposed to the 
Confucians' qualified laissez-faire which allowed government inter­
vention to assure popular welfare. Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advo­
cated extinction of desire; Yang Chu yielded it free reign. Lao 
Tzu looked back to the simple societies of extreme antiquity as his 
ideal. Consequently his and Chuang Tzu's influence has been a 
negative one, retarding economic growth, as has been Lieh Tzu's 
fatalism and antipathy to the man-made.
The Mohists resembled the Confucians in their ethical bent 
their emphasis on economic equality and the division of labor.
They differed from the Confucians in their statism and extreme 
utilitarian1sm.
Kuan Tzu was the first Legalist and also an economist of great 
historical influence. A commoner, he spent his youth in trade.
As chief minister of Ch'i his policy was to achieve wealth and 
power (fu ch'iang) for his state. Confucius approved of him.
Kuan Tzu disapproved of taxation because it weakened the 
wealth of the people and caused them to dislike government. In­
stead he favored a national monopoly on sale of salt, iron, forest 
products and ores to meet governmental expenses. In the case of
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salt he could take advantage of 
Ch'i's control of the coastal salt 
pans to exact monopoly profits 
from its sale in foreign as well 
as domestic trade. Since even 
housewives and farmers had to have 
a certain amount of iron, a gov­
ernment monopoly on iron and other 
ores was bound to be profitable, 
even though its processing and 
manufacture was left in private 
hands to disguise the state's 
monopoly profit and hence obviate 
popular resentment.
The state should also, ac­
cording to Kuan Tzu, monopolize 
the trade in grain whose price 
would be kept steady by judicious 
buying and selling by the govern­
ment. Its profits from this trade would allow lower taxes and also 
control the prices of other goods which bear an inverse relation­
ship to the price of grain. In addition, the quantity of money in 
circulation ought to be kept in proportion to the amount of goods 
for sale so as to keep prices stable.
The mass of the people must be left no alternative to agricul­
ture which is the ultimate basis of the state's wealth and power. 
Trade is the other pillar of the state's power. If a state at­
tracts the world's merchants, it can control the world's politics. 
The sumptuary regulations Kuan Tzu had Ch'i establish were not to 
denigrate merchants (as was the motive of Han and Ming) but to 
avoid jealousy among the different classes.
The object of foreign trade was to amass cash by exporting 
goods in short supply elsewhere, in Ch'i's case salt and iron.
Fig. 3 Kuan Tzu (Ming illus 
trat ion.
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Profit from trade could be used to buy abroad goods which are in 
short supply at home and thereby attract more people to the state 
by making life there more comfortable. Foreign trade could also 
be used to trick other states into activities unprofitable to them 
and their subsequent poverty used to attract their people to one's 
own state. This was to use knowledge of the laws of supply and 
demand to achieve political profit. By artificially jacking up 
prices of grain, all the surplus grain from smaller nearby states 
could be drawn into Ch'i, thereby causing famine in these countries 
even in good crop years. Later reformers made profitable use of 
Kuan Tzu's economic principles, though most later thinkers were 
blinded to his insights by their own prejudices against commerce.
Li K'uei (470-380 B.C.) was a Wei civil official noted for his 
economic ideas. He is said to have greatly increased agricultural 
productivity by discouraging exports and by keeping prices level 
through government granaries' buying and selling countercyclically 
according to elaborate calculations of average consumption patterns. 
He greatly influenced Shang Yang who was born in Wei while Li's 
methods were in use.
Applied in Ch'in, Shang Yang's methods made it the most power­
ful of the Warring States. These methods involved encouragement of 
agriculture by establishing private property in farmland, propor­
tioning taxes to productivity, encouraging migrants from abroad to 
open new land, and keeping merchants' activities under strict con­
trols so that they could not exploit farmers.
Han Fei had little to say on economics. As a student of Hsun 
Tzu, he believed that human nature was evil and primarily sought 
profit and hence he emphasized legal controls over this instinct.
The agrarians, like Hsu Hsing and his disciple Ch'en Hsiang, 
celebrated the virtue of simple agricultural labor for aristocrat 
as well as commoner. They would declare all goods of equal value 
in their homogeneous collective agrarian society. Mencius, their
38
contemporary, criticized them for not recognizing the reality that 
different goods do in fact have varying values and hence prices.
No complicated civilization could avoid chaos in applying their 
theories. Nevertheless, their emphasis on the dignity of labor was 
wholesome and it is regrettable they have historically had so little 
influence.
Yen Tzu of Ch'i, a contemporary of Confucius and representative 
of the political school, shared his emphasis on ethical controls 
over the state's economic activities but put even more emphasis on 
frugality.
Merchants made a great contribution to ancient economic thought; 
though little of their work has been preserved, except in the econ­
omics section of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history.
Chi Jan lived slightly later than Confucius. He held that 
wealth was the basis of a state's military and hence political 
power. Famine should be anticipated and provided against. He 
foreshadowed modern Western theories of long-range economic cycles 
with his assertion that famine could be expected every twelfth year. 
Hence government intervention in the grain market could keep prices 
from wild fluctuations. Both government and private merchants 
should sell goods when prices are high and buy them when prices are 
low. This, he argued, would stabilize prices and maximize the 
wealth of both government and merchants.
Po Kuei believed in applying the strategic insights of Shang 
Yang and Sun Wu to business. In a good harvest year grain prices 
will be low, Po reasoned, but because of high purchasing power 
goods prices will be high. Hence the good businessman will buy 
grain and sell goods. He should do the reverse in bad crop years.
The Economy's Metamorphosis
By this time Western Chou's extended family style of politi­
cal organization had broken down, just as ordinary extended fam­
ilies tend to fragment after the passage of three or four
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generations. The most successful states now picked advisers for 
their talent, not their family connections. By Warring States 
times centrally controlled regional governments began to replace 
fiefs and sub-fiefs. The 1,700-odd more or less equal fiefs of 
Western Chou were consolidated into less than a hundred states, with 
most of the power, economic as well as political, concentrated 
among some ten of these.
These consolidations also assimilated most of the barbarians 
within metropolitan China. The nine "provinces" into which most 
ancient documents divide metropolitan China (all of modern China 
except Mongolia, the far southwest and Kwangtung-Kwangs0 were not 
political units but natural economic units with a wide range of 
climate, terrain and resources. It was this wider China which was 
now sinified and was to come under centralized imperial rule by the 
end of the Warring States period.
The Land System and Agricultural Economy
In Spring-Autumn times land was still the most important re­
pository of wealth and measure of political power. As the land had 
become concentrated in the hands of a few great states, it could 
only be managed by dividing it into sub-fiefs whose rulers could 
directly supervise and collect taxes from it. This sub-fief aris­
tocracy came to hold effective sovereignty over the land, and to 
the peasants remained only usufruct over the land. Without power 
over the land the people could not be trusted to take interest in 
cultivating the public fields and hence the well-field system 
d i sappeared.
V^e may view Spring-Autumn's land system as a transitional one 
between the well-field system of Shang-Western Chou and the War­
ring States' free private land system. Population increase was 
pressing against the available supply of land. More sophisticated 
technology required greater expertise by farmers. The rise of 
manufacture and trade lowered the status of agriculture and allowed
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commercial wealth to gain control of land. Hence the trend was to­
ward private property in land. Politically induced mass movement 
of peasants from place to place broke old customs. The shift from 
taxes in labor to taxes on land also encouraged private property in 
land.
This was happening to some degree everywhere and not just in 
Ch'in where Shang Yang's reforms explicitly called for private 
property in land. Reformers like Kuan Tzu claimed that private 
property in land was necessary to assure popular prosperity and 
hence the popular obedience which was in turn the basis for a 
state's political and military power.
Though most agricultural techniques in Spring-Autumn times did 
not much differ from those of Western Chou, the seeds of the much 
greater changes of Warring States times were present. Iron was be­
ginning to be used, and by the late Warring States era iron plows 
enabling deep plowing were common. It is not known, however, if 
they were drawn by animal or man power.
Large scale artificial hydraulic works also became common and 
were used to avoid both drought and flood. Canals hundreds of 
miles long connected important rivers and opened much new land to 
agriculture. Large dikes, built and maintained by farmers under 
government direction, helped lessen flood dangers.
Human and animal manure was extensively used for fertilizer 
by Warring States times. The use of different crops on different 
soils was also understood as was the correct time to plant various 
crops.
During times of scarcity, grain was lent to the peasants from 
the granaries of the rulers and aristocrats. Kuan Tzu advocated 
keeping up prices of grain to keep the peasants from being victim­
ized by merchants and hence assure a strong agriculture. He also 
advocated strict controls by the government over those who lent to 
farmers at interest. Kuan Tzu wanted the government to keep track
of agriculture at all stages of production so that it could make 
sure taxes were being paid honestly, have a quantitative basis for 
estimating relief needs in bad times and could make sure rapacious 
merchants were not monopolizing the grain supply, a danger to the 
state should war break out. Kuan Tzu also wanted the government to 
maintain its own granaries for lending grain to the peasants before 
harvests were in. These granaries were to buy in the market counter 
cyclically so as to maintain steady average prices.
Science and Technology
Pebbles and fingers were used for simple calculations in the 
earliest times. By Spring-Autumn times all of the simple arithmet­
ical operations could be performed. The casting of the milfoil 
stalks is an early example of practical arithmetic. Later, bundles 
of sticks were used, with the sticks laid out to represent the 
place values in a decimal system, and zero was represented by the 
absence of a stick.
Military needs stimulated leather making for armor, the devel­
opment of metallurgy and the design of machinery. Specialization 
increased the number and precision of the tools in various crafts.
By Warring States times workmen were no longer solely dependent on 
their home states for employment, and this served to greatly stimu­
late invention.
The coastal areas of Ch'i, Wu and Yen produced enormous aixDunts 
of salt. Prospecting for mineral deposits on the basis of the 
surface soil's nature became a highly developed art. Servile labor 
was often used in the mines. There were a wide variety of iron and 
bronze implements. This indicates the existence of a great demand 
for metals. Large labor forces were involved in smelting, and many 
private fortunes were made. Dyeing and weaving were also increased 
in importance by the growth in population. Ch'i earned great 
profits from its cloth exports.
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Commerce and Money
Commerce flourished as the feudal system decayed. In Spring- 
Autumn times commerce had not yet much penetrated into the villages 
but concentrated on supplying luxuries for the aristocracy. There 
were regular markets in the cities and interstate trade took place 
but largely on a barter basis, though some metal money was in use. 
Official salaries and taxes were usually paid in grain and cloth.
By Warring States times the use of money became much more 
prevalent, but even then and for some time thereafter grain was 
often used to pay official salaries. During the Warring States era 
lending at high interest was prevalent in urban as well as rural 
areas and even the state engaged in it. The search for wealth 
became ubiquitous, and writers like Ssu-ma Ch'ien asserted that the 
lust for wealth was part of human nature, though he and other 
moralists deplored this and eventually forced the lust for wealth 
out of reputable men's overt ambitions.
Ch'i had the most developed commerce of the Warring States era, 
and this was based on its earlier preeminence in trade. Naturally 
well endowed with resources and having a large population, it also 
had benefitted from Kuan Tzu's reforms. Agriculture, weaving, and 
salt manufacture were its chief activities and the basis for its 
commerce. Ch'i merchants were numerous and rich enough by Kuan 
Tzu's time to rival the state in power.
In Ch'u, in addition to agriculture, metal mining was well 
developed, especially of gold. Ch'u was also famous for its iron 
swords. Its commerce was based on its gold, iron, copper and tin 
ores. Commerce in Eastern Ch'u (formerly Wu) became well devel­
oped, based on salt and copper. Western Ch'u was well placed to 
serve as a transit area for commerce. Southern Ch'u's commerce 
in hides, wood, pearls, and other commodities was funneled up to 
the middle Yangtze commercial centers of Shouch'un and Hofei in 
modern Anhui province.
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Ch'in originally had a purely agrarian and herding economy 
which served as the base for its commerce. Its extensive and natur­
ally well defended territory had easy riverine communications with 
the states to its east and with the barbarians on its other sides. 
Hence it enjoyed a great transshipment trade in all directions. 
Though Shang Yang's reforms had placed commerce secondary to agri­
culture, his third-century B.C. successor, Lu Pu-wei, was himself a 
rich merchant who encouraged trade and under whose auspices was put 
together one of the most useful practical compendia of the era.
The First Emperor later deposed Lu, lumped merchants with criminals 
and exiled both to the frontiers.
Small, crowded, and with few natural resources, the state of 
Lu nevertheless had an extensive commerce based on cottage industry, 
especially weaving. This was even truer of the Eastern Chou ter­
ritory centered around Loyang, the greatest commercial center.
The economy of Yen and Chao was centered around agriculture 
and salt manufacture. Yen traded with Ch'i to the south and with 
the barbarians of Liaotung to the north. Teng could trade with 
Ch'i to the east, Chou to the west and Ch'u to the south. Its 
merchants operated all over metropolitan China.
Commerce remained less important quantitatively than agricul­
ture during Warring States times, but in certain places, as in Ch'i, 
it was of considerable magnitude.
Although metal money was present in Western Chou, only in 
Spring-Autumn and later times did a three-tier money system become 
elaborated. The most valuable objects were precious stones and 
jade. The next tier was formed of uncoined gold. Rare in Western 
Chou, it became more common in Spring-Autumn times and was plenti­
ful enough to be used as the accounting unit in interstate trade 
by the Warring States era. The most numerous money was cast in 
bronze, most often in the shape of a knife, though other shapes 
were used in different states at various times. Eventually,
pierced round bronze coins became most 
common, and strung together they remained 
the dominant smali coin all through the 
succeeding imperial era.
Credit appears along with trade and 
usually predates money, but it receives 
its full development only when trade and 
money are flourishing. The earliest ref­
erences to credit involved the lending of 
grain by both state and private creditors.
By Warring States there is evidence of 
credit for both consumption and capital uses.
Communications
The states of Eastern Chou times, 
though spanning two great river valleys, 
enjoyed increasingly regular communica­
tions. By Warring States timeseven the 
states of the Yangtze valley were in ever 
closer touch with the states to the north. 
Frontiers with the barbarians to the north and south were pushed 
out to virtually the points held during most of the succeeding im­
perial era.
According to the Chou Li. roads and bridges were supposed to 
be maintained by the officials and trees were to be planted by 
their sides. The people were supposed to maintain rest houses at 
intervals along them. With some exceptions these regulations were 
observed during this time. Armies required supply routes to re­
main in the field for any length of time. The Golden Ox Road 
(chin niu tao ) between Shensi and Szechwan was built by Ch'in as 
part of its conquest of Shu. It is said but not proven to have 
been a covered road, a new type of road with a kind of wooden roof 
over it for protection against landslides and erosion in mountain 
country.
Money
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Privately operated hotels appeared by Warring States times for 
the convenience of traveling merchants. Postal rest houses for 
official couriers (on foot, riding chariots or later on horseback) 
existed and by Warring States times accommodated travelers as well. 
There were several canals big enough to carry boats and hence to 
serve transportation needs in several places along both major river 
valleys. They were also used for irrigation.
Horseback riding was the most significant improvement in trans­
portation methods. According to Han Fei, it was present in Spring- 
Autumn times. By Warring States times the adoption of barbarian 
costume greatly increased the efficacy of cavalry which became 
numerous, much reducing the importance of war chariots. But civil­
ian wheeled traffic became much denser. Grain was being shipped by 
boat from Ch'in to Chin. During the Warring States era, on one 
occasion Ch'in sent large boats down the Yangtze from Szechwan, 
each carrying fifty men and three months' provisions. They travel­
ed 300 j_i_ per day. The overseas voyages of the Ch'in dynasty were 
made possible by Warring States era connections with Southeast 
China and Vietnam developed during Ch'u's earlier expansion to the 
South.
Tax Systems
Tax rates were increased over the 10^ which the traditional 
sources say was constant from Hsia through Western Chou. In 
Spring-Autumn times rates varied, and reached as much as two-thirds 
of the crop in some states at some times. Mencius accused the War­
ring States rulers of imposing taxes like brigands. The rulers 
themselves recognized that taxes were getting out of hand. With 
the spread of trade and money it became possible to begin to col­
lect land taxes in cash. In the Kuan Tzu, tax receipts were al­
ready calculated in cash and later on in Wei were actual ly col lect- 
ed in cash.
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Mercantile taxes were already a significant part of Ch'i's 
revenues in Kuan Tzu's time. Frontier taxes were important enough 
for Mencius to also complain about them. The number of tax col­
lectors increased significantly as did the percentage of taxes 
which they kept for their own enrichment. Hence it was possible 
for both the people and the state treasuries to be simultaneously 
impoverished.
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Section V
THE FLOURISHING PERIOD: CH'IN-HAN
Outiine
The 438 years from Ch'in through Eastern Han represents the 
culmination of the trends of the Warring States era as first crys­
tallized by the Ch'in empire. The new national economy establish­
ed by Ch'in might have progressed indefinitely but for the excessive 
burdens Ch'in placed on the people and which led to its overthrow. 
The economy remained in confusion for five decades after Ch'in's 
fall, but by Emperor Wu's time the 
new forms of a national economy 
had been restored under Han 
auspices. Wang Hang's reforms, 
rational though they were, were 
too badly executed to succeed.
Eastern Han's economy was pat­
terned on that of Western Han, 
but ultimately was hampered by 
its narrower sphere of control.
The Economic Successes and Fail­
ures of Ch'in Unification
Even in Warring States times 
the competing powers realized the 
inefficiency resulting from their 
political and military quarrels 
and the resulting lack of stand­
ardization of weights, measures, 
and written languages, and they 
made tentative attempts at unity in such matters. Hence the unity
Fig. 5 Han Wu-ti (Ming 
i11ustration)
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the Ch'in conquest imposed completed a natural process already under 
way. By formally abolishing the old states and ordering mass mi­
grations, Ch'in undermined both local patriotism and the basis for 
the old aristocratic system. It separated political from economic 
power whereas feudalism had conjoined them. Private property in 
land and capital were now clearly distinguished from public admin­
istration. Regional impediments to the road, waterway and monetary 
systems were removed. Gold was established as the standard of value 
and round bronze cash was settled on as the standard ordinary cur­
rency.
Although its changes proved to be irreversible over the long 
run, over the short run Ch'in placed itself in the position of 
enemy of its own people. Aside from the enormous casualties of the 
wars of unification and then the wars on the frontiers, there were 
many lives lost in the great building projects of the new dynasty. 
Taxes rose precipitously to pay for these projects and to support 
the large number of government servants who were not directly en­
gaged in production. Ssu-ma Ch'ien estimated that half the popula­
tion was ready for rebellion by the last years of Ch'in. Hence 
even the uninf1uentia1 commoner Ch'en She was able to set off a 
local rebellion which quickly engulfed the entire empire.
The Unification and Extent of the Ch'in-Han Economic Realm
In size Ch'in was midway between Shang-Chou and Sui-Ch'ing 
China. Its 40 chun and 800 hsien were the local and regional 
economic centers. Han was of comparable size, but its administra­
tive units were more various to accommodate the quasi-feudal res­
toration which accompanied Western Han, and they were also more 
numerous at the most local level.
Thirty of Ch'in's forty chUn were conquered from its rivals. 
Han's boundaries extended past Tunhuang to the northwest and into 
northern Korea in the northeast. The forcing of the Hsiungnu out 
of the northwest in Wu-ti's time was expensive in both blood and
■>
^9
treasure and had to be repeated with varying degrees of success 
several times during the next few centuries. The southern branch 
of the Hsiungnu was eventually assimilated. Sinkiang was held dur­
ing the latter part of Western Han but lost during Eastern Han.
The Policy of Emphasizing Agriculture After Han's Unification
A number of writers all through Western Han advocated concen­
tration on agriculture. Farming had been disrupted during Ch'in's 
unification wars and the disorder which accompanied its fall. Some 
Western Han writers advocated the forcible return of vagabonds to 
the land. Some called for more indirect measures, such as accept­
ing grain as payment for government grants of perquisites to the 
rich and as fines to avoid punishments. This would allow the gov­
ernment to reduce the land tax in kind, leaving more grain in the 
hands of the farmers.
Early Western Han saw many imperial exhortations to encourage 
agriculture, and special officials were appointed in each prefec­
ture for this purpose. For a time taxes were reduced to 1/15 and 
later to 1/30 of the crop. Population growth was encouraged by 
calling for earlier marriages and fining spinsters thirty years or 
older. Rural security was encouraged by urging people to sell 
weapons and buy oxen. Five years of free rent on government land 
was offered to those without land, with the option of then return­
ing to their native place without penalty.
A number of new types of specialized iron tools came into gen­
eral use with government encouragement. Notable among them was the 
ox-drawn plow which greatly increased productivity but also render­
ed agriculture vulnerable to plagues affecting cattle. Poor famil­
ies and regions were still dependent on hand-drawn plows.
New planting methods came into use. One was planting in 
straight lines in the depressions between furrows and pushing the 
furrows into the depressions as the plants grew so as to reenforce 
their roots against wind and drought. Another was planting in
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regularly spaced square depressions so as to facilitate irrigation. 
The latter technique appeared in Eastern Han.
Several great irrigation canals were built under state aus­
pices, including one near the capital over 300 j_i_ long which took 
several tens of thousands of men three years to build. The amount 
of irrigated land and hence productivity increased significantly.
In addition to measures to encourage population growth in gen­
eral, Han moved large numbers of people, especially workmen and 
rich merchants to the capital so as to build up its population base 
for defense purposes. In addition, criminals and paupers were 
transported to the frontiers to help guard against barbarian incur­
sions. But periods like Wu-ti's thirty years of war drastically 
reduced the population, as did Wang Mang's usurpation. Eastern 
Han's population never qu<>)te rose to the level of Western Han.
After Wu-tl's time, the proportion of land which fell into the 
hands of rich men and officials greatly and steadily increased and 
so did the number of poor landless peasants. Through grants of 
public and uncultivated land as well as by encouraging migration 
the government tried to alleviate this problem but without signif­
icant success. Scholars like Tung Chung-shu advocated limiting 
private estates and the number of their tenants and dependents, 
but the disapproval of estate owners was too great for such poli­
cies to be carried out. Wang Mang's attempt to restore a pure 
well-field system ended in disaster. Some later scholars, ad­
mitting the impracticality of the well-field system, called for 
restricting right over land to usufruct, abolishing the right to 
buy and sell land. During Eastern Han the garrison fields system 
was extensively used within the country as well as on the fron­
tiers, partly to curb rebellion and partly as a system of rural 
relief.
Farmers incurred short-term loans in seed, implements, oxen, 
foodstuffs and money from the state. The latter engaged in coun­
tercyclical trade, but less (so said the critical Confucians) to
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stabilize prices than to assure adequate supplies for its frontier 
outposts, thereby reducing supplies for the interior of the country. 
Hence countercyclical trade was abolished soon after its introduc­
tion in the first century B.C. Some local officials illegally lent 
government funds at interest. Long-term loans were more indirect, 
usually involving the grant of public lands to the impoverished 
with a term of tax exemption. Grants of forest and marsh lands to 
villages were also made to encourage a wider range of crafts.
Han Science, Technology and Management of Manufacturing
Mathematics flourished. The use of fractions was understood. 
More exact values of £_i_ were calculated. Earlier works on mathe­
matics were collated, and several new ones embodying some new meth­
ods of calculation were composed. Chang Heng invented a device 
which could detect the presence and direction of earthquakes. He 
is also said to have invented a mechanical bird which could fly.
But the society of that period gave no particular encouragement to 
inventors. A hand-operated waterwheel for irrigation was invented. 
Doctors practiced surgery using wine as an anaesthetic. Damask 
silk and paper were invented. Wall and palace building was done 
on a great scale, beginning with Ch'in and continued by Han. Im­
perial tombs were so large and so richly furnished that construc­
tion of an emperor's tomb had to begin upon his ascent to the 
throne. Decorated and inscribed tiles and bricks were extensively 
used. True porcelain probably appeared by Han, based on techniques 
which had been evolving since \hang, now supplemented by glassmak­
ing techniques for adding the glaze which probably came from West 
Asia. The word for porcelain did not, however, appear until Wei 
and Chin times.
Industry was not as well developed during Han as in late War­
ring States times. This was especially true of the salt and iron 
industries which became state monopolies in Wu-ti's time. Dynastic 
precedent limited the land tax. Hence military expenses to fight
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the Hsiungnu could only be raised through the profits from these 
monopolies. Adminstrative abuses limited the state's profit and 
jacked up prices, but these abuses do not prove the principle of 
state monopoly was wrong. The state also maintained large estab­
lishments of artisans in both the capital and provinces to supply 
the palace with luxury goods. For a time the state even maintained 
a monopoly over the manufacture and sale of wine but eventually 
settled for a sales tax instead.
Han Commerce and Money
Commerce soon recovered from the bad effects of the decade of 
civil war which followed Ch'in's fall. Han unity opened a national 
market. Salt and iron dealers became as wealthy as the nobility 
and, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, grievously exploited the people, 
in part through manipulation of currency which was privately coined 
without state control. Private trade reached its peak in Wu-ti's 
time and then inexorably declined as Wu-ti conscripted merchants 
and their capital into service of his military campaigns rather 
than let the merchants make great profits out of such activities 
as was earlier done. Wu-ti's successors favored agriculture over 
commerce, as did Wang Mang and his Eastern Han successors. Mer­
chants were now compared to robbers and were blamed for rural pov­
erty, though in fact they were not powerful enough to cause such 
mischief. One writer went so far as to advocate the abolition of 
money. Western Han's overt repression of merchants was less ef­
fective in limiting commercial growth than the pervasive contempt 
of Eastern Han which became the norm thereafter and had much to do 
with China's eventual failure to continue to progress economically 
into the industrial age.
Sang Hung-yang, a high fiscal official of Wu-ti's court, was 
responsible for the state monopolies in salt, iron, and alcoholic 
beverages, and a scheme for a centrally administered wholesaling 
operation which bought and sold countercyclically. It replaced
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the former merchant-dominated system for forwarding tribute to the 
capital. But the state's needs for funds and collusion between 
officials and merchants sabotaged the system's countercyclical aims 
and hence obliged most of the people to sell cheap and buy dear.
In the famous debate on salt and iron in 8l B.C. Sang argued 
that frontier defense against the Hsiungnu required the revenues 
from these monopolies. Internally, the monopoly system supported 
such aids to agriculture as hydraulic improvements. It also made 
possible necessary imports. The resulting increase in commerce 
made all goods more generally available and hence raised the level 
of life of farmers as well. Sang's Confucian opponents in the de­
bate argued that his policies actually undermined agriculture, the 
fundamental occupation, which ought to be directly supported. Mer­
chants can only profit by buying cheap and selling dear. This 
means, the Confucians argued, that the people must sell cheap and 
buy dear. Hence the merchants' interest runs counter to that of 
the people. The state monopolies obliged the state to adopt the 
merchants' methods and hence exploit the people. Indeed, they 
argued, private merchants would still profit excessively as govern­
ment purchases would tend to drive up prices. They also opposed 
government controlled coinage as more harmful to the masses than 
free private coinage. Buying off the Hsiungnu would be cheaper 
and less harmful to the domestic economy than expensive attempts 
to conquer them. The virtues of a true king, they concluded, would 
ultimately evoke a virtuous response even from barbarians. Con­
versely, if the state seeks profit so will the people who will be 
drawn into nonfundamental activities.
And yet Sang's policies must be judged a success. They sup­
ported the frontier wars and made possible domestic relief. Wang 
An-shih approved of them and so did Sun Yat-sen. Unfortunately, 
when Wu-ti died. Sang lost his chief protection. The opposition 
of the Confucians and his own family's speculations brought about 
his execution and that of his family.
Commerce took place in political centers, centers of produc­
tion, communications junctions, and foreign trade centers. Emperors 
encouraged the natural tendency for men of wealth to settle in the 
capital, Ch'angan, lest they get into mischief in the provinces. 
Ch'angan lost its earlier commercial predominance when the capital 
was moved to Loyang. Ch'engtu was Szechwan's commercial center and 
an important foreign trade entrepot. An official of Wu-ti‘s reign 
said that his greatest regret was not ever having seen Ch'engtu, 
ample testimoney to that city's great development. Its merchants 
lived and were buried like aristocrats. Lintzu in Shantung was 
noted for its wealthy salt manufacturing houses. Its population 
was over 300,000 even in Warring States times. Loyang was a great 
communications junction even before it became Eastern Han's capital.
When Chang Ch'ien visited Ta Hsia in West Asia he found Chin­
ese goods already present there, but the policies of Wu-ti and his 
successors greatly increased China's foreign trade in the course of 
the many wars against the Hsiungnu. New plants, like the grape, 
came from Central Asia. China was in indirect touch with Rome 
through Persian merchants. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus sent a mis­
sion to China via Annam and attacked Persia in an attempt to open 
direct links to China. There was also trade with India, Korea and 
Japan.
Han nominal feudalism (su feng) gave the revenue of a terri­
tory to its nominal ruler but political power to a centrally ap­
pointed official. Because such rulers were more interested in 
profit than wholesome government, they allowed merchants to become 
powerful enough to make high profits from trade within these fiefs 
and by charging high interest to poor farmers within them. Up un­
til Wu-tl's reign Han permitted free private coinage in the fiefs 
which was dominated by merchants and officials. Wu-ti banned such 
coinage, though it continued illegally for some time.
Ch'in's dual monetary system (gold and bronze) was modified
by early Han to allow free coinage because the excessive weight of
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Ch'in money proved inconvenient. But the new coins were too various 
and usually too light to maintain their face value. Initial govern­
ment attempts to replace these coins with standard government issue 
were not successful. Finally, after experiments with coins of vari­
ous weights of metal, Wu-ti managed to issue a coin of sufficient 
value and convenience to stay in circulation and was able to ban 
local coinage and collect and melt down all unofficial coins. Aside 
from a period of monetary confusion during Wang Mang's usurpation, 
this coin remained standard all through the Han.
Han Communications
Wen-ti had abolished the requirement for travelers to show 
passes at boundaries, thereby freeing communications on the network 
of official roads which had been begun in Ch'in times. There were 
guard stations on these roads every ten 1i, each with a five-man 
garrison. In all there were 29,635 such stations by the end of 
Western Han. Rest houses with spare horses were placed every thirty 
1i♦ Private parties could use these facilities by payment of a 
fee.
The Yangtze was navigable downstream from Szechwan east, and 
from its middle sections east easily navigable in both directions. 
There were transport canals in the lower Yangtze region and others 
connecting Ch'angan with the Yellow River. By Wu-ti's time ship­
ping was using the Gulf of Chihli to Korea and the northern fron­
tier. The coast route from Chekiang to Fukien was also in use.
Overland, indirect communication with Rome was possible, and 
direct links with Japan and with India via Southeast Asia were 
opened. Wu-ti had fleets of tower boats in the northeast and off 
the coast of Chekiang. He annexed the areas of modern Canton and 
Hanoi as trading outposts, and Chinese were trading as far as 
Madras in India, though apparently not in Chinese vessels. The 
throne closely supervised this trade through eunuch overseers. 
Traders came from as far away as the Red Sea and by late Eastern
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Han an envoy from the Roman empire came to Loyang. Contact with 
Japan brought that country out of the Stone Age by Eastern Han 
times, and migration of Chinese from Korea in the Three Kingdoms 
period gave the Japanese a genetic connection with the Chinese race.
The Han Tax System
There were four kinds of tax: land, artisan-merchant, capita­
tion, and miscellaneous. Kao-tsu reduced the land tax to 1/15, but 
this was an idle gesture as the central government was not yet pow­
erful enough to get local authorities to forward much of the tax 
they collected. Hui-ti reduced it to 1/30, at which level it re­
mained for the rest of the dynasty, except for a short time at the 
beginning of Eastern Han.
All men from age fifteen to fifty-six were liable to pay the 
capitation tax in cash. Some rulers reduced or waived it, but 
others increased it from its standard rate of 120 cash. Hui-ti 
ordered merchants and slaves to pay at double the normal rate.
Wang Mang put a head tax of 3,600 cash on slaves. Originally males 
from age seven to fourteen were to pay twenty cash which Wu-ti in­
creased to twenty-three. In addition there was a tax in lieu of 
labor and military service of 300 cash paid by males from the age 
of twenty (later twenty-three) to fifty-six.
Prior to Ch‘in-Han times commerce was insufficiently developed 
to require a very complex tax structure. During Han commerce was 
heavily taxed, particularly the salt and iron trades but also wine, 
commercial carts and boats, and commercial capital. Han did not 
lower the high Ch'in tax rates. Wu-ti placed the salt and iron 
trades under state management where they intermittently remained 
thereafter. For a short time Wu-ti collected twenty cash as tax 
for each 1,000-cash string issued by government in payment for 
goods so as to put some of the tax load onto profiteering mer­
chants, but this proved too difficult to collect. There is little 
evidence on the short-lived liquor tax. Taxes were also levied on
market stalls and on yoods crossing local government boundaries, 
the latter designed to pay the maintenance of border guards.
Miscellaneous taxes were of little importance. The tax on 
capital was 120 cash per 10,000 cash of capital. Wang Mang in­
creased it to 10^. There was also a tax of twenty cash per thou­
sand on the value of livestock, a tax on money lent at interest, 
one on fish caught, and one on official property lent to the people.
Contrast of the Good and Bad Aspects of the People's Livelihood 
in Han Society
The Ch'in oppression was followed by a decade of chaotic civil 
war which disrupted agriculture and the crafts and reduced city 
populations by 70^. After Liu Pang won out, he proclaimed a gen­
eral amnesty and encouraged refugees to return to their homes by 
urging local officials to treat them leniently. Hence by Wen-ti's 
reign, Han's golden age had begun, aided by the court's frugality. 
Officials practiced magnanimity.
Abundant harvests kept grain 
prices low and life in the village 
peaceful. This early Han pros­
perity continued up to Wu-ti's 
ascent to the throne, a period of 
some seventy years. The eighty 
years after Kuang-wu's restora­
tion of the dynasty, though good, 
were not as perfect as the earlier 
era of prosperity. Hence of Han's 
AOO years, only seventy can be 
considered truly prosperous.
Wu-ti had to fight the 
Hsiungnu for thirty years. East­
ern Han was never free of wars
against the Hsiungnu, Hsien-pi, , . /...
Fig. 6 Han Kuang-wu (Ming
or the Yi rebels in the Southwest. illustration)
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The nomadic Hsiungnu had inherent military advantages over the ag­
ricultural Chinese. Hsiungnu raids devastated agriculture, requir­
ing expensive relief operations and expensive support for defense 
armies sent to the north. In some parts of North China, where draft 
animals and horses had been plentiful, horses were now conscripted 
and fields left to waste as the population declined. Eastern Han 
saw barbarians settle in Chihli and Shansi. An Eastern Han writer 
describes harvesting being carried out by women and girls, the 
horses and men all having gone west to fight the barbarians.
The subtropical climate and difficult terrain of the South 
were alone sufficient to cause high casualties among the unacclima- 
tlzed northern troops. Men died of poisonous plants and insects 
before they ever saw the enemy. Ssu-ma Ch'ien judged that all the 
taxes of Szechwan were insufficient to finance a successful cam­
paign against the Southwestern Yi. But such sacrifices were neces­
sary to keep these and the northern barbarians from overwhelming 
Chinese culture. They made possible sinification of the South and 
maintenance of contact with Central Asia, Korea and Japan.
Wu-ti's desperate attempts to raise revenues for these foreign 
wars encouraged official corruption. By Eastern Han official 
positions were as a matter of course being sold to raise money. 
Unscrupulous rich men bought offices as a way to make still more 
money. In the process they diverted money and talent from legiti­
mate commerce, thereby helping delay China's evolution of an in­
dustrial economy. This noxious custom began under Wu-ti as did 
the practice of allowing the well-off to buy absolution from crimes 
by contributing grain to the state. These abuses greatly under­
mined public morality. By late Eastern Han office buying had be­
come so ubiquitous that even able men who had demonstrated their 
talents had to buy their positions. Many of the best men left 
public life or committed suicide. A contemporary aphorism went: 
"Straight as a sage, die in a ditch; crooked as a hook, enfeoffed 
as a duke." The gap between rich and poor grew wider and more
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obvious. We know that such a society must be on the brink of revo­
lution.
From Wu-ti's time on luxury grew ever more conspicuous from 
the Court on down. If the emperor kept a thousand women in his 
harem, an aristocrat would keep several hundred and a rich commoner 
several dozen. By Eastern Han moralists were complaining about 
there being 5,000 to 6,000 women in the imperial harem and the bur­
den they placed on taxpayers. One Eastern Han ruler placed a surtax 
of ten cash on each mou of land to finance palace building. Imper­
ial tombs required tens of thousands of laborers, used up much 
valuable agricultural land, and took years to build. Rich merchants 
lived and died with a scale of expenditure commensurate with that 
of the great aristocrats.
For commoners, the time of peace and plenty ended with Wu-ti's 
thirty years of war and the accompanying rise in taxes, conscrip­
tion and exploitation by the great merchants. The pressure of 
foreign wars let up for a time under Wu-ti's immediate successors, 
but before long the consequences of domestic corruption were impov­
erishing the masses as much as before. Within a century after 
Eastern Han's inauguration famine and banditry were rife.
The official Han histories abound with references to slaves of 
various types. Government slaves were usually criminals or war 
prisoners or palace eunuchs and servants. They could have their 
freedom restored by the state. Private slaves were usually sold 
into bondage during hard times and worked as servants for rich 
households. They usual ly remained servile. The sources allude to 
tens of thousands of slaves in Court service and great families 
holding hundreds or even thousands of servile retainers. Since 
most did not take part in production, the loss to the people's 
livelihood was significant.
"it is nevertheless likely that only a small proportion of 
the total Han population was of servile status (EHK).
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The Economic Disaster of Wang Hang's Hsin Dynasty
The ideological and political ferment which led to Wang Hang's 
usurpation had its roots in the increasingly unsatisfactory econ­
omic situation since Wu-ti's time even though the outward forms 
this ferment took in Wang's hands were expressed in terms of yin- 
yang and five-elements superstition. Born in kS B.C. the nephew of 
an empress, Wang and his family dominated the court during the reigi 
of his cousin. Emperor Ch'eng, and he was brought up in the palace 
by his aunt. He stood out as a scholarly and modest exception to 
his family's otherwise licentious behavior. In 8 B.C. he became 
head of his family and the dominant power at Court. From 9 to 23 
A.D. he ruled as emperor of his own Hsin dynasty. Pretending to 
rule as a sage in imitation of Shun, Yu and the Duke of Chou, his 
power actually rested on the women of his family, and he was pre­
pared to use bad means to achieve his ostensibly noble ends. His 
superstitious practices eventually alienated the Court, and he was 
without effective support when the Liu clan challenged him militai 
ily. He was particularly condemned for his lack of a constant 
policy. He not only frequently changed officials and their titles 
but also the money system, impoverishing thereby the merchants and 
artisans. He was also accused of excessive taxation and encourag­
ing official corruption as well as of engaging in ruinous and un­
successful foreign wars.
Wang's military adventures flowed from his egomaniacal refusal 
to acknowledge that any border people could remain outside his 
sovereignty. He stirred up the enmity of the Hsiungnu after they 
had been quiescent for more than a generation and had allowed 
peace to return to the northern frontiers. His ten years of war 
in the north and his campaigns against the southwestern barbarians 
were both unsuccessful and economically ruinous.
Wang's monetary policy was the most conspicuous example of 
his economically disastrous policies. His frequent changes in the 
value and style of the currency were designed to fit his own
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abstruse theories and not 
the actual needs of the 
people. Hence despite 
strict punishments, his 
coins did not circulate 
and were replaced in prac­
tice with illegal private 
coinage. His twenty-eight 
different denominations 
of money eventually evoked 
contempt, the more so as 
his attempts to coerce 
their use were impossible 
to enforce.
Wang's land reform 
went well beyond what had 
been called for by earli­
er reformers, a simple
Fig. 7 Money during Wang Mang's reign
limitation of the size of private holdings, and by fiat he nation­
alized all land with the aim of restoring the ancient well-field 
system. Private sale of land was forbidden. No family with eight 
or fewer men could hold more than 900 mou. Surplus land along 
with government land would be distributed so that each family (one 
man and one woman) would get 100 mou. Slaves, relabeled "private 
dependents," (ssu shu) could no longer be bought and sold. Vio­
lators of these edicts were to be exiled to the farthest frontiers. 
But violations were numerous from the first. His critics objected 
that private landownership was now too deeply established to be 
overturned even by a Yao or Shun. Within three years Wang was 
obliged to back down.
Wang also imposed excise taxes on salt, iron goods, liquor 
and a variety of other goods. For grain lent to the people, 3% 
per month interest was to be charged. Wang's aim to displace
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private profiteers was admirable, but he failed because he and his 
local officials had to rely on these very profiteers to administer 
the policy. Wang's government and he himself were also covetous.
He accumulated enormous amounts of gold in his treasury. But be­
cause his administration was too disorganized to pay salaries regu­
larly, officials were tempted to practice corruption. Wang's in­
ability to enforce his harsh punishments only brought his whole 
regime into discredit.
f
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Section VI
THE AGE OF TROUBLES: LATE HAN, WEI, CHIN, SOUTHERN AND 
NORTHERN DYNASTIES
Out!ine
This period of over three centuries was largely one of dis­
order and disunity. Agriculture and commerce suffered. Landlordism 
increased and became still more unjust. In the southern dynasties, 
the politically powerful great landed families dominated commerce 
and manufacture as well as agriculture. The barbarian invasions of 
the north threw that region's economy into disorder, left many agri­
cultural areas desolate and ultimately evoked the Hsienpi's re­
sponse of instituting the equal-fields system.
The Late Han Military Disorders and Socio-economic Vicissitudes 
Refugees fleeing the barbarian attacks in the north were 
caught up in the consequences of the Yellow Turban revolt and the 
various local uprisings linked to it. Communications were blocked 
and agricultural areas devastated. The political battles in the 
capital involving the eunuchs and then Tung Cho's usurpation dev­
astated the entire region surrounding Loyang. To cope with local 
disorder, the great landed families organized private armies and 
the empire was divided into warlord satrapies, with all loyalty to 
the central authority soon dissipated. Even nominally loyalist 
local armies were privatized in the course of these local wars. IT #
Enormous numbers of refugees fled the Yellow and Huai River ...
valleys into the lower Yangtze, Szechwan and southeastern Man­
churia. Many came as dependents, virtual serfs, of great land­
lords. Others went into hitherto unsettled frontier areas and 
remained out of the control of the southern dynasties for a
>4.
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considerable time. In 157 A.D. the population was 56,500,000. By 
280 it was only 16,000,000, though this did not include refugees, 
bandits, local armies and others. Registered agricultural land had 
been reduced to one-fourth of the peak Han level. Whole regions in 
the Huai valley were totally depopulated. The destruction and 
emptying of cities, cutting of roads, and Tung Cho's unsuccessful 
recoinage all helped paralyze trade and manufacture. Soldiers in 
the local armies were recruited from among ex-bandits, barbarians 
and ordinary commoners. They became professionals, hereditarily 
limited to the military life and hence unavailable for productive 
labor or taxation. The number of those of servile status grew 
enormously, and they were now used largely for agricultural work. 
This continued to be the case until the T'ang.
The Three Kingdoms' Economy
The late Han famines had driven up the price of grain. Hence 
each of the three kingdoms which succeeded Han placed great empha­
sis on economic policy as the base for securing their rule. In 
the north, Ts'ao Ts'ao successfully used the military colony sys­
tem. Commoners either volunteered or were conscripted to work 
public fields under the supervision of afmy officers. The chief 
agricultural official in each locality reported directly to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, by-passing the local officials. The 
numerous refugees of the north were easily recruited for these 
military colonies. Government funds were used to purchase draft 
animals and finance irrigation works. The soldiers used in these 
military colonies gradually merged with the civilians and good 
order and a slowly increasing population resulted.
Shu-Han and Wu lacked this system. Shu-Han was sufficiently 
prosperous and its government received enough revenues from the 
salt and iron trades, so that it did not require the military 
colony system. Wu constituted a natural economic unit. Politic­
ally it was dominated by a few great landowning clans at whose
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sufferance the Sun clan ruled. Hence its government lacked the 
power to institute military colonies.
The lines of commerce between the three states remained open 
as each lacked products the others could provide. Shu traded across 
its southwestern boundaries, and its silk reached as far as the 
Roman empire. Though Wei's commerce was the least extensive of the 
three it did trade with the Hsienpi and the Japanese. Wu had an 
extensive domestic and foreign trade. On at least one occasion a 
Roman merchant came to its shores. There were complaints that lux­
ury goods were so numerous in Wu as to interfere with the produc­
tion of necessities. Wu's fleet was large and had a greater variety 
of vessels than Han. Unable to match Wei's land power to the north, 
Wu used its fleet to expand its commerce and territory to the south. 
Vietnam, a part of China since Han, contributed a variety of prod­
ucts. Sun Ch'Uan, Wu's ruler, probably learned much about South­
east Asia from the Roman merchant whose name was transliterated as 
Ch'in Lun, though unfortunately the emissary who accompanied the 
Roman back home died on the way. Nevertheless, after putting down 
a Vietnamese rebellion. Sun used Vietnam as a base for a ten-year­
long naval expedition which used vessels capable of holding one 
hundred men each and which may have reached as far as India. An 
expedition numbering 10,000 armored men was also sent to Taiwan 
in 230 A.D. This is the earliest mention of Taiwan in Chinese 
records. Another, but unsuccessful expedition was sent to the 
Phi 1ippines.
The severe decline in population in Wei made it impossible to 
collect the traditional 1/30 land tax, even though it was official 
policy to base the state's revenues on agriculture rather than 
commerce. The tendency was to shift from a field to a household 
tax, a system perfected by Western Chin. Wu also reduced the land 
tax so as to stimulate production. Like the other two, Shu also 
had a special class of officials to collect the tax in grain.
Metal money, debased by the several political authorities.
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no longer circulated effectively and was replaced by grain and 
cloth. Wei attempted to make grain and cloth official money, but 
when insiders monopolized these commodities, it was obliged to re­
issue Tung Cho's unsatisfactory coins. Shu issued a similar coin 
and Wu one twice as heavy which was recalled because it failed to 
gain circulation.
Liu Hui, who lived either in Wei or Chin times, calculated the 
circumference of a circle by inscribing ever more many-sided poly­
hedrons within a circle. He also developed a method for indirect 
measurement of height and distance. Liu-Sung's Tsu Chung-chih Im­
proved on Liu Hui's calculation of jpj_ as 3.1^» to arrive at the 
accurate figure of 3.1^15926, a degree of accuracy not matched in 
the West until Valentinus in 1563.
The Chin Economy
Chin relaxed Wei's legalist controls and allowed free rein to 
the great clans who monopolized land and servile labor and also 
much of the coinmerce, including the lucrative trade with Southeast 
Asia. Their wasteful style of life, epitomized by the "Pure Talk" 
group, established a pernicious model for gentlemanly behavior for 
the next millenium and more. The military colony system was taken 
out of military hands and placed under local officials who took 
over 70^ to 80^ of the crop and thereby became great landlords. 
Members of other influential and rich clans could use their politi­
cal power to control the scarce supply of labor and their wealth to 
buy up land the price of which had been driven down by the shortage 
of labor. Each commoner family was supposed to be allotted 100 mou 
of land in lifetime usufruct.
Field and household taxes were combined on the assumption that 
each household of equivalent size had the same amount of land. But 
as there is no evidence that Chin ever so distributed land, one may 
assume that this system was followed because it was easier to count 
households than to measure land. Though there is no hard evidence
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on the weight of taxation, Ma Tuan-1 in is likely right in judging 
such a system to be harder on taxpayers than a tax directly on the 
land. This system also encouraged keeping large households to­
gether and hence gave a tax advantage to great clan estates over 
small peasant holdings. Partly to compensate for this, Eastern 
Chin collected a higher tax, a larger proportion of which was placed 
directly on the land, but the great landowners could still dodge 
most of their tax load.
Though commerce revived with the Chin unification, it again 
slumped in the north with the renewed barbarian invasions. The 
south's commerce continued to thrive, and with Eastern Chin the 
political center moved to coincide with this new southern economic 
center. Trade relations were maintained with Central Asia and 
Japan. An anonymous late third-century ironic "Paean to the God of 
Money" (ch'ien shen 1un) whose product, cash, substitutes for all 
the moral virtues, testifies to the spirit of the times when the 
lust for wealth dominated even the court. Such selfishness was a 
natural reaction to the decades of chaos since late Han.
The Southern Dynasties' Economy
Eastern Chin's successors. Sung, Ch'i, Liang, and Ch'en, all 
had their capitals in Chienk'ang [Nanking]. Hen rather than land 
were taxed. Hence household registers were very important. Aris­
tocratic tax avoidance heavily burdened the masses. In one ten- 
year period during Ch'i, the number of those on the tax registers 
dropped by nearly half. Yellow (bamboo) registers were kept for 
those who had migrated from the north in Eastern Chin times. White 
(paper) registers were for southerners. Southern aristocrats 
eventually got themselves transferred to the yellow registers 
which carried more privileges, while commoners were shunted to the 
white ones. Ch'i and Liang continued to collect taxes according 
to the population. Ch'en (557-89) shows evidence of basing its 
taxes on land. This was the source of the tax system of T'ang.
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From Eastern Chin through Ch'en, transactions made by contract 
had to pay ^00 cash tax for each 10,000 cash worth of business done, 
with 300 paid by the seller and 100 by the buyer. Transactions 
without contract paid a tax. Sung had a tax of 10^ on fish, 
firewood, and other items which was very burdensome. Ch'en had a 
wine tax and Sung a liquor tax.
The imperial clans of these dynasties took a direct role in 
the commerce of the major cities. Their officials followed suit, 
as did the great landed clans in their nome areas. Yangchou, to 
become the chief economic center of T'ang times, was already very 
important. Canton was a rich entrepot for foreign trade. Szech­
wan's Yichou was also very prosperous. Trade with Southern and 
Western Asia was more extensive than in Han times and could regu­
larly use the southern sea route as could the continental South­
east Asian trade.
Pawnbroking, based on precedents going back to the Spring- 
Autumn era, appeared in Ch'i times. Ch'i used monasteries as its 
agents for refugee relief in times of famine and flood. Such re­
lief work also got monasteries involved in pawnbroking, though not 
initially for profit (as was the case in T'ang-Sung secularized 
pawnbroking) but rather as a service to poor commoners.
Sung issued the first dated coins but was unable to come up 
with a coin of appropriate weight to forestall private coinage.
For a time private coinage was legalized, but this only led to 
still more debased coins. In early Liang only a few cities used 
coins. Liang's official coinage started in 502, was unsuccessful 
and was replaced by a still more unsuccessful iron coinage in 523- 
By 556 the state legalized the circulation of old coins as well as 
its new bronze issue. Early Ch'en continued this practice, but 
its coins were rapidly melted to make private coins of lighter 
weight which circulated at the same face value. Commodity curren­
cy continued in use, especially in the south.
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The Northern Dynasties' Economy
Han Kuang-wu, the founder of Eastern Han, had invited the 
southern branch of the Hsiungnu within the frontiers. Their north­
ern branch was later driven west into Europe by the Hsienpi. Even­
tually the Southern Hsiungnu became the dominant force in the 
northern frontier provinces, though they were increasingly sini­
cized. During the fourth and fifth centuries they and four other 
barbarian groups succeeded one another in an irregular series of 
sixteen kingdoms holding various parts of the north. Their incur­
sions completely upset the agricultural land system, especially 
during the first generation of invasions. Great migrations to the 
south were set off. The period from 383 to ^39 was the time of 
darkest confusion. Not only was agriculture thrown into chaos, but 
all the major cities were destroyed and their merchant inhabitants 
fled south. Trade virtually disappeared from the north for over a 
century, as did the use of money. Money was not coined again until 
Northern Wei and did not come into general use until late in that 
dynasty.
The old Han clan structure was also destroyed and hence the 
social structure imposed by the Toba peoples of Northern Wei dif­
fered greatly from that of southern China.
The Buddhist church became a great social force, strong enough 
to avoid taxes, for the first time during the Sixteen Kingdoms era. 
Where Southern Liang had 2,846 temples, Wei and Northern Ch'i had 
40,000. The number of monks and temple fields grew inordinately. 
Northern temples became as privileged and profit seeking as south­
ern landed families. By the time of Northern Ch'i's Wen-ti, monks 
were said to be more numerous than laymen. Their numbers did not 
begin to lessen until Sui. Many monks took the tonsure as a way 
to avoid taxes. Aristocrats also used this device.
The equal-fields system was the basis for Northern Wei's 
ability to reunify the north, just as the military colonies enabled
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Ts'ao Ts'ao to so do earlier. The equal-fields system was the most 
successful version of the kind of reforms Confucians had been urg­
ing since late Han. The ultimate Confucian aim, however, had been 
to restore the ancient well-field system, whereas the Northern Wei 
system appears never to have had such pretensions. Unlike the 
other barbarians. Northern Wei had earlier established its own 
version of the military-colony or garrison-fields system. This 
later served as the base for the equal fields, first established in 
485. Every adult male, free or unfree, was to receive forty mou, 
every woman twenty mou. A family would also receive thirty mou for 
each ox it possessed, up to four oxen. These figures refer to 
prime quality land. Less desirable land would be distributed in 
greater amounts. Additional land was to be distributed for growing 
mulberry, hemp and for home sites, though less of the latter was to 
be given to unfree people. Only these latter types of land could 
be kept in perpetuity. The rest was to be returned to the state for 
redistribution at age seventy. Mulberry land was to be sold should 
it come to exceed a family's quota.
Ma Tuan-1 in believed this system was designed less to cut down 
the power of great landed families than to attract farmers to de­
populated areas. Northern Ch'i and Northern Chou used variants of 
the Wei system. Northern Ch'i limited the number of unfree persons 
each officially ranked aristocrat could enroll for land distribu­
tion. Northern Chou distributed more land per person and had no 
regulations for unfree persons.
During the I50 years from Northern Wei through Northern Chou, 
the equal-fields system revived agriculture and enabled the north­
ern dynasties to exceed the southern dynasties in wealth and power. 
Northern Wei continued to use the garrison-fields system as well. 
Aristocrats could maintain and even expand their holdings through 
grants of equal fields to their unfree dependents and animals. 
Officials also got land grants, and larger ones than commoners.
The pao-chia system of local government was linked to the equal-
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fields land arrangements.
Before the equal-fields system, taxes may have risen as high 
as 80!^ on occasion. Aristocrats avoided taxes which were assessed 
by household rather than by field. Under the equal-fields system 
taxes were also assessed by head, using the population registers of 
the pao-chia system, but these were difficult to keep accurately.
To meet government crises, taxes were often collected in advance. 
From Northern Chou on the trend was toward assessing the taxes on 
land. By late Northern Chou those without land were not to be 
taxed. The northern dynasties' market taxes were light. Salt and 
iron were intermittently left free of regulation during Wei but in 
the end made a significant contribution to state revenues.
Commerce not only failed to develop but actually regressed 
after Han. Many areas were reduced to barter as only the old Han 
coins remained to circulate. After 298, as north and south came 
into closer contact and life in the north became more secure, com­
merce revived. During Northern Wei Loyang revived as a great econ­
omic center, comparable to Chienk'ang in the south. A contemporary 
wrote of Loyang's marketplaces: "Whatever the central lands lack
is all brought from the western frontiers." This foreshadowed the 
great international trade of Sui and T'ang. Official coinage first 
began again in the north in 495 but had great difficulty competing 
with private coinage. Northern Chou fell before it could fully re­
place Northern Ch'i's coins with its own still not fully accepted 
coinage.
I►
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Section VI I
THE AGE OF REESTABLISHMENT: SUI, T'ANG, AND FIVE DYNASTIES
Outiine
The period from 58O to 755 witnessed the economic equivalent 
of a dynastic revival. The following period, from 756 to 96O, was 
one of renewed warfare and consequent reversion to economic depres­
sion. The preceding Six Dynasties era had been a period of regres­
sion, the localized economies of the great landed estates somewhat 
resembling the manorial economy of late antiquity in Europe.
The Sui-T'ang restoration was worthy to be called a golden 
age. Nevertheless, though quantitatively greater, it did not, 
economically, represent a qualitative advance over the centralized 
agrarian empire of Han. During Sui-T'ang times a reinvigorating 
mixture of Chinese with northern barbarian blood and customs oc­
curred. Sui's enormous expenditures on public works give evidence 
of the size of the treasury available to it. These public works 
made possible T'ang's economic revival.
The An Lu-shan rebellion was the economic watershed of T'ang. 
The period prior to this was one of prosperity and cultural ef­
florescence. After the rebellion, despite a new tax system, the 
former prosperity was never quite recovered. T'ang's tenure was 
extended for a century, but it was succeeded by the disorder of 
the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.
The Influence of Taxation Methods on the Chinese Economy
Sui did not last long enough to evolve a distinctive tax sys­
tem. T'ang, in its first generation under T'ai-tsung and again 
after 755» made notable changes.
T'ang reestablished the equal-fields system. Northern Wei's 
version had disintegrated by Sui times. Under the T'ang system 20% 
of the land allotments were permanent; the rest reverted to the al­
lotment pool at death. Taxes were assessed by head rather than 
directly on the land and paid in kind in grain, cloth, and labor 
(twenty days per year, twenty-two days in years with intercalary 
months), and the latter could be partially or totally commuted into 
an additional tax in cloth. If twenty-five days of service were 
required, other taxes were partially remitted; if thirty days, all 
other taxes were remitted. Service was never to exceed fifty days 
annually.
But this system presupposed the success of the equal-fields 
system. The elite undermined this system by amassing too much land 
through imperial grants to officials and favorites, buying up the 
alienable 20% of allotments, and having land allotted to aristo­
cratic dependents and, consequently, the tax system had eventually 
to be changed. The tax load on the fewer people who remained out­
side the tax-avoiding great manors became inordinately high even 
before An Lu-shan's rebellion added its burden to rural life.
Yang Yen, the creator of the double-tax method, came from an 
old scholarly family in Shensi. In addition to instituting the 
double tax, he kept revenues from going into the emperor's private 
treasury and clearly separated the imperial household expenditures 
from the state's fiscal administration. Talented but inhumane, he 
persecuted his rivals in office and was himself driven from office 
and then killed on his way to exile.
Under the double-tax system, instead of collecting taxes dur­
ing the eighth or ninth month, they were now to be collected in 
two installments, in the sixth and eleventh months, and local and 
capitation taxes were to be subsumed in these two installments. 
These taxes were not assessed on households because census regis­
ters had been too greatly disordered by the An Lu-shan rebellion, 
but rather in proportion to the amount of cultivated land in each
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district. Despite opposition from those used to the centuries-old 
former system, the new arrangement succeeded in returning fiscal 
power from the regions to the Court, though it required periodic 
modification, including a sharp rise in the quantity of commodities 
to be paid as taxes in kind so as to make up for a fall in commodi­
ty prices.
Lu Chih, the new system's leading critic, argued that the old 
system had much clearer criteria: possession of fields by a clear­
ly defined household having men of the proper age. Capital, the 
basis for the new system, was much harder to measure precisely be­
cause it could be more easily hidden. As the tax was calculated in 
cash but paid in kind, the actual rate could vary with prices and 
the honesty of officials at various levels. Lu did not advocate 
abolition of the reform but its modification, particularly the cal­
culation as well as the assessment of taxes in kind, not cash, and 
broader time limits for its collection.
Most later writers approved of the reform, Ma Tuan-1 in observ­
ing that it was the only alternative to reestablishment of the 
equal-fields system. According to the principles of fiscal theory, 
the double-tax system was simpler than the one it replaced, and it 
was progressive because the amount collected varied in proportion 
to the amount of capital an individual possessed. It also treated 
farmers and merchants equally, introduced the practice of taxation 
in cash, and introduced something akin to modern budgetary controls 
on the state.
Yang Yen was the first in our nation's history to call for a 
precise accounting of government income and outgo. He got Emperor 
Teh-tsung to return to the early T'ang practice of putting tax re­
ceipts in the Left Treasury, where they were accessible to bureau­
cratic audit, rather than in the imperial treasury which was not 
accessible to the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, Yang's idea of a 
budget was never put into actual practice. The old assessment 
rates were kept under the new tax system and were not regularly
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adjusted to accord with actual expenditures.
The Sui-T‘ang Land System and Agricultural Economy
Until late T'ang, a somewhat modified version of the Northern 
Dynasties' equal-fields system continued to be used, but the system 
was undermined by increasing dominance of the economy by the great 
families and the monasteries. Initially Sui had no difficulty ex­
tending the equal-fields system to the south as the registered pop­
ulation was at first small compared to the amount of state- 
controlled and formally ownerless land.
T'ang restored the equal-fields system in 62k. Its version 
differed from earlier systems in that minors, unfree persons and 
livestock were not granted land. The amount of land distributed 
was the same regardless of the size of the household, and a flat 
20^ could be retained as private property regardless of the use to 
which it was put. In 713 monks and unfree persons were included 
in the system. Men of rank were allowed to keep as private proper­
ty three to five hundred times more land than commoners. In addi­
tion, officials received large amounts of office land. By mid- 
T'ang over 14,000 official families qualified for such land and 
their number was still growing. Commercial, artisan families, and 
unfree households qualified for half the amount of land granted 
ordinary households. Unfree households appear to have been re­
garded as mere human capital, their lands actually belonging to 
their masters.
The system broke down well before the An Lu-shan rebellion, 
mainly because the long peace had allowed the population to grow 
beyond the limited amount of land available for redistribution.
The amount of allotment land was reduced still further by aristo­
cratic preemption. Various forms of the garrison-fields system 
were tried to restore a measure of equity in the use of those 
fields still nominally under public control, but these lands 
tended to be preempted by military officers by means analogous to
U
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those used by aristocratic civilians.
The T'ang manors resembled the Roman campagna or the estates 
created by the sixteenth-century English enclosure movement, except 
that management of the Chinese manors was more decentralized than 
the latter. The manorial system had originally developed out of 
the old feudal economy, and though a portion of the peasantry was 
now free, the great manors were so nearly self-sufficient entities 
that the system still resembled an offshoot of a feudal economy.
The structure of the system was exceedingly complex. Nominal­
ly there were public and private manors, but many of the former 
were actually the private property of the imperial family, though 
managed by public officials. Cultivators were either fuii slaves 
or tenants referred to by a number of labels incorporating the word 
“guest" (k'o). Absentee owners were represented by resident mana­
gers, references to whom are still found in Five Dynasties and Sung 
times.
Private estates were owned by officials, the relatives of the 
imperial family, and military men as well as by great aristocratic 
cians, ail of whom used their politically privileged positions to 
amass more and more land. Rents on these estates were as much as 
ten times the tax rate on non-manorial land. Private estates were 
in part worked by sieves who could be bought and sold with the 
land.
Buddhist and Taoist temple estates fell midway between the 
status of private and public manors. They enjoyed political priv­
ileges, like tax exemptions, and were used as tax-avoidance insti­
tutions by aristocrats and hence flourished despite periodic at­
tempts by the state to limit their growth. It was only after the 
persecution of the 8A0's that temple manors went into decline.
Like feudal serfs, tenants on private manors owed iabor ser­
vice as well as rent in kind to the lords of the manors. Local 
place names were often derived from the names of the owners of the
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local manor.
As rural prosperity returned during the early seventh century, 
cooperative societies appeared as early as Sui. The first of these 
was the Hsin-an Association in Anhui. There is no evidence that, 
as one theory holds, such organizations originated in T'ang-Sung 
times as a result of commercial and religious contact with India. 
Sui Wen-ti also set up Righteous Granaries to receive contributions 
of extra taxes from the rich to be used to relieve the poor during 
bad times. The system gradually lost its voluntary character and 
by Sung-Yuan times became just another head tax. Its level of ad­
ministration rose from the village to the prefecture and hence be­
came more remote from the people, more subject to corruption, and 
less likely to actually carry out relief when needed.
The great development of commerce during T'ang resulted in the 
spread of usury into the villages. Peasants could lose their lib­
erty as well as their land and moveable property to usurers. By 
manipulation of the rent of official lands, local officials also 
participated in this usury. From the late eighth-century attempts 
were made to anticipate bad years and lend grain from government 
granaries to the people. Attempts were also made to limit the in­
terest charged by private lenders, to remit debts after a given 
time and/or a given amount over the original principle had been 
paid, and to prohibit private lending.
Governrnent-run Ever Normal and Righteous Granaries were used 
to mitigate usury, a network of the former being set up early in 
the eighth century to attempt to keep grain prices level. The 
T'ang Righteous Granaries were financed solely by taxes and lent 
grain at interest rather than merely providing relief as was done 
during Sui. These two institutions were all but ruined by the 
An Lu-shan rebellion and never reached their potential because of 
corrupt administration.
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Sui-T'ang Communications
It was an improvement in communications, the construction of 
the Grand Canal, that made possible the new epoch of Sui and T'ang. 
This new epoch is analogous to sixteenth-century Europe's new era 
of commercial capitalism which was a consequence of the new commun­
ications links with America. In addition to international trade 
routes, the Sui-T'ang economy drew great strength from the opening 
of the Grand Canal. The canal changed the context of the south's 
economy.
In Han times still a region of much land and few people, the 
south had developed greatly during the Age of Disunion, and the 
Grand Canal further stimulated its commerce to make it the dominant 
commercial region by T'ang-Sung times. Running north to south, the 
canal linked the great natural waterways flowing from west to east.
The two Sui emperors connected the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, 
and early in the ninth century the canal was extended south to the 
Hangchou region. The canal made possible adequate supplies for 
Yang-ti's invasion of Korea.
The canal made possible use of the south's resources to support 
the capital in the northwest. The amount transported increased 
from 200,000 tan to over 7 million tan every three years by the 
eighth century.
Road building was also energetically pushed, notably an 
eighth-century road linking Canton with Yangchou to facilitate for­
eign trade. A network of eight major trunk roads fanned out from 
Ch'angan to each major region, with post stations at regular inter­
vals. As the roads were originally designed to transmit military 
news, these post stations were administered by the Board of War. 
These stations were equipped with spare horses, or boats along 
waterways, and could house and feed messengers and officials in 
transit. There were 1,639 stations, placed every thirty 1i.
Private travelers were not supposed to use the system. There were
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seven major routes leading across the frontiers to the northeast, 
northwest and southwest.
$ui-T'ang Commerce
Sui Yang-ti greatly valued the products imported along the land 
routes from Central and Northern Asia. Three major routes branched 
off from Tunhuang reaching by land and sea to the Mediterranean.
The diplomatic preliminaries to trade with Japan were initiated.
By the end of the seventh century T'ang had reduced much of 
Central Asia and Korea to tributary status. Traders and goods from 
these areas filled the great city markets. Unfortunately, at the 
local level, the anti-commercial practices of the great manors 
hindered the full commercialization of the countryside. Canton, 
filled with Arab and Persian vessels from the Persian Gulf, was the 
great foreign trade entrepot. Much of the trade with Japan origin­
ated in Yangchou and proceeded by way of the coast to Liaotung and 
Korea.
The south played a more important role than the north in for­
eign trade. In the south, Chinese silk was exchanged for precious 
stones, ivory, and other commodities; in the north tea was ex­
changed for animal products. Since the first century foreign ves­
sels had given up the coastal routes for direct runs across the 
open sea, taking advantage of the seasonal monsoons. Chinese 
vessels had been trading with the Persian Gulf at least since the 
fifth century and dominated the trade as far west as Ceylon. Chin­
ese settlers were beginning to appear in Southeast Asia.
Politics and economics mutually influence each other. Up 
until mid-T'ang a laissez-faire policy was followed; thereafter 
policy turned anti-commercia1 and economic development was hindered.
The early T'ang military victories helped secure commerce, 
particularly with Central Asia. Commercial law became more form­
alized, with penalties prescribed for not using standard measures 
and attempts to set up monopolies. Contracts were required for
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the sale of slaves and livestock. These laws, far more detailed 
than those of earlier periods, were retained in later eras.
T'ang entered a period of decline after the An Lu-shan rebel­
lion, with the central government losing much of its power to re­
gional warlords who often passed their power on to their children. 
Such local particularism hindered communications and hence commerce. 
The wealth of south China could no longer be funneled into the 
north.
The weakened central government resorted to confiscatory taxa­
tion of commercial capital. Merchants viewed the tax collectors as 
bandits and trade was stifled. Forced sales to palace officials at 
arbitrarily low prices ruined even small merchants and artisans in 
the capital. The limited excise taxes associated with Ever Normal 
Granary operations were replaced by excessive direct excise taxes 
after the rebellions ruined the old system.
The state supervised only the larger markets serving areas 
with 3,000 or more households, but many smaller markets at river 
fords and other natural trade junctions flourished. The structure 
of commerce grew more complex, with warehouses and shops now more 
formally organized under private auspices.
The major cities were the capitals, Ch'angan and Loyang, Pien- 
chou (K'aifeng) at the confluence of the Yellow River and Grand 
Canal, Yangchou at the confluence of the Yangtze and Grand Canal, 
and the great seaports Canton, Chiaochou, Ch'Uanchou and Mingchou.
As the capital, Ch'angan was the communications hub, and Sui 
Wen-ti restored to it the glories of Ch'in-Han times. Though 
virtually barbarized during mid-T'ang by the large number of for­
eign merchants residing there, the city recovered by late T'ang 
from the wounds of An Lu-shan's rebellion.
Loyang was rebuilt by Sui Yang-ti, using two million corvee 
laborers each month. He moved several tens of thousands of mer­
chants there from all over the empire. It was the secondary
82
capital in T'ang and Sung times.
Yangchou was the most flourishing city, the entrepot of the 
seacoast salt trade, the communications link between north China 
and Canton's foreign trade, and hence the residence of many foreign 
merchants. The city suffered much during the late T'ang troubles, 
and though it remained important during Sung it never recovered the 
primary position it held during T'ang. It was also an important 
manufacturing city, noted for its bronze, cloth, hats, wood imple­
ments and cane sugar, the latter product first imported from India 
in T'ai-tsung's time. In addition to being the chief junction be­
tween the Yangtze and Grand Canal, it was the temporary capital in 
Sui Yang-ti's time and was much celebrated for its beauty and 
thriving urban 1ife.
Canton was the main port for foreign trade. Its foreign res­
idents were more numerous than those of Yangchou. Over 100,000 
foreigners were said to have been killed there during the late 
T'ang disturbances which greatly affected foreign trade. Its com­
mercial wealth made it a magnet for grasping local officials.
Sui-T'ang Science and Technology
Sui had bureaus specializing in such sciences as astronomy 
and calculation of the calendar, and T'ang expanded them. Mathe­
matics was one of the six subjects taught in the T'ang National 
Academy. Mathematics reached its greatest degree of importance 
during T'ang. Definitive editions of the earlier mathematical 
classics were compiled under state auspices. A mathematics exam­
ination was instituted in Sui times and continued by T'ang.
From India came the concept of zero (indicated by a dot) to 
give place value to numbers, and the use of sand-boards to write 
out calculations. Scholarly pilgrims from Japan introduced Chin­
ese mathematics into their new schools. The long forms of Chinese 
numerals for use in commerce first appeared in Sui-T'ang times, 
not during Sung as was long believed.
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A water-powered armillary sphere was invented. It revolved 
once a day and indicated the passage of fractions of a day by 
mechanical wooden men who beat on drums and bells. This served the 
same function as later Western clockwork mechanisms.
In addition to the great fleet of canal barges used in the im­
perial progress along the Grand Canal, Sui technology was able to 
build a great five-storied warship capable of carrying 800 soldiers. 
The technique of carving words on boards was begun in Sui times for 
imperial orders, and this represented the beginning of printing 
technology which was applied directly to printing by late T'ang and 
Five Dynasties times. The great palaces built in Loyang were of a 
size and complexity unknown since antiquity.
The scale of operations of individual workshops was no greater 
than during Han. In the cities, workshops of the same trade were 
clumped together in particular districts known as hang, with the 
workshops often both making and selling their products. The name 
hang or t'ung-hang became a synonym for street. Ch'angan had 
twelve such hang. Within a hang each establishment had its master, 
with apprentices and hired laborers working under him. Each hang 
had a head who led its members in religious worship and was its 
representative before the government.
There were some large government and private business estab­
lishments engaged in trades like weaving, dyeing and wine making 
to meet imperial household needs. Mints and armories were also 
large-scale state enterprises. Some of their skilled workmen were 
conscripted for twenty-day annual terms from artisan families as 
their share of the labor service tax. Others were hired. Some of 
the less skilled workers were official dependents owing the state 
fixed periods of service during a portion of each year.
The center of silk production tended to shift from the Yellow 
River valley to the lower Yangtze during late T'ang as a conse­
quence of the disturbances in the north. Cotton, originally from
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Central Asia and South Asia, was becoming rather common. The tech­
nique of printing on cloth began during T'ang, and a variety of 
special weaving and dyeing techniques were practiced.
Porcelain manufacture developed greatly in both north and 
south China from its pre-T'ang roots. Printing, of which an ex­
ample from Tunhuang in 868 A.D. is still extant, was well developed 
in the two capitals, in Szechwan, Yangchou and Hangchou.
Sui-T'ang Money
Sui Wen-ti's initial recoinage was successful. The coins were 
of appropriate weight and honestly labeled. Systematic recovery of 
old and private coins was made at all excise tax stations. But bad 
regional coinages, Yang-ti's devalued coins and a renewed upsurge 
of private coining ruined the currency system by the end of the 
dynasty.
T'ang's recoinage in 621 was initially successful, but the 
dynasty was later plagued by competition from private coinage and, 
from the ninth century, by a coin shortage. Government edicts pro­
hibited coin exports from the country and from individual prefec­
tures. It was also ordered that one string equal 850 cash rather 
than the black market rate of 800. None of these measures allevi­
ated the ills of the monetary system.
“Flying money" was a system of mercantile notes of exchange 
which evolved to get around the inconvenience of sending direct 
cash payments over long distances and the prohibition against 
sending cash across even regional boundaries. Issued by large- 
scale private interests and government treasuries, this flying 
money was also known as “convenient exchange."
As these certificates gradually circulated more widely as a 
substitute for ready cash, hard money disappeared from circulation. 
When government edicts forbidding the use of this paper for money 
were ignored, the state determined to monopolize its issuance.
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The Economy During the Age of Disunion of the Five Dynasties
The land tax was increased and collected ruthlessly to meet 
the demands of military expenditures. Despite periodic attempts at 
reduction, taxes on salt and the raw materials for brewing wine 
were also kept high and the death penalty exacted for black market 
sales of more than a certain minimum of these items.
The political dislocations did not destroy trade opportunities. 
Overseas trade continued from places like Fukien. North-south 
trade within China was also maintained, with southern tea being 
sold in the north and used to finance southern military prepara­
tions. Hostilities, however, periodically blocked communications 
within China.
Four of the five dynasties of the north had their capital in 
Pienliang (K'aifeng), already a densely populated commercial cen­
ter, and its walls were extended outward to accommodate its com­
mercial growth. Its riverine communications with the east and 
south were also perfected.
Trade with northern barbarians like the Khitan and the Koreans 
flourished. There were formal horse markets on the former's 
borders and trade missions to Korea to barter cloth for bronze.
The Nine Classics were printed under government auspices dur­
ing the Latter T'ang. Porcelain came into wider use.
As during late T'ang, bad coins continued to circulate il­
licitly in the south. In other areas, T'ang's old official coin­
age still circulated, but private melting of these coins because 
of the value of their metal content reduced their quantity suf­
ficiently to hinder their circulation. Melting of coins
86
flourished despite government edicts forbidding the practice.
Society and People's Livelihood
Sui Wen-ti eased the burden of taxation on land, wine and salt, 
and labor service. Ma Tuan-1 in praises the frugality of his admin­
istration. Yang-ti completely reversed his father's policies. His 
Korean invasions, palace building, and construction of a great fleet 
of enormous canal boats to transport the court so burdened the 
nation that he was overthrown.
The casualty rate among his corvee laborers often approached 
50%, and the agriculture of whole districts was in consequence 
ruined for want of timely labor. Yang-ti alienated even his 
courtiers, who were mostly northerners with families and estates 
remaining in the north, when he moved the capital to Yangchou and 
abandoned the north to the numerous rebels who had sprung up.
Sui's fall was entirely due to Yang-ti's profligacy with the 
people's wealth.
T'ang T'ai-tsung's humane administration established the basis 
for the dynasty's prosperity, Hsuan-tsung' s reign up until the An 
Lu-shan rebellion was the most prosperous era of T'ang, looked 
back upon with nostalgia by both poets and historians. The poet 
Tu Fu described the K'ai-yiian era (713-^2) as one in which both 
public and private granaries were overflowing. There were networks 
of inns for the convenience of commercial travelers.
All this prosperity ended with An Lu-shan's rebellion and the 
succeeding nine years of related uprisings. Production dropped 
drastically and communications were blocked. The dominance of the 
manorial system increased and the ruin of the equal-fields inten­
sified, The registered population dropped from A9,000,000 to 
17,000,000. The state sold increasing numbers of ordination cer­
tificates for monks, gaining revenue over the short run but cut­
ting its tax base over the long run.
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Though after 780 the refcms of Liu Yen partially restored the 
state's finances, the earlier glories of T'ang were never fully re­
stored.
In the midst of a great drought in eastern China, an ex-salt 
seller named Huang Ch'ao raised a great rebellion in 875. It soon 
encompassed Shantung, Honan, Anhui and Hupei. Eventually Huang 
raided south to Fukien and Canton and then back up to the Ch'angsha 
area. Huang alternately fought and feigned negotiating his sur­
render. Failing to push north of the middle reaches of the Yangtze, 
Huang moved downstream to Hangchow. By 88O he had renewed his 
strength and struck north again across the Huai to Loyang and, a 
month later, to Ch'angan itself. There he proclaimed a new dynasty.
Huang had acquired a spurious reputation for humaneness, but 
once in the capital his bandits showed their true nature. They 
looted and filled the streets with corpses. The T'ang emperor had 
fled to Ch'engtu, but loyalist forces rallied, drove the discredit­
ed Huang from the capital, but then began looting themselves. This 
allowed Huang to successfully reoccupy the city and impose a re­
newed bloodbath on its inhabitants for initially welcoming the 
T'ang forces. By 883 Huang's own depredations had ruined his base 
for supply, and a loyalist force led by Li K'o-yung again drove 
him from the capital. Huang escaped into Honan while the loyal­
ists once again delayed pursuit to carry on looting, but by 885 he 
was finally run down after causing a decade of chaos and the death 
of some eight million persons. Accounts of Huang's conquest of 
Canton and murder of foreign merchants there even made their way 
into the Arab histories.
The life of the people continued to be bitter during the Five 
Dynasties. According to one contemporary story, it would not rain 
within a hundred JJ_ of the capital because even the rain feared 
taxes and would not approach so close to the city. Though no ac­
curate figures are available, the evidence indicates that the pop­
ulation continued to shrink as a consequence of the ongoing dis­
order .
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Section VIII
THE AGE OF RENEWAL: THE TWO SUNG DYNASTIES
Outiine
The period from 755 to the fall of Northern Han in 978 was one 
in which China was divided among numerous warlord states whose econ­
omies varied widely. The degree of economic development enjoyed by 
any area depended on the degree of peace and good order imposed by 
its government as well as on its previous level of development.
Hence Fukien, Canton, Szechwan, and the Ch'ien-t'ang region 
(that southern part of the lower Yangtze centering on Hangchou) re­
covered and prospered while Yangchou, which suffered repeated dis­
orders after Huang Ch'ao's rebellion, continued in a depressed 
state. Much of the Yellow River valley also quickly recovered from 
the late T'ang troubles. The southeastern states were particularly 
well insulated from the northern military disorders and their trade 
flourished.
Pienliang (K'aifeng) became the great entrepdt of north-south 
trade. For this reason the Sung founder was obliged to use it as 
his capital, as adequate supplies for the centrally controlled army 
he created to end the Five Dynasties' cycle of military usurpations 
could not be adequately accumulated at Loyang or Ch'angan.
Because of winter freezing, the main waterways were only open 
half the year, and the Sung state carefully organized the trans­
port system to compensate for this, sending salt from the north to 
the south on what would otherwise have been the empty barges which 
had been rushed north with the year's supply of southern grain. 
Chenchou replaced Yangchou as the southern entrepot of the canal 
network.
Northern Chou had melted down over a third of the Buddhist
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images, imported copper from Korea and forbidden the manufacture of 
copper implements so as to gain enough bronze for its coinage.
Silver was also in extensive use as money.
The rulers of several of the states preceding Sung were close­
ly connected with trade and the protection of trade. The townsmen 
of the Yangtze valley were demanding peace and unity even before 
Sung reunited the north and realized it needed the supplies of the 
south even to maintain itself in power in the north. Hence Sung 
was able to rapidly unify north and south.
Thereafter a monetary economy spread rapidly throughout the 
empire. Even the state's fiscal operations were soon monetized.
Both army and bureaucracy thenceforth were paid salaries directly 
by the central government. No longer, therefore, could locally 
supported armies serve as the privileged base for warlord power.
The pre-T'ang decentralized bureaucratic powers were replaced by a 
centralized fiscal, military and sovereign power and the bureaucracy 
was professionalized. All this was the consequence of the economy's 
monetization. Sung's centralization may be said to have been based 
on popular demand for reform and for progress on the basis of peace 
and good order.
The Current of Economic Thought of the Two Sung Dynasties and Wang 
An-shih
The heart of Wang An-shih's famous reforms was his aim to en­
rich state and people. The twelve items in his reform encompassed 
reform of the state structure, the state's taxation and social 
controls over society, the military and educational systems. To 
understand why more than half of these items involved economic and 
fiscal matters it is necessary to examine the background of the 
age.
Sung's founder had accepted a weaker position on the frontiers 
as the price for preserving central control over the armies and 
thereby preventing the sort of coup which had originally given
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the throne to him and his predecessors during the Five Dynasties.
If Khitan suzerainty over the Yen-Yun territories of the north 
had not been conceded, the dynasty might have had to flee south 
much earlier than the second quarter of the twelfth century.
Emperor Shen-tsung (r. 1068-86), who smarted under the humilia 
tion of paying tribute to the Khitan, viewed fiscal reform chiefly 
as a means of amassing military power to avenge this shame. The 
fiscal demands on the Sung state were large and rapidly growing.
By Ying-tsung's time (r. 1064-67) there were over 24,000 officials 
in the bureaucracy. Military expenses in the north ate up two- 
thirds of the budget which was chronically and drastically out of 
balance. The main reason for such chronic deficits was the in­
equality in the application of the land tax and the consequent re­
duction of the amount collected in taxes.
Edicts were unable to halt the trend toward concentration of 
land in the hands of the elite, its avoidance of taxes, and what 
some contemporaries described as the reduction of tenants to the 
status of slaves, subject to whipping and private corvee. Wang 
An-shih took it as his task to reform this desperate situation.
Born in 1021 into an official family in Kiangsi, at the age of 
nineteen Wang was orphaned and he, his mother and elder brother 
were impoverished. After his period of mourning, he passed his 
chin-shih examinations, entered local office and won the patronage 
of Ou-yang Hsiu. Thereafter Wang rose steadily in office, con­
tinuing to win the admiration and support of influential men like 
Ou-yang and Ssu-ma Kuang. By 1060 he was advocating better pay 
for minor local officials as the basis for reforming fiscal policy. 
Ying-tsung's short reign (1064-67) largely overlapped Wang's period 
of mourning for his mother.
The new emperor, Shen-tsung, called him to Court in 1068 and 
the next year, at age forty-nine, Wang became chief minister. He 
had the emperor's full support for the fundamental reforms he now
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proposed. Wang's reorganization of the central fiscal agencies, his 
equal tax and "green shoots" plans were begun that year.
By the following year massive opposition, led by such former 
supporters of Wang as Ssu-ma Kuang and Han Ch'i, had begun, but 
Wang forced these men into retirement and kept the now fearful em­
peror on his side to begin the pao-chia and voluntary labor service 
reforms. In 1071 he converted the Broad Grace Granary fields into 
capital for the Ever Normal Granaries and the following year re­
formed the examination system and the national university. The next 
year he instituted the market exchange reform, horse-breeding system 
and equal-fields tax reform, thereby completing the bulk of his re­
forms .
In 1074 Wang temporarily left office as drought intensified 
opposition to his reforms. But his proteges maintained the reforms 
and the next year he returned to power. Within another year, how­
ever, dispirited by the death of his son, Wang again left office af­
ter over seven years in power and at age fifty-six was not again 
to hold office.
Though in retirement, he retained the emperor's favor. Nevei— 
theless, Wang lived a simple life visiting monasteries, writing 
poetry and editing the San Ching (Three Classics). In IO86, an­
guished at the death of Shen-tsung and at Ssu-ma Kuang's abolition 
of the reforms, he took sick and died. It may be said that he 
never acted selfishly but rather for the public good, though he 
did harbor resentment of his opponents to the very end of his life. 
The nobility of his character and thought have always been vener­
ated by posterity.
His goals were twofold: first to enrich the state and
strengthen its armies, and second to encourage increased production. 
Each goal was to interact with the other. The base for all his 
reforms was a new office he set up directly under the premier's 
control to unify the hitherto separate three offices (revenue and
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population, budget, and salt and iron) which controlled fiscal pol­
icy. His aim was to make sure taxes were collected fairly, thereby 
removing state-imposed obstacles to popular prosperity.
Within fifteen months, however, this fiscal coordinating re­
sponsibility was returned to the secretariat (chung-shu-men-hsia, 
the chief political authority of the central government) because of 
the criticism of men like Han Ch'i. Nevertheless, in this short 
period it reduced waste by some k0%, something Ssu-ma Kuang had been 
unable to do when in power at the beginning of Shen-tsung's reign.
The market exchange law was designed to remove the abuses com­
mitted by the great shops established in the capital by rich mer­
chants and aristocratic officials. First established in K^ifeng 
and then in five other major cities, the market exchange offices 
organized merchants into hang or guilds through which alone govern­
ment purchases would be made. Interest rates on commercial loans , 
were to be limited. Though edicts had to be issued against exces­
sive interest charged under the system, the fact that the rich 
merchants opposed it indicates that it was of benefit to the poor 
ones.
Wang's equal contributions law was similar to the reforms of 
Han's Sang Hung-yang and T'ang's Yang Yen. It attempted to modify 
the requirement that regions send in the same tribute (i.e. tax in 
kind) whether the year was good or bad. It would do so by giving 
a sum of cash and grain to the transport officials to use as capi­
tal in buying and selling tribute goods within and among the six 
major regions. This would minimize transport costs and maximize 
government receipts of taxes in kind. This scheme was criticized 
for encouraging official corruption which merchants could take ad­
vantage of for profit, just as happened in Han Wu-ti's time when 
the state attempted to buy cheap and sell dear. But these were 
not criticisms of the law, rather of the men who enforced it.
The "green shoots" law was designed to lend cash to the
9^
peasants in the spring and collect it back with interest in the fall, 
using capital from the Ever Normal and Broad Grace granaries. Bor­
rowing was to be done by groups of ten households, with landlords 
as the guarantors for their tenants. No household was to be forced 
to borrow and limits were set to the amount each category of house­
hold could borrow. Urban households could borrow on analogous 
terms. Five years after the system was begun the number of of­
ficials supervising it in each circuit was increased from 200 to 
500 so as to provide sufficient supervision and to minimize official 
corruption. The system lasted sixteen years in all. It was de­
signed to end the usury which had always been the chief inhibitor 
of rural growth and prosperity.
Its critics argued that the interest rate charged amounted to 
k0% annually in practice if not in law, and that such easy loans 
constituted an unwarranted temptation to ignorant peasants to live 
beyond their means. Nevertheless, its early critics later called 
for its reinstitution, proof of this reform's essential merit.
The field survey and equal tax law attempted to alleviate a 
problem going back to the founding of the dynasty. Ou-yang Hsiu 
had asked for such a reform as far back as 10A2 and had actually 
carried it out in a few localities. The twelve years during which 
Wang and his successors carried out half of this land survey com­
pares favorably with the eighteen years taken for a land survey in 
Napoleonic France.
Sung, like the many dynasties before it, called on the people 
for a bewildering variety of labor service taxes. These were for 
both civilian and military tasks at the hsien and chou levels.
But the exemption of official, military and monk households en­
couraged abuses and great hardship for those households unable to 
obtain exemptions. The better-off households which were respon­
sible for such tasks were encouraged to split up or even turn to 
banditry when ruined by the expenses of carrying them out.
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Wang's Avoidance of Labor Service law divided households of 
property into five grades based on their wealth, and it imposed a 
tax proportioned to their wealth in lieu of labor service. Mon­
asteries and official families were not exempted from this tax.
Men were hired to carry out the services with the revenues generated 
by the tax. An additional surtax could be collected to anticipate 
flood or drought relief expenses. In the greater K'aifeng metro­
politan area, where the system was first tried, several thousand 
men were hired to substitute for the former labor service.
Critics objected that well-off non-gentry households did not 
benefit as much as the poorer non-gentry households by the indirect 
subsidy the latter obtained when official and monastic households 
were added to the tax rolls. It was also argued that the men hired 
were not as reliable as those formerly impressed into service, and 
that the tax tended to not be effectively collected in bad years 
whereas the old system had been enforceable even in bad years. In 
its favor, it may be argued that this was a progressive tax, capa­
ble of increasing in proportion to the growth of the economy.
Wang also appointed officials to spread knowledge of irriga­
tion and drainage techniques in each circuit. Because he rewarded 
these officials for concrete accomplishments, over 360,000 ch' ing 
of fields were newly irrigated during his administration.
A guild exemption tax was also instituted in lieu of compul­
sory contributions in kind to the Court by the various trades, 
thereby ending, it was hoped, extortion of kickbacks by palace 
servants. The tea and salt trades were not much affected by the 
reforms, having earlier been freed from government monopoly li- 
censing.
In general, Wang favored free trade. He increased the amount 
of coinage by more than threefold and ended the prohibition on 
manufacture of bronze implements and export of bronze cash. That 
these measures were opposed indicates the strength of reactionary 
forces.
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Though Wang was unable to accomplish all his aims, his unques­
tioned loyalty was reciprocated by Shen-tsung to the end. Though 
he was not able to much improve the lot of the people, the state's 
resources were increased and these new resources were used along 
the northern and southern frontiers more successfully than ever 
previously. That the reforms were basically in accord with the need 
of the times is evidenced by their partial restoration even by such 
opponents as Ssu-ma Kuang.
The reforms did run up against the interests of the great fam­
ilies. When Shen-tsung once observed that though the reforms dis­
pleased the elite, they were of use to the masses, it was pointed 
out to him that the elite were those used to govern the empire, not 
the masses. If before the reforms were instituted Wang had been 
able to train cadres to propagandize them among the masses, he 
would surely have been able to overcome the reactionaries. Never­
theless, his was a noble failure and his career a glorious page in 
our history.
Land Distribution and Agricultural Credit Policies
Farming techniques did not differ from those of earlier times, 
but credit and land measure methods did. The first two Sung em­
perors followed policies of tax abatement and agricultural relief 
and thereby successfully raised the level of agricultural produc­
tion.
Later emperors placed restrictions on the amount of land the 
elite could own, but these laws proved unenforceable. By mid- 
Northern Sung tax-free elite estates comprised 1Q% of all arable 
land. The situation in Southern Sung was comparable and worsened 
late in the dynasty. There were official and imperial manors in 
addition to privately held ones. In late Sung many official manors 
were sold to raise revenue for the state.
The agricultural population was divided into "master" and 
"guest" households, the former being landed cultivators with a
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measure of capital, the latter being landless and often of servile 
status. In 1021 there were 6,039.331 master households and 
2,638,346 guest households. By 1080 there were 10,109,542 master
and 4,734,144 guest households, showing the increased degree of land
• ^concentration in the hands of the rich and well-born.
The average household appears to have cultivated around 100 mou 
in mid-thirteenth century and to have shouldered a heavy tax burden. 
Guest households had to pay capitation taxes in addition to their 
rent, and though they avoided corvee to the state they often had to 
do various equivalent tasks for their landlords.
Wang An-shih‘s land survey was designed to measure all land, 
grading it into five degrees of fertility. Local residents were to 
check the records, copies of which would then be filed locally as 
the basis for levying taxes. Ts'ai Ching, Wang's early twelfth- 
century successor, claimed that these land records made it more 
difficult for large landowners and local officials to cheat the 
peasants in land sales and tax assessments. The obsolescence of 
these records by late Southern Sung contributed greatly to the de­
cay of agriculturethen and the consequent fall of the dynasty.
Official fields had been accumulated from time to time by con­
fiscation of the lands of disgraced officials. In 1263 lands in 
the lower Yangtze region held by private owners above the legal
Chou's figures, though they indicate an increase of (from 
43^ to 46^) in the percentage of guest households, may not neces­
sarily support the point he wishes to make. The total number of 
households in 1080 is so much greater than that of 1021 that it 
must to some considerable degree reflect better reporting in 1080, 
probabiy in part because of Wang An-shih's cadastral survey. Hence 
the figures for the two dates are likely not sufficiently commen­
surable to permit comparison of their component parts. Even for 
the latter date evasion of population registration must have been 
considerable. Cf. Ho Ping-ti, Studies in the Population of China, 
1368-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). pp. 264- 
65. which notes that in 1102 20,000,000 households were registered 
(a suspiciously large increase of more than five million over the 
figures for I080), and that even this figure must be corrected for 
"rampant" evasion of population registration. (EHK)
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limits were purchased to serve as public fields. Chia Ssu-tao has 
always been accused of corrupt practices in buying this land. The 
administration of the system does appear to have allowed confisca­
tion of smaller peasant holdings despite its original aim of reduc­
ing large estates. Hence though it aimed to increase state reven­
ues from the rents received and thereby bolster military prepared­
ness, its actual effect was to accelerate the dynasty's decay during 
the years just before the Mongol conquest.
The long-term bad effects of rural usury obliged the state to 
devise policies dealing with rural credit. Most of Sung's fiscal 
resources were based on taxation of commerce. Tax receipts from 
overseas trade increased drastically during the dynasty, especially 
during early Southern Sung.
In early Northern Sung there were complaints that only 20% to 
30^ of the arable land was being cultivated and that tax receipts 
were consequently barely half of what they should be. Interest 
rates charged by the rich were extortionate. One tan of grain bor­
rowed in the spring had to be repaid with two tan in the fall.
Labor service was so heavy as to drive many farmers from their homes 
either actually or through forging of official documents.
The consequent rural poverty stimulated government attempts 
at reform even early in the dynasty. Attempts were made to use the 
various civilian and military government granaries for seasonal 
relief, but these schemes were all ruined by the corruption of lo­
cal officials. Wang An-shih's “green shoots" law and, during 
Southern Sung, Chu Hsi's attempts to set up local cooperative gran­
aries to remedy this situation were the forerunners of modern 
agricultural banks and constituted a glorious page in the history 
of our country's agriculture.
All the various schemes for state credit emphasized lending 
seed grain or oxen which would directly contribute to increases 
in productivity. Attempts were also made to mobilize local private
99
capital for relief through various kinds of government guarantees. 
Attempts were made to limit or eliminate interest on loans to suc­
cor disaster victims.
Wang An-shih's and Chu Hsi's plans were designed to eliminate 
the official corruption which had ruined all earlier attempts at 
agricultural credit reform. The latter was an attempt by Chu to 
transcend the urban limits of earlier official granaries (like the 
ever Normal and Righteous granaries) by placing cooperative granai— 
ies right in the villages and to correct the major flaw of the 
“green shoots" scheme, its administration by remote officials, by 
having these granaries administered by the local gentry.
Under the general supervision of the hsien, Chu's system 
grouped households into units of ten and fifty, with a granary for 
each fifty households. The local gentry was encouraged to contri­
bute a granary's initial capital. Loans were to be made carefully 
and only to those who actually needed help. Interest was to be 
limited or abolished during bad years. When capital had been in­
creased tenfold, the surplus was to be applied to public use. Ul­
timately, interest would be limited to three sheng per tan of grain, 
or 3%-
Chu himself tried this scheme in one area for a decade and a 
half. He advocated its use nationally on a voluntary basis, with 
no compulsion exerted on the part of peasant households to Join a 
cooperative granary. Chu's model was widely imitated during South­
ern Sung, but with the passage of time this system too fell into 
disuse.
Science and Technology
Sung was China's golden age of mathematics. The earlier 
mathematical classics were printed by the late eleventh century 
and reprinted during Southern Sung. There were several mathemati­
cians whose treatises were also published. The eleventh-century
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mathematician Liu Yi worked out the equivalent of “Horner's Method" 
which was not achieved in the West until I8I9. The Northern Sung 
mathematician Chia Hsien did work similar to the trigonometry of the 
seventeenth-century Frenchman Pascal. Ch'in Chiu-shao of late South­
ern Sung was the first to use the symbol for zero and the simplified 
forms of the numerals now used in commerce. He also improved on the 
formulas of his predecessors for extracting roots of numbers.
Gunpowder, known by Sui-T'ang times, was used for military pui— 
poses in early Southern Sung to make smokescreens. A late twelfth- 
century device used true gun powder to fling projectiles more than
A “south-pointing carriage" was used in 
Han-Wei times, but a true magnetic compass was 
first used for navigation during Sung and was 
then transmitted to Europe by the Arabs. Pi 
Sheng invented movable-type printing in the 
mid-eleventh century. Foot-powered paddle­
wheeled boats had been In use since T'ang, and 
though they played a notable role in several 
early Southern military campaigns, they were 
not, unfortunately, taken seriously by con- 
tempora ries.
The rocket, now being used to explore the 
universe, was invented in early Northern Sung 
and used for military purposes. It was likely 
transmitted to the West by the Arabs in the 
thirteenth century. The term “fire arrow" 
goes back to Three Kingdoms times but must 
have then referred to arrows shot from a bow. 
Fire arrows as true rockets could not have preceded the late T'ang- 
Five Dynasties invention of gunpowder. The fire arrows described 
in an early Sung and a Ming treatise on military technology are 
unquestionably true rockets.
two hundred paces.
Fig. 8 A south­
pointing carriage.
Fig. 9 Crossbows
Porcelain manufacture flourished in several famous kilns, such 
as the Chiin in Honan, the Lungch'uan of Chekiang, the Ko of Hang­
chou, the Ju of Honan, the Ting of Hopei and the various Kuan (or 
official) potteries in Fukien and Hangchou.
The amount of tea drunk had increased prodigiously since the 
introduction of the practice during T'ang. There were now many 
varieties produced, some very expensive. The state taxed and mo­
nopolized the marketing of tea through several regional offices. 
Relatively free trade in the commodity was not permitted until 
after the middle of the eleventh century.
There were several centers specializing in the production of 
various types of silk cloth.
Communications
Sung's area was more constricted than Sui-T'ang's, but its 
communications network was highly developed. The main difference 
was that Ch'angan was the hub of the T'ang road system andK'aifeng
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of the Sung. The roads west to Kansu and Szechwan were essentially 
the same, as were the roads heading east and southeast from K'a ifeng 
The routes to the north, northeast and northwest differed somewhat 
from T'ang's. After Sung's flight south the north-south roads were 
cut until later eras saw the restoration of unity.
There were oceangoing vessels operated by both Chinese and 
foreigners capable of carrying loads weighing 300,000 chin. Equip­
ped with watertight compartments, carrying large crews, weapons to 
ward off pirates and even equipment for measuring the depth of the 
water, they could navigate by the stars, sun and magnetic compass.
Unlike T'ang whose overseas commerce was dominated by foreign­
ers, Sung overseas commerce was increasingly dominated by Chinese, 
especially in the Indian Ocean. By Yiian times Marco Polo could 
travel in a Chinese vessel to the Persian Gulf, and Chinese merchant 
vessels occasionally reached as far as Madagascar and the Red Sea.
Commerce
The early Sung emperors were sympathetic to commerce, allowing 
no tax increase on it and occasionally reducing taxes as well as 
removing taxes altogether on minor items. During Northern Sung 
certain valuable imported goods (different categories at various 
times) had to be sold initially to special government bureaus which 
then wholesaled them onto the private market.
Temple markets were highly developed. In K'aifeng, one 
temple's market ground could hold ten thousand people and markets 
were held there five times each month. The markets of K'aifeng 
were numerous, large, and in certain trades witnessed very large 
transactions. Tea and wine houses were numerous and many people 
ate all their meals in such places, never eating at home. Markets 
remained open well into the night. Goods, including bulk products 
like grain, came by water from most areas of the country to the 
capital's markets. Dishes cooked in the styles of all regions of 
the country were available in the restaurants of the city.
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Foreign trade flourished more than in any previous dynasty.
To Canton as an officially sanctioned port of entry for foreign 
trade were added Ch'uanchou, Hangchou, Mingchou, and Michou. Trade 
was engaged in with Korea, Japan, continental and insular Southeast 
Asia, and Arabia. Exports included gold, silver, strings of cash, 
lead, tin, various kinds of cloth, and porcelain. Imports included 
spices, ivory, coral, various precious stones, and tropical hard­
wood s.
Both foreign and Chinese merchants engaged in foreign trade 
were closely regulated. Exports of armaments or goods capable of 
being manufactured into arms were forbidden to places like Korea.
Though Northern Sung frequently fought with Liao and Western 
Hsia, trade with these states nevertheless flourished during peace­
ful intervals. Each state established tax offices on their mutual 
frontiers and these served as marketplaces where spices, ivory, and 
tea were traded by China for precious metals, wool and horses.
Liao attempted to bar trade with Sung in commodities in short sup­
ply domestically, such as horses and sheep. Trade with Western 
Hsia also flourished, so much so that Sung had difficulty limiting 
illegal private trade by managers of the official markets.
Though the early Southern Sung emperors frequently reduced or 
remitted commercial taxes to ease the burden on northern refugees 
reestablishing themselves in the south, local and transit taxes 
continued to be collected illegally by local officials to an ex­
tortionate extent, putting a great burden on the poor and contri­
buting to the ultimate demise of the dynasty.
The capital, Linan (Hangchou), became as great a commercial 
center as K'aifeng had ever been, its avenues and lanes crowded 
with shops. Both official and private trade, involving export of 
grain and manufactured goods in exchange for horses and tropical 
products, flourished with the barbarian states of the southwest.
The Monetary System
Bronze money continued to be used, supplemented b^j^ilver and 
paper. After banning inferior coinage, the Sung founder in 971 
circulated a bronze one-cash coin similar to the eighth-century 
T'ang issue. From T'ai-tsung's time on dated coins were issued for 
each new year period (n jen hao).
Early in the dynasty, because of localized bronze shortages, 
large iron coins were issued in Szechwan and Fukien. To support 
this currency for a time it was forbidden to import bronze coins 
into Szechwan. The Fukien iron issue was soon withdrawn.
A mid-eleventh century attempt to debase the coinage by adding 
a large bronze coin worth ten cash and a small iron coin worth one- 
third of a cash to the issue stimulated forgery and inflation. The 
amount of bronze cash continued to decline during Southern Sung, 
causing broader use of iron cash.
Gold was scarce during Sung and silver gradually replaced it 
as a monetary metal, with taxes frequently being collected in sil­
ver. The silver "shoe" of fifty ounces and worth one hundred 
strings of bronze cash became standard nationwide.
As a "shoe" was often split up in actual use, by 1197 a new 
standard was devised with each ounce of silver being worth about 
two strings of bronze cash, but by 1200 the practice of alloying 
baser metals with the silver ruined attempts to use it as a stand­
ard of value. Nevertheless, the use of silver as a monetary metal 
continued to become more popular during the thirteenth century.
Sung's use of paper money represented a great advance in the 
history of Chinese currency. In Szechwan paper certificates in­
itially called chiao-tzu (but known by other names at various 
times) replaced the heavy and inconvenient iron money. Each cer­
tificate expired three years from the date of issue. Initially 
they were issued by sixteen rich mercantile houses, but disorder 
caused by occasional failure to honor the certificates by their
sponsors led to takeover of their issue by the state early in the 
eleventh century. Thereafter their use gradually spread.
In early Southern Sung such notes were issued extensively (in­
itially to the amount of 500,000 strings) under the label hui-tzu 
and then kuan~tzu. But overissue and the ease with which they coul 
be forged greatly reduced their value despite imposition of the 
death penalty for forgery and high rewards offered informers. Ul­
timately even local governments would not accept the notes even in 
payment for taxes.
There were also various kinds of local note issues, but these 
were not permitted to circulate nationally. Government manipula­
tion of the monetary system impeded circulation of the money and 
caused much popular resentment against the dynasty.
Taxation
During its first two decades Sung was distracted from tax re­
form by the need to complete the unification of the empire. It 
accumulated official fields from the holdings of the various states 
it conquered and from their ruling families. The rental it got 
from these holdings, amounting to S0% of the crops they produced, 
made a larger contribution to early Sung state revenues than the 
tax on private land which amounted to only 10^ of the crops. Prior 
to Wang An-shih's land survey, records were so inadequate that 
only a fraction of the taxes actually owed were ever collected. 
T‘ai-tsung's policy of allowing renters to keep official fields as 
their private property and giving them a three-year tax holiday 
followed by a two-thirds reduction in taxes thereafter was insuf­
ficient even to fully repopulate the region around the capital.
In addition to rent on official land and tax on private land, 
there were taxes on buildings, a head tax and miscellaneous taxes 
on livestock, silkworms, and salt. Taxes were paid in grain, 
cloth, cash and commodities, with the quantity of commodities vary­
ing each year according to their market prices.
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No fundamental changes were made in the tax system until Wang 
An-shih's land survey system was instituted in 1072 to record the 
quantity and quality of all land as the basis for an equitable tax. 
Unfortunately, when the reform was ended after twelve years, only 
half the land had been surveyed. Though reinstituted between 110^ 
and 1120 when the system was then again abolished, the old methods 
of allocating taxes were reverted to.
By early Southern Sung all the old abuses had returned, exacei— 
bated by the destruction of war. Official corruption remained, as 
always, and was one of the main causes for the failure of Wang's 
reforms.
One of the main reasons for Sung's ability to unify the realm 
was its policy of remitting commercial taxes. These had reached 
extortionate levels during late T'ang and Five Dynasties times. 
Sung's goods in transit tax was only 2%, its tax of fixed businesses' 
transactions only 3%.
Though the dynasty continued to limit commercial taxation into 
the eleventh century, surtaxes for military needs and on goods for 
palace consumption constituted important exceptions. Such abuses 
were especially prevalent during the times Southern Sung was under 
military pressure.
Sung's salt laws were revised several times. Originally salt 
transport was handled officially, and hsien officia1s wholesaled it 
to merchants. But this placed a great transport burden on corvee 
labor and in 1030, in exchange for payment of a fee at the capital, 
private merchants took over transportation of salt. This reform 
not only cut down on the burden of corvee but reduced state ex­
penses and allowed for more efficient market allocation of trans­
portation resources.
In 10A2 the old system was restored because state revenues, 
which had originally gone up under the new system, had then de­
clined. In 10^8 the system was again changed to allow merchants
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to buy salt certificates regionally. Abuses soon crept into this 
system as well.
Wang An-shih moved from a state monopoly to a free enterprise 
position, and Ts'ai Ching ultimately returned to the certificate 
system though it soon suffered from the old abuses. The monopoly­
sales system failed in part because it controlled only a portion of 
salt production and hence could not effectively eliminate a black 
market, and in part because political conflict within the central 
government led to frequent changes in policy before any one policy 
could establish itself.
Early Sung used the latter Chou system of state control of the 
production of.wine at the capital and provincial centers. Private 
production was permitted locaily but subject to government supei— 
vision and taxation. By T'ai-tsung's reign abuses appeared. High 
prices charged by state wineries and high taxes imposed on private 
production led to tax dodging which the imposition of stiff punish­
ments, including execution for violators, could not eliminate.
Severai regional state offices were founded to buy up and tax 
tea production. Free trade in tea was permitted in Szechwan,
Shensi and Canton, though their tea could not be sold outside these 
three regions. Elsewhere the state bought tea cheaply and sold it 
in the producing areas to private retailers who had previously 
purchased tea certificates at the capital. By the 1070's this 
policy, which both tempted the official tea plantation managers to 
sell on the black market and threatened them with heavy punishment 
if they did so, was tending to drive tea-producing areas out of 
production. There was a saying: "The land produced not tea but
misfortune."
At the beginning of Sung local ferry taxes were abolished, and 
the preceding era's tax on those who wished to hold high office 
was restored. The tax on the raising of aquatic products like fish 
and ducks was removed, but these were taxed once they entered the 
market. A certificate had to be bought to validate sales of land
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and livestock.
Several excise taxes were collected as surtaxes, especially 
during Southern Sung. These surtaxes were first imposed to meet 
extraordinary military expenses, but most were continued even after 
military threats had abated. The state also made a good profit 
through its monopoly of the wholesale trade in incense. Almost all 
incense was imported and had to be initially sold by importers to 
the state.
Sung's corvee system was based on its predecessor's. Initial­
ly officials and the military were exempt. It was administered at 
the chou and hsien levels. Only men between the ages of twenty and 
sixty were subject to it.
In 971 in the north corvee was limited to river conservancy 
work during spring. In the south the old practice of commuting 
corvee to a tax in cash and grain was continued, and though the 
cash tax was ended in 1011, the grain tax was continued. In parts 
of the southeast a cash tax was retained and, as it was linked to 
the salt laws, was increased when the salt certificate system was 
instituted.
Sung also conscripted commoner families for various civil and 
military tasks at the local level. This proved extremely burden­
some as monks and elite households were exempted from service.
Wang An-shih's labor service avoidance law was designed to end 
these abuses. It was, however, abolished in IO86.
Society and People's Livelihood
So as to avoid the chaos of the preceding era of disunion.
Sung T'ai-tsu instituted a policy of centralizing power, in par­
ticular he placed the main army under direct imperial control at 
the capital. Garrisons on the frontiers along with their officers 
were regularly rotated back to the center.
This policy and the long period of peace led ultimately to a
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slackening of military efficiency. To restore the army's effective­
ness, Wang An-shih instituted a militia system to substitute for 
mercenaries at the local level. But after 1086 the end of the re­
form led to a weakening of this militia, and Sung was no longer able 
to match the power of Liao and Western Hsia on the frontiers. Hence 
it eventually fell to Chin. The responsibility for the loss of the 
north must be shared by both the centralized state, which could not 
guarantee security despite all the taxes it collected, and by Ssu- 
ma Kuang and his faction who took too narrow a view of their re- 
sponsibi1ities.
It is evident that economic development and the political sys­
tem are intertwined. The Sung Shih (Sung History) concludes that 
the central government was not in fact truly centralized. The con­
stant rotation of Its personnel made it certain that 80^ to 90^ of 
the high officials never really knew their jobs. Sung attempted 
to centralize power and at the same time avoid the corruption which 
centralization encouraged. In practice, this meant that those with 
responsibility were so constricted by regulations designed to avoid 
corruption that they lacked power and those with power lacked re­
sponsibility, a system certain to bring disaster to both state and 
people.
Sung factionalism set the gentlemen against each other, leav­
ing room for lesser men to take over. This was the fate of Wang 
An-shih's reforms. If the great men who led the opposing factions 
had been able to work together, the dynasty could have been saved 
and there would have been hope for raising the level of the 
people's livelihood, j
The estrangement of Sung Neo-Confucianism from social needs 
is also one of the reasons for the failure to maintain the people's 
livelihood. The quarrel between the war and peace factions at the 
time of Northern Sung's fall ended with the latter traitorously 
selling out both state and people. '
Conflict with Liao continued from early in the dynasty until 
the treaty of 1004 which made Sung the subordinate power. In 1074 
additional territory was ceded to Liao. Peace was made with West­
ern Hsia in 1044 after six years of war. Renewed war in Shen- 
tsung's time only increased the tribute Sung had to pay to Western 
Hsia.
The deal with Chin in 1122 gave Sung only empty cities and 
merely transferred its tribute payments from Liao to Chin. The two 
attacks by Chin in 1125 and 1126 beggared the capital and set the 
stage for the loss of the entire northern half of the country and 
a humiliating peace a decade and a half later. The peace with Chin 
in 1207 increased the annual tribute which had to be paid.
These successive defeats and indemnities had all to be paid 
for by the people. Military expenses also were a heavy burden on 
the people, the south alone paying taxes of 70,000,000 strings 
through a tax system which left hardly any items untaxed.
Even before the foreign disasters at the end of Northern Sung, 
two great popular rebellions, led by Sung Chiang and Fang La, had 
taken place largely because of bad social conditions. Such popular 
rebellions continued during early Southern Sung, led by men like 
Li Ch'eng and Yang Yao.
THE AGE OF DESTITUTION: LIAO, CHIN, AND YUAN
Out Iine
The nine rulers of Liao reigned from 918 to 1125 over much of 
Manchuria and the northern parts of Shansi and Hopei. The Jurched 
who founded the Chin rose in northeast Manchuria and eventually 
controlled all of Manchuria, the Yellow River valley and part of 
the Huai valley. Their nine rulers reigned from 1115 to 1234.
Yuan's founder Temuchin ascended the throne in Mongolia in 
1206 with the appellation of Chingis Khan. He conquered Western 
Liao, Western Hsia and joined with Sung to attack Chin. His grand­
son Kubilai ascended the throne in 1260, established his capital in 
Yenching and adopted the dynastic name Yuan. Sixteen years later 
he conquered Sung and united China. He then attacked Japan, Korea, 
and various states in Southeast Asia, many of which sent him tri­
bute. His territory extended across Asia to Eastern Europe, to an 
extent unprecedented in all antiquity. Though he reduced this 
great area to peace and good order with the aid of able officials, 
his armies were constantly in action and the people much burdened.
Because it was compiled during YUan, long after the fall of 
the dynasty, the economics section of the Liao Shih (Liao History) 
is rather incomplete. The economics section of the Chin Shih (Chin 
History) is rather more complete, but as it put so much emphasis 
on warfare, the Chin was not much interested in economic issues 
and hence left few records on the subject.
By contrast, the Mongols who founded the YUan dynasty, although a 
barbarian people without a recorded history before they entered 
China, once in control of China used Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai's aid and 
hence had much in their economic system worthy to record. Because
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of the Mongols great military successes their contributions were 
especially numerous in the realm of economic connections between 
China and foreign civilizations.
The Special Features of the Economy
Yeh-lii Chu-ts'ai (1190-12^3) belonged to the Liao royal Yeh-lu 
clan. Since his grandfather's time his family had served the Chin 
court. His father held high office and was learned in both Confu­
cianism and mystical studies. Ch'u-ts'ai was born when his father 
was already old, and hence he was lovingly brought up in his fa­
ther's scholarly tradition. His greatness is measured by the fact 
that though by blood a Khitan, he was in the mainstream of Chinese 
culture.
A man of peace and good order, he could only bide his time 
with scholarship during the decadent and corrupt last years of the 
Chin dynasty. When Yenching fell to the Mongols he was granted an 
interview with Chingis because as a Khitan he was expected to be 
thirsting for vengeance against their Chin conquerors. His unwill­
ingness to denouce Chin because his family had loyally served them 
impressed Chingis and the khan kept him in his entourage.
With his talents as an astronomer, physician, and diviner 
Ch'u-ts'ai gradually won Chingis' confidence and hence on hisdeath- 
bed Chingis recommended him to his successor, Ogodei, who made 
Ch'u-ts'ai chief minister.
Ch'u-ts'ai was deeply learned in Buddhism as well as secular 
studies. He was also the most important political figure of early 
Yuan, the man who completed the process of assimilating northern 
China into the Mongol empire begun by Chingis.
His career is documented in the writings of contemporaries, 
his own collected works and in the Yuan Shih (Yuan History). He 
has also been much studied by modern Western and Chinese scholars, 
beginning in detail with Bretschneider's work in the nineteenth 
century. He is first mentioned in the West in de Mail la's
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Histoire generale de la Chine in the eighteenth century.
Ch'u-ts'ai's most notable accomplishment was to establish the 
principle that China had to be governed according to Chinese prin­
ciples, the principles of the Confucian tradition. As a conse­
quence, the Mongols were slowly sinicized. To begin with, during 
the completion of the conquest of Chin, he had the Mongol policy of 
annihilating resisting cities' populations rescinded. He also res­
cued and subsidized the numerous Confucian scholars whose work 
helped sinicize the Mongol administration. In the realm of fiscal 
policy he persuaded Ogodei not to enforce the jokingly put forward 
scheme of reducing China to pastureland and instead established ten 
regional tax offices to collect the usual land and excise taxes.
So pleased was OgOdei at the revenues thereby produced that he 
placed fiscal policy entirely under Ch'u-ts'ai's control.
He established a budget and ordered that the amount and type 
of taxes had to be first approved by him before being levied.
Though some were still hurt, so honestly did he run his system that 
he was universally hailed as a loyal and public spirited prime 
minister. His measures increased the strength of the dynasty \«hile 
curbing the Mongol impulse to loot.
After his death he was slanderously accused of amassing private 
wealth while in office, but these accusations were unjustified.
Like Sun Yat-sen, with whom he is comparable in honor, he did 
leave a large private library.
Unfortunately not only did his successors fail to build on 
the foundations he had established but let these fall into ruin, 
thereby allowing YUan to fall into decadence.
Though China had had sea navigation since Warring States 
times, the sea routes were never of crucial importance for inter­
nal communications until Yuan times, when there was an enormous 
increase in the use of coastal shipping to transport southern 
grain to the north so as to avoid the expense and labor needed to
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maintain the inland waterways. The sea transit route was eventually 
reduced to a ten-day run to the north by going far enough out to 
avoid shoal waters and take advantage of the prevailing winds. The 
route was not as safe as in recent times. The wind and waves were 
not dependable and ships and cargoes could be lost. Specially con­
structed grain freighters of two thousand tan capacity came into 
use.
Special attention was also paid to river conservancy. Central 
and regional bureaus were used to supervise such work. The Yellow 
River shifted its mouth to the north in 1344. In 1351 a seven- 
month project using 150,000 corvee laborers restored it to its for­
mer course, flowing into the Huai and then into the sea. This pro­
ject was, however, blamed for the rise in popular discontent which 
preceded the fall of the dynasty. The methods used by its manager 
Chia Lu, constructing embankments of earth, stone, metal, wood and 
straw, continued to be used by later generations.
Ylian s postal system was highly developed. There were land 
and water postal stations which supplied means of transport, food 
and lodging for their users. This network stretched from Korea 
south to Annam, with 115 stations along the route from Annam north 
to Yenching. To the northwest there were stations strung out into 
Sinkiang and southern Siberia. The greatest number of stations 
were in the lower Yangtze transportation centers.
Somewhat later a separate network of express courier stations 
was established. Traveling night and day, these couriers auto­
matically had the right of way on all highways. Ming and Ch'ing 
used postal systems similar to Ytian's.
Hsien officials were responsible for bridge maintenance under 
the supervision of the Board of Works. A set annual schedule of 
road and bridge maintenance was enforced, and interference with 
the trees planted along rights of way was punished.
The Mongol military campaigns extended from Korea and Japan
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in the east to Eastern Europe in the west, from the Arctic Ocean in 
the north to the Indian Ocean in the south. This unprecedented 
scope of activity led to numerous contacts between Chinese and for~ 
eign civilizations.
In addition to the famous official missions there were numer­
ous merchants, craftsmen and adventurers from all over Europe who 
spent all or part of their lives among the Mongols. Many eastern 
techniques were brought back to Europe by these anonymous travelers. 
Silk and porcelain became familiar objects in Western Europe, and 
these and other innovations served to stimulate progress there. 
Chinese navigation techniques and gunpowder were also transmitted 
to Europe by the Mongols as were the techniques of carved-board 
and movable-type printing. Eastern Europe received the Chinese 
abacus.
Though Korea was reduced to tributary status, two seaborne in­
vasions of Japan failed, and no political relationship with Japan 
was established. Nevertheless mercantile relations between Japan 
and Yuan China were not broken and piIgraImages by monks from both 
sides continued. Many of the states of Southeast Asia paid tri­
bute to China. According to I bn Battuta, Chinese vessels domin­
ated the trade between China and India during the YUan period.
The Liao Economy
Liao's acquisition of northernmost China gave it a base for 
commercial growth under its state's supervision. Its southern 
capital (modern Peking) had three markets to serve its 300,000 
inhabitants. The main capital in Inner Mongolia had foreign mer­
chants In residence, and cloth rather than cash was used for money. 
All the other main cities had markets as well.
In addition to markets on the border with Sung, there were 
markets adjoining the states in the northeast. Imports included 
gold, cloth, furs and livestock. Salt and wine were state monopo­
lies.
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An abundance of locally produced copper permitted coinage from 
922 on. To avoid private coinage, in IO63 the people were forbid­
den to sell copper cash, and sale of copper cash to foreign mer­
chants was strictly prohibited.
A land tax was instituted by T'ai-tsu and a census by T'ai- 
tsung. After 1027 several types of partially or totally tax-exempt 
public fields were established and coexisted thereafter with tax 
paying private land. The corv€e became especially burdensome for 
the maintenance of the postal stations and was replaced by a tax- 
supported hired service system.
The Chin Economy
The Jurched had no commerce to speak of when they were still 
a nomadic herding people of the north. After conquering half of 
China, however, their people engaged in some commerce.
As late as the ll60's most of Chin's coinage was engrossed by 
the officials. This obliged the population at large to resort to 
barter or paper vouchers.
Ten items were state monopolies, including salt, wine, tea 
and iron. All tea was imported from Sung either as part of the 
annual tribute or via the frontier official markets which were set 
up after 1142.
After the capital was moved south in 1154 a more elaborate 
paper money system was set up, with large denomination bills worth 
from one to fifteen strings and small denomination bills worth 
from 100 to 750 cash. These were to circulate for seven years and 
be used interchangeably with cash.
Overissue and an end to the use of expiration dates devalued 
this currency and drove good cash into hiding. An early thir­
teenth-century reissue failed to solve the problem of devaluation, 
and the practice grew of quoting all prices in terms of silver 
rather than in terms of this increasingly valueless paper.
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Rent was paid to the state by the cultivators of official 
lands. Tax on private lands was calculated in terms of ox units, 
with three oxen per unit. Every unit of twenty-five individuals 
was to have four ch' ing four mou^of land and pay no more than one 
_tari_ of grain per year. Using a variant on the pao~chia system, the 
tax and corvee burden was to be proportioned to the size and wealth 
of a household.
The Yuan Economy
Though Chingis had to be dissuaded from turning China into 
pastureland, Kubilai put great emphasis on the encouragement of
agriculture through both state 
supervision and the encouragement 
of local Righteous and Ever Normal 
granaries.
The official fields acquired 
by the state during late Southern 
Sung were used during Yiian to re­
ward officials. The Mongols also 
adopted the Chin practice of con­
fiscating peasant land and re­
ducing its cultivators to the 
status of agricultural slaves. 
Estates containing as many as
80,000 households were in this 
way given to court favorites. 
Officials were given smaller es­
tates. Taxes on these did not 
need to be forwarded to the cen­
tral authorities. Monastic 
estates, also tax exempt, expanded greatly. Though in I327 monas­
teries were forbidden to buy additional land from the people, 
this ruie was widely broken.
tration)
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Two attempts at a land survey so as to increase tax receipts 
failed, largely owing to the interference of the Mongol aristocracy. 
The unequal burden of taxation created many tax absconders from 
north China and ultimately contributed to the downfall of the dy­
nasty.
The Mongols ultimately came to use commerce as their initial 
weapon of conquest and their military power only secondarily. For 
example, prior to the conquest of Southern Sung, the Mongols cut 
off all trade across the border, but after a while they pardoned a 
number of Sung merchants who had violated the prohibition, thereby 
earning their gratitude and easing the task of their armies during 
the subsequent military campaigns.
Yuan's international trade policy was to encourage the estab­
lishment of tributary and hence trade relations with even remote 
countries of the south seas. The dynasty also received substantial
tax revenues from internal commercial taxes. There was a sales tax
«■of 1/30 (later 1/20) and a surtax on that as well as a tax on ship­
building materials. Tax farming by rich merchants was the method 
used for collecting these taxes.
During the early years after the conquest of the south, for­
eign trade was taxed at 1/10 (coarser goods at 1/15). Eventually 
shipping offices were set up in seven major ports and the only 
foreign trade permitted was placed under government auspices, with 
the state taking 70^ of the profit from each voyage.
Severe restrictions were placed on the hours of business in 
the south. All travelers had to have official documents without 
which they were not to be accepted into inns. Coastal residents 
were not allowed to trade for cash with foreign merchants. Private 
foreign trade was forbidden. Violators were to be whipped and 
their ships and goods confiscated. All vessels had to be regis­
tered. Southern iron products were not permitted to be sold in 
the north.
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Numbered among the merchants were Mongols, North Chinese (in­
cluding Khitan and Jurched), South Chinese, and, most influential 
of all, foreigners from Central and West Asia and Europe. Though 
among merchants there were adherents of all the major religions of 
Eurasia, Muslims were most numerous. Most of those Muslims who had 
settled within China had gone into trade to make a living. In ad­
dition to priests like Friar Odoric, European merchants like Marco 
Polo came to China. The accounts of Chinese life written by some 
of these men whetted a European interest in China which was to be­
come more manifest in Ming times.
Yuan had state monopolies over salt, tea, wine and vinegar. 
Ch'uanchou was the chief entrepot of foreign trade. Marco Polo 
considered it one of the world's two greatest ports. For a time 
the tax rate there was lower than in the other six major ports.
The state occasionally used its monopoly right to finance for­
eign trade to earn revenues specifically for such needs as finan­
cing the empress' palace establishment. The new capital city be­
came the focus of foreign and domestic trade and the center of 
Industry producing solely for palace consumption. Its suburban 
population was as great as that of the city itself. The other 
major cities of the two river valleys and Canton also flourished. 
Ibn Battuta wrote that Ch'Uanchou harbor held a hundred large ves­
sels and countless smaller ones and that its Muslim merchants con­
stituted a separate market.
Kubilal issued Yuan's first paper currency, one version backed 
by silk and another in various denominations calculated in terms of 
copper cash and strings of cash. Later smaller denomination notes 
proved impractical and were withdrawn. Different forms of the 
other notes were periodically reissued as they depreciated in val­
ue. Despite this depreciation such notes continued to circulate 
to the end of the dynasty.
In addition to the local and national academies, YUan
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established a network of local medical schools with standardized 
examinations of their graduates. Kubilai estabiished a network of 
regional astronomical observatories. Mathematics also continued to 
advance, with the invention of quadratic equations and a new tech­
nique for performing iong division. In the realm of military tech­
nology, a cannon built by a Muslim technologist was used in the 
siege of Hsiangyang in 1273.
State-owned workshops staffed by salaried artisans conscripted 
by the authorities produced a variety of specialized goods, such as 
multilayered lacquerware inset with precious metals, and clay and 
cast-metal statues.
Artisans were conscripted for service with the armies recruit­
ed locally during the conquest of North China, and later of South 
China. Most of these were skilled in making arrows, armor and 
catapults.
YUan's Board of Works was responsible for all engineering 
tasks, gathering materials and recruiting skilled workmen for these 
tasks. It controlled various subordinate institutions, most of 
them in the north, which carried out a variety of specialized tasks 
from smelting silver to dyeing silk. The various segments of the 
palace establishment also controlled enterprises, often with local 
subdivisions, producing goods for their use.
At heart the Yuan treated China as conquered territory, to be 
parcelied out in feudal fashion among the conquerors. This was 
the source of great popular suffering. The Yuan institutions for 
managing the various crafts greatly influenced Ming and Ch'ing 
practice.
The Mongols always gave great weight to technical expertise,
* at first for warfare and later, as they grew more sophisticated, 
for the adornment of their women and for their personal luxuries. 
Even in his early conquests Chingis spared captured artisans to 
satisfy his and his aristocracy's love for ornate trappings.
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Originally prisoners of war and then a part of the armies, organized 
groups of craftsmen eventually became a distinct caste within so­
ciety. Craftsmen were divided into thirty-two subdivisions, all 
paid by and working for the state. There are records of many such 
artisan families who did exceedingly well in the Mongols' service. 
Unfortunately the traditional Chinese distaste for technical ability 
did not allow this high position for artisans to continue. Other­
wise our industrialization might have occurred two or three centur­
ies earlier.
The early Yuan land tax resembled the T'ang system. At first 
it was a simple head tax, but when that produced insufficient rev­
enue, a dual system was instituted. A family was to pay a tax 
either on its property or by head count, whichever was larger.
There were also taxes in kind collected in cloth and silver 
which were destined for use of the court establishment. These were 
collected by the central government at different rates from various 
categories of households.
Though its adoption of Confucian goals was vitiated by its 
racism. Yuan was not without its accomplishments in such depart­
ments as encouragement of agriculture, water conservancy and the 
restoration of a measure of peace to the north. But its racism 
and harsh taxation caused much popular resentment.
Southerners especially suffered from discrimination. Chinese 
were forbidden to possess weapons. The population was divided in­
to ten classes: officials, minor officials, Buddhist monks, Taoist
monks, physicians, artisans, hunters, commoners, Confucians, and 
beggars. Local officials were often foreigners, and they frequent­
ly extorted excessive taxes from the people and offended opinion 
by, for example, robbing the graves of the Sung imperial family 
and its high officials. Kubilai himself used several venal and 
incompetent high officials, and his successors showed even poorer 
judgment in their choice of men.
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Rents on the estates of the south were several times higher 
than taxes, and tenants were treated like slaves. Three-year tax 
holidays for newly opened land were more than made up for by ex­
tortionate surtaxes levied by local officials. Agriculture was also 
much harmed by the conscription of horses. In the north these had 
been used for both transportation and as draft animals. The Mon­
gols wanted these animals for their own use and as a precautionary 
measure wished to deny their use to the Chinese. Approximately
700,000 horses were conscripted between 1286 and 1328.
Many southerners were reduced to serf-like status on estates 
extorted by officials. Many northerners fled south as refugees. 
Institutions like the Righteous Granaries existed more in name 
than in fact.
So close to the margin of existence did the people live that 
when natural disasters struck many were obliged to abandon their 
families and join movements of resistance. By the 1330's popular 
rebellions began in several places in the south and central regions, 
and the Yangtze valley was soon totally out of control. These re­
bellions were led by men of all classes, salt-smugglers, impover­
ished peasants and priests. So ended the Yuan hegemony.
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Section X
THE AGE OF REVIVAL: THE MING DYNASTY
Outl ine
The 275-year long Ming, with its first capitals in Nanking and 
K'aifeng and its move of the capital to Peking during the reign of 
the third emperor, was the first native Chinese dynasty to rule all 
of the country since the fall of the T'ang. Ming's founder, ob­
serving the lessons of history, took the road of centralization.
The economy was progressive compared to that of earlier times.
Taxes were collected in silver rather than goods, and the aristoc­
racy was paid in rice rather than land, and in mid-dynasty in part 
in paper money. The manorial system gradually fell into decay.
The Ming Single Whip tax system remained the basis for the tax sys­
tem into Ch'ing times.
Ming centralization much increased the power of the eunuchs, 
who greatly oppressed commerce. Their heavy punishment of the 
gentry was a fundamental reason for the fall of the dynasty. The 
seven voyages to the western oceans of Cheng Ho during the Yung-lo 
era represented an important development in Chinese economic his­
tory. In addition, the fiscal policies of Chang Chu-cheng wrote a 
new page in the economic history of Ming which was long discussed 
by posterity.
The Contribution of Chang Chu-cheng to Ming National Planning for 
the People's Livelihood
Chang was one of the great statesmen of the sixteenth century, 
an age when internal and external problems reenforced each other. 
The Ming manorial economy was more developed than during Yuan.
Many manors were tax exempt and peasant land was being encroached 
upon, often voluntarily as peasants sought to avoid taxes. As a 
consequence land was becoming less equally distributed, land
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records were losing accuracy and government revenues were declining. 
From the beginning inequities were built into the land tax. The 
founder's home area, among others, was very lightly taxed. Several 
areas in Chiangnan associated with the rebellion of Chang Shih- 
ch'eng were very heavily taxed. The tax on confiscated and official 
fields was higher than that on private land.
Compilation of a land register was undertaken early in Ming.
The more than 8,570,000 ch'ing then registered had declined by 1529 
by half, but a new land census could only be carried out in a few 
places. In 1578 Chang's recommendation to carry out a land survey 
was accepted. This increased the amount of registered land from 
over A.5 million to over 11.5 million ch' ing. In addition to the 
Single Whip system, Chang instituted several other reforms in the 
collection system to end cheating by the elite. His policy of for­
giving delinquent back taxes by the peasantry evoked great approval 
among the people.
Before the Single Whip system, there were so many taxes and 
their types were so complex as to lead to abuses. The new system 
was a response to the objective needs of the times. The relative 
simplicity of the calculations involved in the system drastically 
limited opportunities for tax avoidance by the rich and corruption 
by local officials. From the modern viewpoint it represented a 
progressive tax system. It was both simpler and cheaper to collect 
than earlier systems, and constituted less of a burden on the 
people.
Even before taking office Chang advocated frugal government, 
arguing that this was the only way to assure a prosperous people 
and hence the only true basis for warding off foreign threats.
When he took office the treasury held only enough revenue for three 
months' worth of expenditures. The assured revenues from the nu­
merous central and local state-controlled weaving establishments 
had in turn stimulated growth in state expenditures and led con­
sequently to extraordinary levies on their production, even in bad
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times. Chang sought to reduce these levies during times of depres~ 
sion. He also drastically limited the use of the state post system 
and thereby reduced expenditures and the burden on taxpayers.
Though the official histories have an ambiguous attitude toward 
Chang as an individual, they could not but approve of his fiscal 
policies. He was praised for increasing the state's grain reserves 
while lessening the burden on the people. This enabled successful 
pacification of tribal peoples in the north and southwest. He is 
also criticized for having obstructed debate within the Court and 
for arousing thereby much resentment within government during his 
eighteen years in power. But though there is disagreement about 
him, given the conditions during mid-Ming and thereafter, a man of 
his strength of character was needed.
The Accomplishments of Cheng Ho's Voyages to the Western Seas
Though the south and east have a coastline, including islands, 
of over 20,000 kilometers, our mentality has traditionally been 
that of a continental power, with little emphasis on maritime de­
velopment. Only by Sung and Yuan did maritime trade become signif­
icant. The Yunglo emperor changed his traditional landlocked 
policy for one which emphasized expansion both by land and sea.
Cheng Ho's seven voyages constituted a new and glorious page 
in Chinese history. Though not a new development, his voyages 
were unprecedented in scale, distance covered and duration. They 
occurred nearly a century before the voyages of the great West­
erners, Columbus and Vasco da Gama. He carried an average of
27,000 men on each voyage, 400 men on each of some sixty large 
vessels. The length of the voyages varied from a year and a half 
to two and a half years, and a supply station had to be set up on 
the Malay peninsula to meet the needs of such long expeditions.
The first three and the sixth voyage were limited to the coast 
of the Indian Ocean. The fourth and fifth went to the Persian 
Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian coast and East Africa. The seventh also
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went to the Persian Gulf with side expeditions to the Red Sea.
Cheng was thirty-five when his first expedition departed in 1^*05 
and fifty-two when the sixth returned. He was an old man of sixty- 
three by the end of the seventh expedition of 1432 which departed 
3^tcr Yung-lo's death. Estimates of the number of countries he 
visited vary from seventeen to fifty-nine, largely because of the 
political fragmentation of South Asia at that time.
One motive for these voyages was to search for the Emperor Hui 
whom Yung-lo had deposed and who was rumored to have fled overseas. 
Yung-lo is reported to have still been worried over this near the 
end of his reign. Another motive was linked to the traditional 
impulse of a Chinese dynasty to have all peoples acknowledge its 
suzerainty. Naturally as a usurper Yung-lo wanted such symbolic 
acknowledgments even more than had the founder. Cheng Ho's seventh 
voyage was to hasten tribute missions which had lagged in the five 
years since the Hsuan-te emperor had taken the throne. An economic 
motive is reflected in the label given to Cheng Ho's fleet—"treas­
ure ships." Yung-lo, who had set up tax offices for overseas com­
merce in Canton, Ch'uanchou and Ningpo, wanted to go beyond merely 
receiving the profits from foreign merchants who came to China.
Yung-lo hoped to gain great profits from the official expedi­
tions to defray the expenses of the campaigns against the Mongols. 
The tribute missions stimulated by the expeditions often, however, 
required great expenditures by the Court in return. Private trade 
was also stimulated. Unintended by the government, migration to 
the South Seas was also stimulated to the point that by the six­
teenth century the area had become linked genetically to the Chi­
nese empire.
J~he tens of thousands of men who accompanied Cheng returned
^th a taste for the foreign which they spread among the CjTjjifise
coistal areas, thereby changing the nature of the Chinese,
to accommodate^a taste for the seagoing life and its pr^its.
From 1405 to 1435 some fifty states came to China to offer tribute.
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and the experiences in China of the hundreds of tribute bearers, 
some of exalted rank, sowed the seeds of increased international 
trade later.
The Han Race's Basic Position and the Establishment of Agricultural 
Policy After the Economic Revival
The life of the peasantry was hard in late Yuan and early Ming. 
Much land had been abandoned in the Yellow River valley. Despite 
attempts by the Ming founder to use the army for rural reconstruc­
tion, 90^ of the peasants of Kiangsu were hardpressed tenants. The 
situation was gradually improved by the detailed land survey ordered 
by the founder, the "fish-scale register" and by the "golden regis­
ter," so called because of the color of the paper of the copy sent 
up to the Census Board, which organized all farmers into groups of 
110 households, with ten groups of ten families each led by the 
leading ten grain-producing families. The latter were revised each 
decade in accord with the production record of the unit over the 
previous ten years.
The land was divided between official and private fields. The 
former included manors for the imperial family, office lands for 
the bureaucrats and garrison fields for the army. The founder 
ordered that private fields be divided equitably according to pop­
ulation, and that they be taxed equally. Cooperative fields owned 
by the state in each village were to be collectively cultivated.
The founder also ordered extensive use of garrison fields to re­
duce the burden of military support on the civilian population. 
Eventually, however, these garrison fields tended to be taken over
t
by the elite, throwing on the treasury the burden of supporting 
the armies. Anyone who opened hitherto uncultivated land was 
allowed to make it his private property.
The founder sponsored hydraulic works in over A0,000 locations. 
Those opening new land were granted draft animals, tools, seed and ‘ 
capital. The Ming local granary system represented a reform of 
the T'ang-Sung institutions. The founder ordered Preparation
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Fig. 12 Water-powered mill.
Granaries, managed by local dignitaries, established in all major 
towns. These were similar to the old Ever-Normal granaries. There 
were Righteous granaries.as weil, one for each twenty or thirty 
families, headed by local gentlemen, and with the families belong­
ing to it giving contributions to it proportioned to their wealth. 
There were also cooperative granaries, entireiy under control of 
the thirty families constituting the membership of each. These, 
a contemporary argued, were superior to government granaries as 
they were more iikely to be efficientiy managed and give loans to
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those who most needed them because of their superior knowledge of 
local conditions. Rewards, up to official rank, were given to those 
who gave generous contributions to the government-sponsored granar­
ies. The laws held officials strictly accountable for operations of 
the granaries. Eventually chou and hsien officia1s were made re­
sponsible for the Preparedness granaries rather than local managers.
The manorial economy had developed out of the feudal economy.
It had originated in T'ang, continued in Sung and flourished during 
Yuan, using the official fields as manors for the elite. The Ming 
founder originally enfieffed his family with land but eventually 
shifted to paying them in rice instead. Such salaries originally 
ranged from 200 to 50,000 tan. By mid-Ming a part of these salaries 
was paid with silver certificate paper money. But manors for the 
highest ranks continued nevertheless to be very extensive. Official 
fields continued to be augmented by lands confiscated from dis­
graced officials and from land without heirs. In early Ming of­
ficial fields constituted one-tenth the amount of private land.
Manors continued to develop for three reasons: imperial
grants to the imperial family and others (in 1601 a proposed AO,000 
ch' ing grant to the emperor's three sons would have brought one- 
half the land of Honan into such manors), the opening of new land 
by manor holders (similar to the T'ang and Sung practice), and the 
obtaining of private land by various means (fraudulently getting 
title to new land opened by the people, taking advantage of unclear 
land titles). Buddhist and Muslim temples also received many 
manors. Taoist lands were confiscated during a late Ming persecu­
tion.
The extent of manorial holdings is not clear, but in the late 
fifteenth century in the imperial domain alone, all kinds of manor­
ial land totaled around 46,000 ch' ing. Manors were managed by a 
hierarchy of officials either selected from local households or 
from among various men without fixed sources of income. One hsien
in fifteenth-century Anhui had 279 households in manors out of a
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Commerce
Though a farmer by origin and hence inclined to favor agricul­
ture over commerce, the founder reduced the market tax from 1/10 to 
1/30 and even had a reading primer, unfortunately no longer extant, 
composed to teach illiterate farmers, craftsmen and merchants how 
to read. He forbade the practice of having officials advance the 
money for goods before delivery to the state. This custom had led 
to exploitation of merchants because officials discounted prices. 
Prices were to be publicly posted by local officials and weights 
and measures were to be periodically checked by them as well. Of­
ficial warehouses were set up just outside the capital, but aside 
from the payment of the 1/30 tax, free trade was permitted and 
small dealers were exempt from the tax. Though, as in previous 
dynasties since Han, there were such anti-commercial edicts as 
sumptuary regulations, in early Ming real repression of commerce 
was rarely encountered.
Each of the many crafts had its own district in Nanking. Most 
of the commercial men were not natives of the Nanking area. When 
the capital moved to Peking, southern merchants and goods accom­
panied the government in large numbers. There were large numbers 
of specialized and periodic markets. One great merchant for a time 
became the country's richest man through his connection with the 
founder. Another founded a great emporium in Soochow which kept 
his family rich for centuries.
total population of 17>I^5 households. The holders of these manors
paid no taxes and governed their holdings independently of local
authorities.
Initially, all official trade with Japan had to pass through
Ningpo, Ryukyuan trade through Ch'uanchou and southern seas trade
through Canton. Pirate raids on the east coast caused the founder
to ban all foreign merchants except Ryukyuan and some South Asian
ones, though these limits were somewhat liberalized during the
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The South Asian trade was eventually shifted to Macao when the 
Portuguese appeared. The Portuguese, referred to in the Ming Shih 
(Ming History) as the Folangchi (Franks), were permitted their own 
city at Macao as a device to wean them away from their earlier free- 
booting tactics with which the local authorities could not cope. 
Sovereign power over Macao was nevertheless retained in Chinese 
hands.
Taiwan was not explored in ancient times, but in his voyages 
Cheng Ho often visited it and it was first described in a travel 
book subsequent to his voyages." It was first settled by the Dutch 
with the aid of several illicit Chinese merchants. At the end of 
Ming the Dutch were ousted by Cheng Chih-lung and his son, Cheng 
Ch'eng-kung. The Cheng family remained loyal to Ming during the 
Manchu invasions and mobilized its 200,000-man army and several 
thousand ship fleet. Though he had only a foothold on the Fukien 
coast, Cheng Ch'eng-kung's fleet and his commercial relations with 
Japan and Southeast Asia gave him a base which the Manchus could 
not break. Taiwan was to be his main base for the restoration of 
the Ming, and in the process he made Taiwan Chinese.
When the Europeans came to the South Seas, Fukien and Canton 
merchants were already active there, and if the dynasty had under­
stood the methods of imperialism, the Europeans could have been 
forestalled. Tens of thousands of merchants from nearby Fukien 
settled in Luzon, but were persecuted by the Spanish conquerors of 
the area. Chinese merchants also traded profitably with other
Yung-lo reign. Tribute missions were limited, for example, the
Ryukyuan to once each two years and the Japanese to once each decade,
with the average for all missions being once each three years. The
strict rules allowed a measure of private trading by tribute mis­
sions, but these rules were often stretched or broken.
*This statement is not quite correct; Taiwan was reached by
an expedition in 230 A.D. See Section VI. (EHK)
13^
parts of the Philippines, Borneo (which also served as a refuge 
for Chinese pirates), and other parts of the Indonesian archipel­
ago. At that time the power of the Chinese people greatly exceeded 
that of the Europeans. That subsequently their power waxed and ours 
waned is truly regrettable.
Manufacturing and Mathematicians
The Ming founder had a parsimonious palace building policy so 
as to avoid burdening the masses during the early years of the dy­
nasty while their loyalty still had to be won. Yung-lo, however, 
built extensively in Peking. The new capital resembled Nanking but 
on a larger scale. The palace complex on the southeast of the im­
perial city had 8,350 rooms. Extensive building and rebuilding was 
also done by later emperors. Among other notable accomplishments 
of Ming building were temples, city walls and imperial tombs.
The Yung-lo reign was the most developed period of Chinese 
shipbuilding. During its first seven years 1,632 seagoing vessels 
were ordered built. These vessels required a high degree of sci­
entific and technological knowledge in the places where they were 
built: Fukien, Nanking, Chekiang, Canton, Kiangsi, Soochow, and
Yangchou. The shipyards were very large. The Nanking shipyard, 
begun by the dynastic founder, was supervised by an official of 
the fifth rank, had a complex division of labor and a permanent 
staff of around two hundred, augmented by hired workers during 
busy times. Little is recorded of the methods used for fitting out 
and supplying these enormous vessels, each holding kSO men, but 
they must have been elaborate.
The mid-Ming plague of Japanese pirates was met by the build­
ing of a variety of large and small military vessels for coastal 
work. There were large and small tower ships with wooden armor 
along their sides; there were patrol vessels and attack vessels
with a variety of shapes, one type of which could use both sails 
and oars.
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The Ming is 
notable in the his­
tory of porcelain in 
our country. The im­
perial ki Ins at Ching 
te-chen were estab- 
1 ished during the 
founder's reign, and 
several new types of 
porcelain were manu­
factured. The first 
three reigns of 
Ch' ing continued 
these developments, 
the progress of 
the kilns resting 
on the power and 
prosperity of the 
state. When nation­
al power decayed 
from the Chia-ch*ing 
reign on, the porce­
lain trade also de­
cayed. Even every-
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Fig. 13 Pottery Wheel 
day ware was often elaborately painted.
There had been kilns in the Ching-te-chen area since the 
Northern and Southern Dynasties and by T'ang its product was fine 
enough to be called “false jade ware." An officially supervised 
kiln was established there in Sung-^uring the ching-te year period 
(100^-7) and this ultimately led to the name of the place and prod­
uct being changed. Even in Sung it was famous as one of the four 
most notable kilns. Ming porcelain tended to be thinner than that 
of earlier periods and colored glazing techniques such as five- 
color glaze and cloisonne were perfected at Ching-te-chen.
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The rise of a craft is not an accident. The rise of Ming- 
Ch'ing porcelain is partly ascribable to objective needs of the en­
vironment, partly to the state's leadership as well as to the con­
tributions of technical specialists. Ching-te-chen reached its 
peak during the more than twenty years it was led by a man named 
T'ang Ying during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung eras of the Ching. 
T'ang shared the life of the potters and wrote a still indispensible 
book on the trade. The division of labor was as complex as under 
modern scientific management techniques. Since the late eighteenth 
century there has been no further progress in techniques even though 
as late as the early republican period there were still over a hun­
dred kilns and several tens of thousands of craftsmen in Ching-te- 
chen .
Ming produced three notable mathematicians, Wu Ching, Wang 
Wen-su and Ch'eng Ta-wei. When a book by the latter appeared in 
1592 it was immediately transmitted to Japan where it became the 
theoretical basis for Japanese use of the abacus. The earliest 
abacus-like device appeared in Greece around 500 B.C. But this de­
vice received its fullest development in China, while even as late 
as the fifteenth century Europe did not make much use of it. Not 
long after the second world war a contest held in Japan for speed 
and accuracy between electrical calculators and the abacus was won 
by the abacus. Western mathematics was introduced in late Ming by 
several Chinese collaborators of the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci 
who translated his works into Chinese.
The Monetary and Postal Systems
The founder established bronze cash as the general-use cur­
rency, but the scarcity of copper evoked so much counterfeiting 
that in I375 a paper money was issued to circulate in parallel with 
bronze cash. It was issued in six denominations, from one string 
(equal to 1000 cash or one ounce of silver) down to 100 cash. Four 
strings were equated with one ounce of gold. Commercial taxes were
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to be paid three parts in cash, seven parts in paper. Private use 
of gold and silver for money was forbidden, but specie could be ex­
changed for paper. Local treasuries were established to exchange 
worn notes for new ones. The exchange rules, however, had to be 
loosened before the system would work since worn notes not accept­
able for exchange would not be voluntarily circulated by the public.
The founder commuted office-rice to notes at the rate of two 
strings 500 cash to one tail of grain. Lower denomination notes 
(from 10 to 50 cash) were issued, but overissue depreciated them 
relative to higher denomination notes at different rates in various 
areas. Inflation hindered their circulation.
In 139^ all cash was called in to be exchanged for new style 
paper notes within a period of half a month. Circulation or hoard­
ing of cash was forbidden. The prohibition was repeated in 1403 in 
more severe terms, forbidding gold and silver to circulate. But 
increasing quantity depreciated the value of the paper. An ounce 
of silver would get eighty strings worth of paper, an ounce of gold 
400 strings of paper. Specie and cloth became media of circulation 
among the people. Further measures proved ineffective. By U26 
paper had depreciated by a factor of twenty in terms of grain com­
pared to its value in the early years of the dynasty.
In 1428 printing of the new currency was halted and all 
treasury stocks burned. The next year taxes were increased and 
made payable in paper money so as to increase faith in the currency. 
The circulation of paper increased somewhat. In 1448 circulation 
of copper cash was again forbidden but relaxed again a decade later. 
In 1452 officials in the capital were allowed to exchange their 
salary paper for silver at the current rate of 500 strings of paper 
for one ounce of silver. In 1466 their salary rice was discounted 
from twenty-five to ten strings of paper for one of grain. The 
new paper had depreciated to only ten cash for one string; the old 
paper to only one or two cash for a string. Copper and especially
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silver were increasingly used for exchange. During the next century 
even the government steadily went over to collecting its monetary 
taxes in silver.
In IA29 commercial taxes were raised by a factor of five on all 
business establishments and all means of commercial transport. In 
most places vessels were taxed according to their carrying capacity 
rather than on the value of their cargo. A vessel might be taxed 
a hundred times for a total of 100 strings in paper on a given voy­
age. Though the rates were later reduced, the network of tax of­
fices was maintained.
The postal system resembled that of the Yuan, with water and 
horse stations and express courier posts. There were also official 
hostels in Peking and Nanking for the reception of tribute missions, 
the former having a 300-man and the latter a 100-man staff. Horse 
stations were forty or eighty j_i_ apart and each stocked from five 
to eighty horses, depending on its importance. Water stations, 
established at important junctions had from five to twenty boats, 
each with a crew of ten men. Transport offices had large and small 
carts or freight vessels of varying numbers.
Express stations were placed every ten _H_and staffed with ten 
or fifteen soldiers recruited locally. A letter was to travel at 
least 300 J_i_ a day. Official messages were to be immediately for­
warded whether received day or night. Official credentials were 
necessary to use the system. These credentials could only be is­
sued to those carrying official messages, those carrying out 
tasks for members of the imperial family, foreign diplomats on 
tributary missions, civil and military officials going to take up 
their duties at least 1,500 J_i_ away and for transport of sick or 
dead officials and their families back to their native place.
The Tax System
The founder initially abolished all Mongol customs and re­
stored Chinese ways of doing things. He tightened administrative
lAl
efficiency and lightened taxes to win back popular confidence in 
government. Various miscellaneous non-agricultural taxes were 
abolished and the surtax on the land tax was removed. The land tax 
resembled the T'ang two-tax system. The founder's aim was to make 
payment easier and to make certain that additional illegal taxes 
would not be collected by officials. The Yellow Register of I38I 
and Fish Scale Register of I387 provided the basis for the land tax 
in Ch'ing as well as Ming times.
After the north had been conquered, merchants were induced to 
transport grain for its garrisons by grants of salt certificates. 
Government offices on the frontier traded the surplus tea of 
Szechwan for barbarian horses.
In later reigns,the people suffered as expenses were increased 
to maintain the imperial clan and, in the sixteenth century, to 
finance renewed military expenses on the northern frontier and 
against south coast pirates. The Japanese invasion of Korea was an 
especially heavy fiscal burden. Taxes were Increased and their 
scope broadened. Particularly obnoxious methods were used to col­
lect the new mine tax which had evoked clandestine mining. Evaders 
of this tax even had their hands chopped off and were thrown into 
rivers.
Internally there were new market, crafts, and paper money 
taxes. Externally, though the Ming customs houses were initially 
not supposed to tax but merely supervise foreign goods, it became 
necessary for foreign merchants to pay over 60% of their goods to 
officials to gain permission to land them.
In 1581 the Single Whip land tax system was instituted, con­
solidating the head and corvee tax with the land tax. It was 
levied solely according to acreage. After the land tax, the ex­
cise taxes on salt, tea, fish, wine and on various commercial ac­
tivities represented the largest source of revenue.
The land was divided into official and private fields, in the
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proportion of one to seven by 1502. Official land included various 
imperial manors, office lands and garrison fields, among others. 
Initially the tax on private fields was about 3/5 that on official 
fields, except in that part of the lower Yangtze which had the 
heaviest taxes since pre-Sung times and was additionally punished 
because it was the seat of one of the Ming founder's chief rivals. 
The founder's home area was lightly taxed. Such favoritism is re­
grettable.
The Fish Scale Registers recorded the size and productivity of 
all fields and were so called because they resembled a picture of 
fish scales. The earlier Yellow Registers had taken household 
numbers as their basis. All land sales had to be officially regis­
tered. This system was rightly believed to be a reliable basis for 
honest taxation because "though men move, land remains fixed." So 
long as land was viewed as the "mother" and men as "sons," meaning 
taxes were based on land rather than households, abuses could be 
checked. But by the late sixteenth century the Fish Scale Registers 
of early Ming had become obsolete. In 1577, on Chang Chli-cheng's 
advice, a resurvey was undertaken.
In early Ming the land tax was collected by the wealthiest 
landowners in each neighborhood, each responsible for a ten-family 
unit, the chia. Collection of taxes in advance tended to increase 
and thereby raise the actual tax rate. The Single Whip system, by 
consolidating corvee (which the elite had been exempt from) with 
the land tax, spread the burden more evenly. Like the earlier 
Sung corvee-avoidance tax it allowed local government to hire 
its workers with the proceeds of taxation, which reduced the ser­
vice burden on taxpayers.
In early Ming men from sixteen to sixty were subject to corvee. 
According to a 1375 edict, every ch' ing of land had to contribute 
the labor of one man for thirty days annually at the capital. A 
man could be hired as a substitute, with the landlord paying one 
to defray his expenses. Though the landless were legally not
1^3
subject to this corvee, they were the ones usually hired by land­
lords to carry it out. Using the Yellow Register of households as 
its basis, corvee hit each chia once every ten years as it was ro­
tated among the ten chia constituting one _l_i_. There was also a 
corvee levied on individuals once every five years, with families 
divided into three classes and an extraordinary corvee levied at 
irregular intervals. Attempts to equalize the burden of these labor 
taxes were undone by gentry exemptions.
Before completion of the reunification the founder levied a tax 
of 1/20 on salt. Afterward he sold exclusive rights to purvey salt 
to merchants who supplied the frontier armies. Each salt producing 
area had to meet a set annual quota to forward to the officials. 
Initially 400 chin of salt was exchanged for one tan of grain.
Later paper money was substituted for grain. In its early years 
this arrangement yielded high profits, but by mid-Ming low-priced 
smuggled salt undercut sales of the government product. Various 
schemes to increase the tax only led to worse corruption in its 
administration. All salt had to be transported in government ves­
sels and be accounted for by official tallies. Heavy punishments 
were decreed for private smugglers and corrupt officials within the 
salt administration. In addition to receiving exclusive marketing 
areas for salt, merchants could receive salt in exchange for grain, 
horses, paper money, iron or cloth deliveries to various places at 
various times depending on the state's needs. On several occasions 
the populace was ordered to buy set amounts of salt and pay for it 
with paper money.
In the tea producing districts any merchants buying tea had 
to report the amount bought to local authorities and buy a propor­
tionate number of tea certificates from them. In some areas vari­
ous other commodities had to be exchanged for tea. This system 
was used successfully throughout the dynasty.
The Ming Hui Tien (Ming Statutes) and the economics section of
thfi Ming $hih record nothing of a wine tax, which at times must 
have been subsumed within other commercial taxes. At times prohibi­
tion was enforced. This was the case in early Ming because of fears 
of a grain shortage should liquor grains be planted. Though this 
prohibition was kept up, wine was occasionally taxed directly, but 
never became an important segment of the tax system.
In early Ming all goods were taxed at 1/30. Goods not marked 
were not taxed. There were 382 tax offices distributed through the 
country, each with several sub-stations under it. The lack of a 
detailed list of taxable items initially led to burdensome taxation 
of anything and everything by these local tax stations until in 
1^03 all personal property and ordinary household and agricultural 
tools and objects for religious use were declared exempt. In the 
USO's the old system was restored, but detailed lists of taxable 
items and their value had to be kept by the authorities. From the 
late sixteenth century on, private tax offices were set up at roads, 
bridges, passes, ferries, and other locations, levying a variety 
of increasingly burdensome taxes.
Late in the fourteenth century private mining was allowed but 
always thereafter under government license only and for payment of 
a tax of 2/30. Tax was levied on silver, iron, copper, mercury, 
alum, and other raw materials. The mines of Chekiang and Fukien 
were from the mid-fifteenth century on supplemented by those of 
Szechwan and Yunnan. Silver mines had to pay a set annual amount 
in tax regardless of changes in production. Receipts from this 
tax increased by a factor of twenty-three during the Yung-lo period 
and by a factor of twenty-seven during the Hsuan-te period, not 
because of a correspondingly great increase in production but 
rather entirely because of changes in government policy. In 1596, 
because the state needed more revenue, new mines were ordered 
opened, especially in Honan, Shantung, Chekiang, Shansi, Shensi, 
Szechwan, Liaotung, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Fukien and Yunnan. The 
officials in charge proved villains who confiscated private
1^5
I
Fig., 16 Coal mining using bamboo pipes for 
ventilation.
property in the guise of opening these mines. Posterity recognized 
this as one of the reasons for Ming's fall.
Society and People's Livelihood
Sensitive to his humble origins as a monk, the founder feared 
and hence persecuted gentry intellectuals, even executing many of 
them for writing phrases which might be construed as puns on his 
origins as a monk and bandit. From the mid-fifteenth century the 
power of the eunuchs rose. They became supervisors of the army.
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the markets and of taxation, the unstoppable masters of the central 
administration. Factionalism became chaotic. The eunuchs were re~ 
sponsible for the cruel rise in commercial taxation, both licit and 
illicit, after 1573- Great merchants were hounded out of business 
and even petty transactions in the villages were taxed.
Though taxes were nominally reduced in 1620 during the brief 
reign of Kuang-tsung, under his son capital merchants were ruthless- 
ly exploited and in 1625, after several loyal officials were execu­
ted, a market tax of 10^ was imposed at important communications 
junctions. Conditions worsened thereafter, evoking the bandit up­
rising of men like Li Tzu-ch'eng and ultimately the Manchu inva­
sions. The last emperor and most of his clan proved selfish to the 
end, refusing to contribute their wealth to the defense of the 
major cities from the rebels. The corrupt central bureaucrats were 
capable only of buying off the rebels to save their own skins.
It is certain that had there been brave leadership, the crisis 
could have been surmounted. But the last emperor was a cowardly 
leader and the moral of people, military and gentry was ruined. If 
the emperor had executed his evil civilian and military officials 
and undertaken a fundamental reform, the dynasty's recovery would 
have been possible, as this would have restored popular morale.
The system of tax exemptions had reached the point where those 
who had the strength to pay taxes and who ought to have paid them 
did not and those who ought not to have paid and lacked the strength 
to do so had their burden increased. Contemporaries had warned 
that such inequality was more dangerous to the state's tranquility 
than Inadequate production. The great clans had walled themselves 
off in isolation from the people. True leadership would have, by 
establishing equality, brought the people back to unity.
The pervasive selfishness of the gentry had led to a fin de 
^^ spirit among the people. The merchants dissipated their 
wealth in riotous living, thinking only of the day and not of their
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future fate, prepared to invite the bandits in once they reached the 
gates. If the ruler had been able to make the people his primary 
interest, wiping selfishness from his own heart, he could have 
brought men's hearts together and warded off the bandits to save the 
dynasty.
The exploits of the "rushing bandit" Li Tzu-ch'eng are the 
bloodiest in the annals of Chinese history. Originating in Shensi, 
he affected the entire empire for nearly two decades. Li began as 
a postal runner in a part of Shensi suffering from the depredations 
of one of chief eunuch Wei Chung-hsien's henchmen and then joined 
the ranks of rebellious soldiers who had turned to banditry. Born 
in the Yenan area, he moved to Ninghsia after his widowed mother's 
remarriage to a soldier. After his stepfather's death he drifted 
into a lower-class life of violent crime and thence to banditry.
In I64l Loyang fell to him, but K'aifeng successfully resisted 
his siege. In the course of his career Li besieged K'aifengthree 
times. Though never successful, the last siege was so tight and 
evoked such Draconian defensive measures that human flesh was sell­
ing for two ounces of silver per chin and barely 20,000 people 
remained alive in the city when the siege was lifted.
Having devastated Honan, Li moved into Hupei where his power 
waxed and he began to consolidate his power over other roving ban­
dits. He set up his capital in Hsiangyang and began to plan for 
the seizure of the north and Peking. He soon occupied most of 
Shensi, with Sian as his new western capital and began to receive 
the surrender of Ming generals, even including the former defender 
of K'aifeng.
He then sent men across the Yellow River into Shansi and pro­
claimed a new dynasty with himself as its head. His army now 
totaled 400,000 infantry and 600,000 cavalry. Having broken Ming 
military power in Shansi he advanced on Peking. Earlier, cavalry 
raids had given him excellent intelligence while simultaneously
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cutting off all sources of information to the Ming Court.
The last Ming emperor committed suicide as Li's forces broke 
into the capital. Li drained the capital of its wealth, renamed all 
the bureaucratic institutions and decreed that each five families 
be responsible for the maintenance of one of his men. But the loot­
ing and murdering by his men cost Li the loyalty of the people of 
the capital, and though Honan and Shantung nominally recognized his 
suzerainty. General Wu San-kuei ultimately invited the Manchus to 
his aid at Shanhaikuan rather than come over to Li's side.
The Ming-Manchu force defeated Li at the pass and he fled Pe­
king, carrying his loot back with him toward Sian. In defeat the 
bandits turned on each other. The Manchus forced Li from Sian back 
to Hsiangyang and then Wu-ch'ang. Li was finally forced into the 
hills with only a remnant of his old force where he was killed 
while raiding a village.
Almost as spectacular was the violent career of Li's contempor­
ary, the roving bandit Chang Hsien-chung who ravaged Shensi, Honan, 
Hupei and Szechwan, for a time in concert with Li Tzu-ch'eng until 
jealousy drove them apart. After feigning return to loyalty to 
the dynasty, Chang took the first opportunity to again rebel and 
set himself up in Szechwan until repeated defeats forced him to 
save himself by joining Li Tzu-ch'eng's now more successful move­
ment. A series of bloody campaigns put Chang in control of Wu- 
ch'ang, but fearing Li's jealousy he fled into Hunan, taking Ch'ang- 
sha and moving far enough east into Kiangsi to alarm the Kwangtung 
border before deciding to pull back into Szechwan to evade his pui— 
suers. With his capital at Ch'eng-tu, he soon reduced virtually 
all of Szechwan to submission.
Chang's twin passions were murder and drink. He regretted 
letting a day pass without killing a man, and his policy toward 
the gentry in his service in Szechwan was predictable only in its 
violence. After being driven out of Peking Lf Tzu-ch-eng tried
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unsuccessfully to force his way into Szechwan. By this time Chang's 
cruelties had left Szechwan ripe for a comeback by the authorities. 
Chang tried to hold on to power by intensifying his terrorism and 
changing his own abode every night to avoid assassination. He fi­
nally evacuated Ch'engtu, leaving it in flames and the territory 
around it for a thousand J_|_ a desert. Intending to kill off his own 
Szechwanese troops before taking off for Hupei, Chang was instead 
betrayed to the Manchus by one of them and killed by the Manchus. 
Just before his death Chang ordered his most trusted subordinate to 
return his loyalties to the Ming. At the last even this bestial 
bandit uttered this expression of renewed loyalty.
History is the melancholy record of mankind's struggle for ex­
istence. In this struggle, error and obstacles and disasters are 
unavoidable. Much blood and tears must be shed before history's 
lessons are learned. There are many earlier precedents for the de­
predations of roving bandits like Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsien- 
chung, going back to the Yellow Turbans. In spite of earlier suc­
cesses, they have all been ultimately destroyed. Their Taoist 
religious basis was not enough to save the Yellow Turbans. Huang 
Ch'ao, Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsien-chung all relied on terror as 
well as the pretense of setting up a new dynasty. But none of 
their acts could ultimately save them. Indeed, their terror was 
what ruined them for, as Mencius said, the world will only be 
united by one who does not kill men.
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SOME ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMY DURING MING AND CH'ING
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Section XI
THE AGE OF FERMENTATION: THE CH'ING DYNASTY
Outiine
Lasting from 16AA to 1911, the Manchus' Ch'ing dynasty halted 
the progress of the Chinese economy because of the narrow-mindedness 
and decadence of the imperial clan and Manchu officialdom. The 
Manchus originated as one of the three main branches of the Jurched 
people of Manchuria who had founded the Chin dynasty In the twelfth 
century. The Manchus' branch was settled in the Chien-chou area. 
They were united in the late sixteenth century by the chief Nurhachi 
who in 1616 proclaimed the Latter Chin Khanate. Before long, with 
his 60,000-man army (organized into eight banners of 7,500 men each) 
he defeated the Ming and occupied Liaotung. Within thirty years, 
having changed their dynastic name to Ch'ing in 1640, the Manchus 
took advantage of Ming decadence, the rise of internal banditry and 
the treason of Ming officers like Wu San-kuei to enter China and 
occupy Peking in 16^A.
The period from then until 1911 was one of the greatest import 
in world history. This was the age of popular awakening, of the 
scientific and industrial revolutions, of mercantilism's expansion 
of world trade, the rise of democratic states, of imperial expan­
sion in an age when no nation could remain isolated and advanced 
nations came to rule over the economically less developed states.
The entire world's economy was revolutionized by this new era of 
capitalism. The nations transcended the limits of their traditions, 
as England did in producing a democratic revolution in I6A9-53, 
as France's Louis XIV did in shaking Europe, as Russia did with its 
Europeanization after I689, and culminating with the American and 
French revolutions in the eighteenth century. By this time England 
had established the base for the industrial revolution, the
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imitation of which was one of the main aims of the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868 in Japan. By the end of the eighteenth century England and 
America had established the base for their modernization. Democracy 
and industrialization flourished together.
But what were China's accomplishments during this period? The 
Manchus had still not transcended their barbarous pastoral origins. 
Their government's decadence and self-satisfaction led to a policy 
of isolation and unwillingness to seek progress. But from the Opium 
War on China could not remain self-sufficient, and the economic 
power of Europe and America deeply penetrated China. At this point 
China's economy began to change and gradually enter the road to 
modernization.
Factors Moving China's Economy Toward Modernization
In Nurhachi's time the Manchus treated captured Chinese like 
slaves and once in power the verbal forms of the master-slave rela­
tionship were in large part retained, and real persecution was 
practiced through such devices as the literary inquisition. Punish­
ments were crueler than those of YUan and Ming times. Power was 
increasingly centralized, local appointments having to be made by 
the central, not regional authorities, and no man could serve in 
his home province nor have any relatives serve with him. Key posts 
were reserved for Manchus, showing the essentially colonial nature 
of the regime. Unlike the Mongols, the Manchus made extensive use 
of Chinese officials, and thus they were rapidly sinicized but also 
became decadent and corrupt, and corruption spread from the top 
down to local government. The corruption of such men as Ho-shen, 
who dominated the government for twenty years in the Ch'ien-lung 
reign, significantly affected the national economy.
There was an unprecedented growth of tax-free manors, 80% to 
90^ of them belonging to the Manchus and largely used to support 
the imperial clan, other Manchu clans, and the banner forces and to 
establish garrison fields. Aside from the land confiscated from
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the Ming imperial estates, land was also taken away from ordinary 
commoners and removed from the tax rolls. Nothing was done for the 
improvement of this medieval agricultural system at a time when 
other nations were progressing into modernity in their agricultures.
An important reason for our lack of economic progress was the 
dynasty's intellectual isolationism. The British East India Company, 
founded in 1600, succeeded in entering the China trade by the late 
seventeenth century, but by the end of the following century they 
were limited to the one port of Canton and obliged to trade solely 
through the Co-hong middlemen merchants, largely because of the 
dynasty's isolationism. This isolationism was an obstacle to the 
new spirit of free trade and anti-feudal absolutism which dominated 
England in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Two English diplo­
matic missions in 1793 and I8l6 had failed to win either free trade 
or equality of status for English. This failure made inevitable 
the Opium War and China's subsequent vulnerability to international 
imperialism under the unequal treaties.
Though the Portuguese were the first to bring opium into China, 
the British East India Company gained a monopoly over the trade 
after I780. All through the eighteenth century England suffered 
from an unfavorable balance of trade with China. Only a few novel­
ties, like clocks for the upper classes, could be sold. Aside from 
such items as silk and tea, large amounts of Chinese cotton were 
sold to England especially early in the century, as the English 
cotton industry, not yet industrialized, could not compete with 
the Chinese product. The resulting deficit was met by exports of 
silver to China until the rise of the illicit opium trade put the 
deficit on the Chinese side beginning in 1828.
In 1833 the Ch'ing court banned the export of silver. Its 
determination to suppress the opium trade by the sending of Lin 
Tse-hsu onspecial assignment to Canton ran up against England's 
determination to preserve the trade so as to avoid a return to
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its earlier trade deficit with China, the current surplus also con­
tributing to the fiscal health of Britain's Indian colony. The 
British Lord Palmerston also wanted to use the occasion to open 
China to trade in general. The Chinese, not realizing British 
strength, were also prepared to risk war. When the British won the 
struggle, China was obliged to accept the Treaty of Nanking.
The opportunities for the West to trade with China thereby pro­
vided were the occasion for the first penetration of capitalism into 
China and the beginning of the transformation of its economy. But 
the placing by the unequal treaties of the collection of foreign 
customs duties into the hands of foreigners contravened the prin­
ciples of international equality and free trade. The 5Z tax on all 
goods in foreign trade, regardless of their type, hindered China's 
economic development. English management of the customs service 
often reduced or abolished the tax for foreigners but not for our 
countrymen. Foreign goods, unlike domestic products, were exempt 
from any further internal taxation. As further military losses to 
the foreigners piled up higher indemnity obligations, the proceeds 
of other tax sources such as the salt and 1ikin were diverted to 
their payment and placed under control of the already foreign- 
dominated maritime customs.
The use of foreign capital to construct railroads caused no 
great harm to China. Though of profit to these foreigners, rail­
roads were of still greater profit to China. Those Westerners who 
built railroads for aggressive purposes did not limit their mis­
chief to the economic aspects. After I895, Russia, Germany and 
France forced Japan out of her newly won position in Liaotung and 
Russia took the initiative by winning a railroad right-of-way 
across Manchuria for a shortcut for the Trans-Siberian railroad.
In exchange China's Li Hung-chang won a secret treaty of defense 
against Japan. In 1897 Germany won railroad and mining concessions 
in Shantung. Russia's riposte was to occupy southern Liaotung so 
as to build the South Manchuria Railway. Russia's occupation of
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all Manchuria during the Boxer disturbances evoked the Anglo- 
Japanese treaty which made possible the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 
and Japan's takeover of southern Manchuria. The latter in turn, 
led ultimately to the eight-year defensive war against Japan after 
1937- The mischievous effects of these events were certainly not 
solely connected with their economic aspects.
The most harmful aspect of the foreigners' economic aggression 
against China was their snatching of mining rights. Such attempts 
increased after the Boxer disturbances and brought China closer to 
colonial status.
After 1895 Japan established textile factories in China, and 
America and England, under the most-favored-nation clauses of the 
treaties got similar rights. By I9II there were over I60 foreign- 
owned factories in China. Foreign postal, inland waterway shipping, 
and banking establishments grew in strength from the l860's.
China's foreign trade balance tended to grow worse after 1842, but 
deficits remained manageable (and balanced by some surpluses) until 
after I890.
Sun Yat-sen characterized China's position then as being that 
of a "semi-colony" whose situation was worse than that of a full 
colony. Sun estimated that China's losses to all forms of foreign 
exploitation amounted to no less than two billion yuan annually.
Though the people were being impoverished and society unsettled, 
this economic agression had its good side. Knowledge was increas­
ing, superstitions were being smashed, and the medieval feudal 
self-sufficient economy, which could no longer be maintained, was 
disintegrated and the millenia-old "changeless" economy and society 
were fundamentally revolutionized. It was an age of economic ren­
aissance and fermentation.
Tseng Kuo-fan was among the earliest of the intellectuals to 
realize the need for fundamental change after the Opium War, and 
from such men came the T'ung-chih Restoration. Men like Tseng and
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Prince Kung, though without much experience with or knowledge of 
the West, understood the practical usefulness of Western science 
and technology. During the T'ung-chih period, Germany and Italy 
completed their unification and America resolved its civil war, 
adding three more to the great powers of England, Russia and France 
who had been aggressing against China.
Of the T'ung-chih era leaders Li Hung-chang had the most posi­
tive and progressive attitude toward Western technology, the older 
leaders tending to despair that their generation could ever grasp 
these things' principles. In 186A Li wrote Prince Kung to deplore 
China's obtuse technological backwardness. If the Japanese, the 
piratical dwarfs of Ming times, could send missions abroad and learn 
to build weapons and steamships for themselves, so too could China, 
Li argued. Emphasis had to be placed on getting men who could 
build machines and acquiring machines to build machines so that de­
pendence on foreigners could be minimized and China could engage 
in self-strengthening.
In 1861 foreign warships were purchased and British naval of­
ficers were put to work training a new army in Tientsin. The 
T'ung Wen Kuan (School for Translators) was established in Peking 
to encourage the new studies. In I863 Li established a foreign 
language school in Shanghai and in I865 Tseng and Li set up the 
Chiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai was a translation bureau attached to 
it. Eventually students were sent abroad. Mining operations were 
begun, military and naval academies established, a telegraph line 
begun. Though these men were the pioneers who set the precedent 
for all later modernization, they did not succeed in reaching their 
goal of self-strengthening. The buds they produced were plucked 
before they could flower and theirs' was only an age of fermenta­
tion.
In general, the West sacrificed equality of distribution for 
productive efficiency; China sacrificed productive efficiency for 
equality of distribution. Ours was an economic policy of negative
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self-limitation; theirs one of positive progress. Hence China ulti­
mately lost its initial superiority to the Western economies, and 
in the age of imperialism suffered the ruin of its villages' handi­
crafts and increase in its urban unemployed.
The old remedies unavailing, a new tide of thought ultimately 
arose among China's intellectuals. Tseng Kuo-fan's predecessor as 
head of the Hunan Army had despairingly said after seeing his first 
steamboat, "This is not something our generation can understand."
But Tseng had enough experience of the foreigners to understand 
something of the basis for their superiority. In his later years 
Tseng devoted his energies to having steamship machinery construc­
ted and students sent abroad. Many of the most important men of 
the late nineteenth century were either from his original staff or 
from among these students.
Tseng had absorbed the characteristic Confucian passion for 
economy and simplicity of life and exhibited these virtues in his 
personal life. He also advocated frugality by public authority so 
as not to overburden the people. Of agricultural origins himself 
and havmg witnessed the destruction of agriculture during the 
Taiping Rebellion, he quite naturally emphasized agriculture over 
commerce in his economic thought. Commerce, he argued, had been 
far less adversely affected by the rebellion. In addition to re­
questing tax remission for the lower Yangtze provinces, he used 
Chu Hsi's cooperative granary scheme in Hunan, financed by contri­
butions from the wealthy and charging 10% for loans of grain to 
the poor. In 1868 he supervised the building of dikes using for­
eign machinery. Use of the 1ikin tax had spread to meet the fiscal 
needs of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion. Tseng advocated its 
extension to Shanghai, partly on the grounds that it was a lesser 
evil to burden commerce with this unfair tax than to further burden 
agriculture.
Having seen the efficacy of foreign arms during the rebellion 
and having come to understand China's weak diplomatic position
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through dealing with the foreigners after the rebellion, Tseng took 
as his motto “Study the barbarians' techniques so as to control the 
barbarians." Tseng's aim in constructing steamships and cannon was 
to simultaneously train Chinese in the techniques of their construe" 
tion so as to ultimately not have to depend on the skills of for­
eigners. The students whom Tseng had so long argued ought to be 
sent abroad finally left in 1872, a month before he died.
Tseng was a transitional figure, a conservative in his attempt 
to preserve the old society, but in his old age a reformer in his 
adoption of foreign economic techniques.
Li Hung-chang, Tseng's younger disciple, built on the founda­
tion Tseng had established. In 1873 Li argued that the coming of 
the Western imperialists was without precedent in the three thou­
sand years of Chinese history, and that it would be possible to 
eventually neutralize their power only by mastering their own tech­
niques for manufacturing weapons of war. He soon realized that 
weapons manufacture required iron and steel production which in 
turn required mining. Continued penetration by foreign capitalism 
evoked new emphasis on light industry and spinning and weaving 
factories. At first officially managed, such industries eventu­
ally became merchant-managed government-supervised establishments 
with an aura of mercantilism about them. Up until 1895 most such 
innovations came about under Li's inspiration.
During the l870's arsenals and shipyards were set up in Shang­
hai and Nanking. In l880 a north-south telegraph was built and 
railroad construction requested. During the early l890's spinning 
and weaving mills were established in Shanghai.
When these proved insufficient to avoid defeat at the hands 
of the French and then the Japanese, Li was accused by critics 
like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao of shortsightedness, of having concentrated 
on acquisition of foreign weapons at the expense of fundamental 
reform. Li acknowledged the limitations of his reforms but
165
insisted that military strength had to be the basis for all further 
improvements. His main handicap was to be limited by the institu­
tional arrangements of the Ch'ing and the shortage of men with ap­
propriate talents.
Chang Chih-tung was politically less powerful than Li but his 
equal as an economic builder. Chang contributed greatly to tra­
ditional scholarship's support during his numerous regional tours 
of duty as a civil official. He also encouraged railroad build­
ing, mining and silk processing. His motto was "Chinese learning 
for the substance, Western learning for practical use." Neither 
could be neglected, but neither should be misused. Traditional 
studies would cultivate the spirit within and hence preserve China 
as China. Western studies would be used in the material world 
but would not interfere with classical studies and hence not in­
terfere with the cultivation of the traditional virtues. The 
principles of the sages, the lessons of history on how to control 
disorder, were all still valid. Western improvements would merely 
supplement the deficiencies of Chinese practice.
By admitting some Western ideas as legitimate Chang went a 
step beyond Tseng and Li, though from our perspective he still 
seems a conservative. In 1901, in the aftermath of the Eight- 
Power Intervention, Chang made several recommendations: (l) The
sending of large numbers of men abroad to study the sources of the 
foreigners' strength. (2) Wholehearted changeover to foreign 
models of military organization and equipment. (3) New policies 
to encourage agriculture (the basis of the economy) through new 
techniques and tax forgiveness for opening new land. (A) New 
policies to encourage industry through patent rights, tax abate­
ment, and the establishment of modern commercial and criminal law 
codes to provide a climate of security within which Chinese capi­
talists could develop. The creation of large-scale corporations 
would result. The lower costs of production would yield within a 
decade lower prices competitive with those of the foreigners.
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(5) Use of the silver yuan to limit exchange abuses by officials and 
facilitate the flow of money in commercial life. (6) Establishment 
of a stamp tax to be placed on the great majority of foreign goods 
not yet taxed. (7) The establishment of a modern postal system with 
its local offices under chou and hsien management. (8) Intensified 
translation of foreign books. Unfortunately, the Dowager Empress 
remained a conservative at heart, and none of Chang's proposals was 
adopted during the next five years, except his proposal for greater 
study abroad to substitute for the defunct examination system.
Kuo Sung~l?ao, the dynasty's first ambassador abroad, was even­
tually Impeached by conservatives for his reports from London call­
ing for reform along Western lines. He pointed out that most of 
the new devices which ensured Western superiority hardly dated back 
to the early years of the century, especially the railroad and 
telegraph which were most important for the state's security. Kuo 
realized that military affairs ran a distant second to economic 
factors in making the West wealthy and powerful, and hence he rec­
ommended that, like Japan, China should have its overseas students 
emphasize the learning of economic techniques. But this was an 
idea for which the men of Li Hung-chang's generation were not yet 
ready.
Another diplomat, Hslieh Fu-ch'eng, argued that China's tra­
ditional favoring of the scholar over the inventor and industrial­
ist would have to be reversed and specialization be encouraged.
He warned that unless the productivity of Chinese labor was in­
creased by industrialization, China's large labor force would not 
be able to match the low prices of foreign goods, even within 
China. Railroads had to be built for internal security and to 
encourage trade by Chinese entrepreneurs who should be further 
aided by tax holidays of three years for new enterprises.
Ma Chien-chung was another diplomat protege of Li Hung-chang.
He argued that the path to wealth and power lay through a mercan- 
tilistic policy of having exports exceed imports, exports to be
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encouraged by loans funnelled through a Ministry of Commerce from 
foreign sources to Chinese enterprises. He also advocated use of 
foreign capital for railroad building but paid less attention than 
Hsueh to the problem of avoiding consequent foreign control. Like 
the Western mercantilists he wanted to encourage mining of gold and 
silver and urged Li Hung-chang to preserve the mineral resources of 
the far north from Russian takeover. Ma called for the complete 
abolition of the 1ikin as an unfair burden on Chinese but not for­
eigners' commerce, but this tax was not to be abolished until 1931.
The reform faction led by K'ang Yu-wei rose briefly to power 
in 1898 in the wake of the failure of the self-strengthening move­
ment to stop imperialist encroachments, but it only remained in 
power for a hundred days before it was overthrown and six of its 
members were martyred by the court reactionaries. Though K'ang 
lived on until 1927 he was henceforth without infl uence.
The society K'ang envisioned in his book Ta T'unq Shu (The 
Great Harmony) was a hybrid between Confucian notions and various 
Western ideas, adding up to a species of anarcho-communism. Under 
the Great Harmony there would be no states, no class or racial 
divisions, no war or poverty. His economic principle was the elim­
ination of private property and establishment of public production. 
All agricultural land would be owned publicly, and public authori­
ties at the national, regional and local levels would decide what 
was to be grown and by what means to meet actual needs. Private 
property would also be forbidden in industry and communications. 
Using industrial methods under these conditions of absolute 
equality, a day's labor might be completed in three or four hours 
or less and the balance of a day devoted to leisure and study. 
Private commerce would be replaced by a Ministry of Commerce which, 
on the basis of its knowledge of local population sizes and varying 
needs, would assure equitable distribution through its regional and 
local branches. There would be no bad goods or cheating merchants, 
merely transportation men, clerks and accountants.
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In practice, K'ang had more modest goals: to establish the
administrative basis for capitalism while preserving the Confucian 
moral values in politics. In his Ten-thousand-Word Memorial to the 
Kuang-hsu emperor, he called for a large number of reforms: issu­
ance of paper money backed by gold and silver in the public treasury, 
building of railroads financed by public subscriptions to avoid 
foreign control, allowing the people to build modern machinery rather 
than attempting to keep monopoly control in government hands, en­
couragement of mining engineering and establishment of a 5^ flat 
rate tax on production, the minting of silver coins and ultimately 
gold ones so as to eliminate foreign coinage from the domestic mar­
ket, and establishment of a government run postal system in con­
junction with the railroad network.
To nourish the people K'ang urged the establishment under gov­
ernment supervision of agricultural societies to diffuse the knowl­
edge to be obtained from foreign agricultural treatises, the estab­
lishment of a network of workmen's academies to diffuse new tech­
niques among the population, establishment of commercial institutes, 
followed by lowering of export taxes to encourage commercial growth, 
and encouragement of migration to the northwest and Manchuria to 
relieve poverty. Such migrants would receive special training.
It was essentially a democratic capitalism that K'ang called 
for in his immediate reform proposals. But unlike England and 
France, who had to go through long and bloody revolutionary ex­
periences before establishing their capitalist systems, K'ang 
proposed to merely take advantage of foreign threats and the good 
will of an emperor to impose such changes on a still feudalistlc- 
aristocratic court. Hence his failure. In its aftermath, K'ang 
remained loyal to the dynasty in the manner of a true Confucian, 
losing thereby the allegiance of those Chinese abroad who were 
turning to revolution, but without himself ever regaining his po­
sition within the dynasty.
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T'an Seu-t'ungand Liang Ch' i-ch'ao were K'ang's chief disciples. 
T'an, though a brilliant thinker, wrote little on economics.
During his fourteen-year exile in Japan after I898 Liang broke 
with K'ang to become a republican. Unsuccessful in politics after 
the revolution, Liang turned to teaching and writing in his last 
years. But his scholarship too was limited by his presentist as­
sumptions. He was, however, very influential among late Ch'ing 
and early republican young intellectuals.
He believed in the creation of a "new people" through education 
as being more fundamental than political reform. He argued that 
China's poverty was not due to lack of land or labor but their un­
profitable application to production of goods which did not them­
selves produce additional goods. This unprofitable notion was 
based on the concept in the Ta Hsueh (Great Learning) that producers 
must be many and consumers few. Traditional Chinese industry could 
not compete with that of the West after the industrial revolution, 
was decaying inexorably, and yet its replacement by modern industry 
was not evident. China lacked both advanced technology and suffi­
cient capital. Hence Chinese commerce could only be a subsidiary 
of foreign commerce.
In agriculture, Liang noted Chinese special crops like tea and 
sugar could no longer compete with equivalent foreign products, 
and ordinary crops were barely sufficient for domestic consumption 
even in good years. In bad years and because of tax increases 
farmers were steadily driven off the land, leading to a repeating 
cycle of poverty causing disorder causing still more poverty.
Liang advocated the application of the principles of sixteenth- 
century European mercantilism to contemporary China, arguing that 
any resulting diminution of economic freedom would be more than 
compensated by increased national wealth. In fiscal policy he 
advocated strict control of expenditures to meet only genuine needs 
through a carefully prepared budget, a state monopoly on salt
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sales, encouragement of a modern native banking system and going on 
a gold exchange standard as the closest China could approach a full 
gold standard.
Though no reactionary (he introduced St. Simon's ideas into 
China), Liang was often inconsistent, praising Kuan Tze and Wang 
An-shih but denigrating Sun Yat-sen for partisan reasons. A self- 
confessed dilletante, his contributions to economic thought were 
not great.
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Yen Fu did not participate in the I898 Reform. He had received 
a modern education in China and then in England, serving as a tea­
cher upon his return. Though he was among those calling for 
fundamental domestic reform after I895 (he argued that 70^ of the 
reason for China's defeat was domestic), he did not win favor and 
remained restricted to a life of wide-ranging scholarship.
It was as a translator of Western works that he helped lay the 
base for China's renewal. He especially emphasized the works of 
the English political and economic philosophers, like Mill, Spencer, 
Adam Smith, and T. H. Huxley who had laid the basis for modern 
Western capitalism and democracy. He was a proponent of the evolu­
tionism of Darwin, Huxley and Spencer and its application to both 
individuals and societies. China would grow competitive with the 
Western powers not by simply imitating their innovations but by 
instituting economic and political democracy which would enable 
the Chinese as individuals to become competitive with Westerners.
He opposed mercantilism and favored Adam Smith's laissez-faire, 
though he also approved of state monopolies over the postal service 
and telegraph and state pioneering in new industries which could 
not yield immediate profit. Population growth could bring disaster 
unless production grew proportionately. Though two or three dec­
ades of sustained effort would be sufficient to retrieve China's 
position. Yen feared (and his fears proved justified) that such 
efforts would evoke hostile countermeasures by the imperial powers.
In youth and middle age Yen believed firmly in fundamental re­
form, but in his later years, seeing the destruction of the first 
world war, his faith in modernization was shaken, and he reempha­
sized the value of China's traditional Confucian thought.
By the last years of the Ch'ing, reformers had gone beyond 
their earlier limited concern with armaments and steamships as the 
requisites for modernization and much work was done in railroad 
building, mining and manufacturing. Sheng Hsiian-huai may be taken 
as representative of the official managers of such enterprises and 
Chang Chien of the mercantile-managed enterprises.
Sheng was originally merely a minor official. He rose in 
status and wealth as a bureaucratic manager of modern enterprises 
like the telegraph, railroads and mines under the sponsorship of 
Li Hung-chang and Chang Chih-tung. His scheme for a great national 
railroad system was aborted by the revolution. He advocated aboli­
tion of the 1ikin tax, raising of the tariff to 10%, establishment 
of a modern banking system, creation of a silver coinage and a 
unified money system with mints in Canton, Hupei, Tientsin and 
Shanghai to produce a range of coins which would become the sole 
medium for payment of all forms of taxation.
He did not want the modern banking network to be officially 
managed lest abuses arise. It should be owned and managed by pub­
lic spirited merchants. It should be allowed to issue paper notes 
and, if successful, would ultimately make possible the establish­
ment of a central state bank. He initially argued that a special 
corporation ought to be set up to build railroads, dominated by 
private Chinese capital and management, but with some government 
and foreign capital as well. By 1911, however, he changed his 
mind. Because of corruption which had appeared in privately man­
aged railroads, he advocated national ownership of the main trunk 
routes, limiting merchant-gentry ownership to local lines. Sheng 
remained adamant against local opposition to his plan to national­
ize the trunk routes, and this led to the riots in Szechwan which
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provided the opportunity for the Wuhan uprising to take place and 
the consequent overthrow of the dynasty.
Chang Chien was an early exception to the general opinion among 
the gentry that modern industry ought to be an official responsi­
bility. Rather, he argued, achievement of high office ought to come 
sfter a man had achieved success in business. Giving up prospects 
for an official career, he returned to his native Nant'ung region 
in the southeast to pioneer a modern cloth industry and eventually 
set up a network of additional businesses and social services, like 
primary and vocational schools, with his profits.
He also advocated governmental reform, including establishment 
of a convertible hard currency, establishing a network of provin­
cial banks as the tax reception agencies, rationalization of the 
tax system, establishment of vocational schools and colleges, and 
encouragement of local corporations for mining and local railroad 
1ines.
Agriculture, in Chang's view, remained the foundation for man­
ufacture and hence trade and military power. In addition to tax 
holidays for newly cultivated land, agricultural corporations 
should be encouraged as the modern way to mobilize capital for 
technological improvements. Unlike traditional advocates of the 
primacy of agriculture, Chang held that commerce, particularly 
cloth and iron manufacture, must be the instrument for improving 
agriculture. When in charge of agriculture and commerce In 1913> 
he made this a formal policy.
Chang opposed socialism, arguing that wealth and poverty were 
ultimately the consequence of differences in Intelligence and 
energy among different people and that China's traditions of social 
harmony could allow it to avoid the class jealousies that had 
plagued Western countries without resort to socialism.
All of the above men could only propose partial remedies. It 
remained for Sun Yat-sen to offer the fundamental revolutionary
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resolution of China's dilemma by recognizing that the very existence 
of the Ch'ing dynasty was an obstacle to true reform.
Mr. Sun's education was entirely modern. He was entirely free 
from the inhibitions of a traditional education. He was also a 
convinced revolutionary. He even viewed his training as a physician 
as a means to modernity rather than an end in itself. In 1894 he 
wrote a letter to Li Hung-chang calling for large-scale imitation 
of the West as the only true path to national resurgence. Educa­
tion, Sun wrote, must be along Western and practical lines, par­
ticularly for officials. The state must actively encourage mechan­
ization of agriculture and the opening of new land so that 
population would not outstrip production. Unprofitable activities 
based on superstition must be replaced by use of ever better devel­
oped technology based on the replacement of animal energy by steam 
and electricity. All internal tariffs must be abolished and only 
a tariff on imports retained so as to encourage the growth of the 
economy. Only a rail network would be capable of fully opening 
the interior to modernization.
This first stage of Sun's development of his economic thought 
emphasized production rather than distribution, but it already 
established the economic realm as more primary than the political 
or military, something Li Hung-chang could not conceive.
Sun's ideas on the people's livelihood first began to crys­
tal ize during his travels in Europe from I896 to I898. He noted 
that even though the West had solved the problem of production, it 
had not solved the social question of distribution. If China 
could solve that question, it could modernize without running the 
ultimate risk of revolution which now faced the West.
The goal of people's livelihood was to assure equal distribu­
tion of society's wealth, and most such wealth was in land. The 
land's value was increased by the labor put into it, but the land­
lord reaped an unearned increment from this increased value which
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ought to revert to the public. Though China's landlords were large' 
ly small-scale, early action was necessary to head off big land­
lordism. The ideal behind equalization was the same as that of the 
ancient well-field system, but the practice had to be different. 
Formerly men had been scarce and land plentiful whereas now the 
reverse was the case. Equalization could be achieved by taxation 
or by the state buying excess land from private landowners thereby 
limiting but not destroying the right of private ownership of land. 
The recent land-to-the-ti1ler program of land reform on Taiwan ful­
fills Dr. Sun's goals. It is fundamentally different from the 
Communist "land reform" which makes the state the single great 
landlord of the country.
As Sun originally envisioned it, the present land value would 
remain the property of its owners, but the boundless increase in 
land value after the revolution would be taken over by the state, 
to be used for needed increases in social services. Right after 
the revolution the price of the land would be determined and there­
after its tax or purchase price would be proportioned to increases 
in its price so as to nationalize its monopoly rent. Landowners 
would set their own price for their land. Should they undervalue 
it, what they save in taxes they will more than lose when the 
government buys them out at the low price they have themselves set. 
Conversely, if they overprice their land, they will pay an ex­
cessive amount of taxes. The principle here is simple and its 
administration easy. Hence the age-old problem of eliminating 
corruption in the collection of taxes is in principle solved by 
this reform. By levying only a single tax on the value of land, 
the non-usage of land would be discouraged as even unused land 
would be taxed. Moreover, the efficient use of labor and capital 
would be encouraged because improvements on the land would not be 
taxed.
The application of this single tax in Canton city alone. Sun 
argued, would provide government with enormous revenues to
175
encourage electrification and roadbuilding without further burdening 
the people. Rural land bought by the state could be equitably re­
distributed among cultivators. It would be easier, Sun reasoned, 
to institute this reform before modernization had driven up the 
price of land all over China to the degree that Shanghai land prices 
had risen during the preceding forty years. If this great increase 
in monopoly rent was reserved for public use, the growth of great 
capitalists and resulting social inequality, like that of Europe, 
could be avoided. If not checked, the landowner usurps the profit 
justly belonging to capital and the wages due labor.
Sun was advocating a land-to-the-ti1ler reform as early as 
1907, a decade before the Russian revolution. Even then he distin­
guished between improvements on the land, which should be private­
ly owned, and the natural land itself the value of which should be 
publicly held.
Sun realized how short China was of capital for building rail­
roads and canals, opening mines and financing machine industries 
and hence, though he understood the danger of creating invidious 
class distinctions, he was willing to see private Chinese and 
foreign capital engaged in such enterprises. By I919 Sun had 
worked out what amounted to an economic plan for China (before the 
USSR had adopted this method) which envisioned the state undertak­
ing those enterprises which individual capitalists were unable to 
take on.
Sun denied that class conflict was the source of social pro­
gress, and though he believed that the struggle for existence was 
the cause of progress, he denied Marx's principle of materialism. 
Social progress could only take place when the majority gained 
profit. Nor did Sun accept the Marxian theory of surplus value.
A factory owner need not reduce his workers' wages to gain a profit. 
The history of the preceding seventy years had demonstrated Marx's 
inaccuracy as a prophet.
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Land Distribution and Agricultural Credit Policies
The Manchus behaved like their Chin dynasty ancestors and the 
Mongols with regard to the land. They usurped land, particularly 
the imperial and official manors of Ming, for distribution among the 
imperial clan and the eight banners. The Ming manorial system was 
already extensive enough to have displaced many peasants. The large 
number of unproductive and often non~office holding bannermen ex~ 
acerbated the situation. The provincial horse stations of the 
local banner garrisons also took much land from cultivation. An 
attempt in 1725 to set up a Mencian well-field system for landless 
bannermen failed within a decade largely because of the bannermen's 
tendency to sell the land to outsiders. Each manor had an heredi­
tary head whose main duty was to forward the rents from the excess 
of which he supported himself.
Imperial manors originated from voluntary cession of private 
lands as well as from confiscated Ming imperial manors. The Manchu 
banner lands were concentrated in Chihli. The lands of the Mongol 
and Chinese banners were spread among the other outlying provinces. 
One class of manors in Chihli and Manchuria served to nurture the 
official troops of the eight banners. The eight banner manors were 
not supposed to be alienable, but in 1853 this rule was abrogated 
as too difficult to enforce.
The garrison-fields institution went back to the first century 
B.C. when it was used in Kansu to ward off the Hsiungnu. It con­
tinued to be used for a variety of purposes through Ming, but under 
Ch'ing its functions had been largely taken over by the banner 
system; by the eighteenth century it was abolished in all but name 
and formally abolished in I898.
Official fields awarded to worthy families, like the descend­
ants of Mencius and Confucius, and to support poor scholars were 
tax exempt. Monastic and temple lands had been largely confiscated 
by the state in late Ming, During Ch'ing they never recovered to
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the size of the T'ang churchly estates.
By the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign Manchu and Chinese offi­
cials had become corrupt. The population had increased to three 
hundred million and a shortage of uncultivated land had appeared. 
Rebellions were caused by both political and economic hardship from 
as early as the 1770's. The Taiping Rebellion of the l850's was 
the culmination of this trend. Most of Hung Hsiu-ch' uan's followers, 
including his chief lieutenants, were impoverished farmers, unem­
ployed artisans, petty merchants and dissatisfied intellectuals.
According to the Taiping rules all land was the possession of 
the Heavenly Father and Heavenly Elder Brothers and was bestowed 
equally on all by the Heavenly Emperor. According to the Taiping 
regulations of 1853> land was classified in nine grades and was to 
be distributed in proportion to the size of families, men and women 
being counted equally. All surplus product was to revert to the 
Taiping state. No goods were to be held as private property. An 
equitable conscription system and a network of churches and local 
treasuries were established. Footbinding and slavery were made 
illegal. All these reforms were in accord with peasant demands.
But after taking Nanking Hung abandoned these utopian goals to 
establish a traditional dynastic structure which soon degenerated 
into bloody factionalism and ultimately led the peasant masses to 
abandon the movement.
To stabilize the chaos into which the countryside had fallen 
since late Ming, the early Ch'ing rulers reinstituted the pao-chia 
system and attempted to regularize certificates of landownership, 
especially for those who opened up new land. Attempts were made 
to discourage slaughter of draft animals and acquisition of land 
by officials. Loans of draft animals and tools were also made. 
Pioneers of remote territories were given housing and travel sub­
sidies. As a consequence, 1.8 million mou of new land was opened 
annually from 1662 to 1766.
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Ever-normal relief granaries were established. Rich men were 
rewarded for contributing to local cooperative relief granaries, 
but a tendency to retain reserves of 70^ kept the granaries from 
selling enough grain to reduce prices sufficiently during times of 
high prices. In 1723 new rules attempted to remedy this defect.
By the l850's rebellions had depleted grain reserves and after 
1870 grain imports were necessary to supplement domestic production, 
ending China's self-sufficiency in food.
After the Taiping Rebellion rural pawnshops which made short­
term loans increased in importance. Some attempts were made re­
gionally to limit their interest rates, but the government had 
traditionally been connected with their profitability through taxes 
on their business. In the last years of Ch'ing there was an abor­
tive attempt to set up modern rural credit banks, but only one 
branch was actually established. Though ostensibly based on French 
and Japanese models, the new bank actually more closely resembled 
the traditional pawnshops in its use of pledges and was so viewed 
by the peasantry.
Commerce
Before the Manchu conquest four customs stations had been 
established by them on the border with Ming. As money was plenti­
ful and goods dear, trade was also encouraged with Korea. During 
the first generations after the conquest attempts were made to 
limit corruption in the collection of commercial taxes through 
published regulations. But even in its years of prosperity the 
Ch'ing gave formal precedence to agriculture, the fundamental 
activity.
The development of Ch'ing internal commerce may be divided 
into three phases: the first, when commerce was nurtured under
the K'ang-hsi emperor; the second, when commerce was flourishing, 
with prosperity, steady prices and many rich merchants under the 
Ch'ien-lung emperor; the third, when commerce was decaying, with
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internal rebellions and foreign competition under the Chia-ch'ing 
and Tao-kuang emperors.
In addition to the capital there were four great commercial 
centers: Chuhsienchen near K’aifeng in Honan, the crossroads for
waterborn traffic from the south; Ching-te-chen in Kiangsi, the 
center of production for porcelain which had a national market; 
Hankow in Hupei, the center for the Yangtze valley's trade; Foshan- 
chen in Kwangtung near Canton on the Pearl River, the gate to 
South Asia. Hangchow and Soochow served the flourishing trade of 
the lower Yangtze. The various provincial capitals were also cen­
ters of provincial commerce. The richest merchants were the Shansi 
bankers and Yangchou salt merchants.
The English, who had been trading with several coastal cities 
since the late seventeenth century and were gradually restricted 
during the eighteenth century to Canton, late in the Ch'ien-lung 
era sent a mission to the capital to unsuccessfully request wider 
trade opportunities and the opening of diplomatic relations. The 
Russians, who had unsuccessfully been seeking trade relations since 
Ming times, ultimately achieved the first Sino-foreign treaty late 
in the seventeenth century and improved terms of trade in a new 
treaty in the eighteenth century.
The Cohong system was established late in the K'ang-hsi era.
Its thirteen Cantonese merchant members' monopoly over foreign 
trade was later given official recognition, thereby limiting for­
eign trade to Canton. Its members determined prices, collected 
taxes and a 3^ commission on the trade. The hong merchants 
rented thirteen buildings, called factories in English, for the 
foreign merchants to reside in on the riverbank in the southwest­
ern suburbs of Canton. Of the fifty-six firms resident in them, 
thirty-one were English. Foreign warships, women and firearms 
were banned from the settlement and even the merchants could only 
remain there during the trading season.
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The customs office, called Hoppo by the foreigners after the 
Hu Pu or Board of Census under which it was placed, was supposed to 
collect a 16^ import and kZ export tariff in addition to charging 
for various services like translators. But the Cohong nominally 
collected 30^, and total exactions were often many times the offi­
cial rate.
Imports largely consisted of opium, cotton cloth, ivory and 
woolens; exports of silk, tea, brocades and granulated sugar. Tea 
was the most important export, but as a consequence of Chi'ien- 
lung's banning of private exports, exports tended to decline in 
quantity toward the level of imports which came to be dominated by 
opium. The English had replaced the Portuguese as the chief sup-- 
pliers of opium which had been formally contraband since the Yung- 
cheng era and which was again banned early in the nineteenth cen­
tury. During the eighteenth century the English had come to domin­
ate the Canton trade, but later the other European states and 
America again began to enter the market. The attempt to really ban 
opium in the l830's led to war with England, the opening of five 
ports to foreign trade, and the opening of an era of unrestricted 
foreign trade.
Treaties with America, France and then several other states 
followed the treaty with England in 1842. A new wave of treaties 
opening more ports followed the renewed conflict with England and 
France of the late l850's. Tariffs were limited and diplomatic 
representation in Peking granted, with each nation gaining all the 
privileges given to any other. Influence over Vietnam was lost by 
war to France, and over Burma to England. More territory and 
privileges were lost in war to Japan in 1895. Still more privi­
leges had to be granted after the Boxer Rebellion and the Allied 
occupation of Peking. Only in 1911 did England agree to end the 
opium trade by 1917.
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Modern Enterprises
China's traditional manufacture was organized on either a 
family or guild base. Even large-scale enterprises like iron 
smelting or salt making were essentially families writ large. Only 
natural sources of energy like wind or water power were used and 
were linked to direction by men doing physical work. This differs 
profoundly from modern industry with its use of steam and electri­
cal power directed by men's intelligence rather than their brawn.
China's development of modern enterprises may be divided into 
two periods: the beginning stage up to 1895 and the flourishing 
stage after the Sino-Japanese War. Before I895 the capitalist 
countries concentrated on commercial penetration of China, and 
within China attention was largely paid to steps to overcome mili­
tary weakness. After 1895 the capitalist countries had reached 
the stage of imperialism and were ready to export capital rather 
than just goods. Hence they now took over spheres of influence and 
invested in railroads, mines, factories and banks. The merchants 
and officials of China now realized that concentration on military 
modernization had not prevented defeat by Japan, and they undertook 
modern enterprises to match the efforts of their foreign competitors 
within China.
-The Ch'ing authorities, defeated by the foreigners twice be­
tween 1839 and i860 and having required the aid of foreign weapons 
to put down the Taiping Rebellion, concluded that military modern­
ization had to be carried out. Hence a number of arsenals and 
shipyards were built with the aid of foreign advisers between 1862 
and 1881, the first being set up by Li Hung-chang in Shanghai in 
1862. Soon realizing that arsenals and shipyards required auxili­
ary supporting enterprises, the first modern mine, the K'aip'ing 
Corporation was established in I878. The first Chinese steamship 
company appeared in 18?2. The telegraph began in Tientsin in I878 
and the railroad in I88I, as did the telephone under English aus­
pices in Shanghai. The early enterprises were all closely linked
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to military needs, were entirely officially managed, and gave little 
emphasis to domesticating among Chinese the techniques involved.
It was only after successive defeats at the hands of the French, 
Japanese and then the Allied force occupying Peking that the inade­
quacy of this approach was finally appreciated. From 1882 to 1894 
the officia 1-dominated enterprises began to be supplemented by 
merchant-managed officia1-supervised enterprises, and the modern 
production of commercial (as opposed to military) products may be 
said to have begun with these firms. Foreign goods had already be­
gun to adversely affect Chinese handicrafts, and it was proposed to 
keep profits from such goods from flowing out of China by beginning 
their production domestically. Cotton goods were especially empha­
sized, but mining and iron smelting were also encouraged. As of­
ficial supervision inevitably proved inadequate, foreign engineers 
were usually called in, but they tended to neglect training of Chi­
nese and usually served as an entering wedge for domination by 
foreign capital. In 1893 electric power generation began in Shang­
hai under foreign auspices.
After China's defeats in 1895 end I9OO foreign capital took 
advantage of the spheres of influence their countries had won to 
separately and jointly make extensive investments, even to exploit­
ing China's cheap labor and raw materials in the interior to pro­
duce goods for sale in the cities on the coast. Though these 
enterprises inhibited native Chinese competition, they also taught 
native capitalists and laborers techniques hitherto not understood, 
and large-scale cloth, tobacco, glass, iron and publishing entei— 
prises aiso began to be established by Chinese capitalists for the 
first time. Railroads began to expand, and the earliest Chinese 
modern bank, under joint officia1-merchant control, was founded 
in 1897. In 1896 a Ch inese-managed postal service was begun.
The government began to reorganize itself to accommodate 
modern industry, establishing a Ministry of Commerce in 1903 snd 
beginning work on a modern commercial law code. In the aftermath
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of the Boxer defeat, military vengeance was out of the question and 
the indemnities had so weakened the government fiscally that it had 
no choice but to collaborate with the merchants in a variety of 
ways, including the establishment of several vocational schools. 
Lower class opposition to the foreigners had been defeated with 
the Boxer movement. The upper classes now took over this opposition, 
though they exercised it through peaceful economic competition, in 
particular through beginning to invest in local rail lines to limit 
the degree of control by foreign capital. Chinese investment in 
modern cotton mills and in silk and wool production also increased. 
Investments In Yangtze steamships, cement works and ironworks ap­
peared. In 1907 the Ching-te-chen porcelain works came under 
private control. Several state banks were established and the rail 
network largely completed. Foreign, particularly Japanese, invest­
ments continued to expand.
The Fishing Trade
Fishing originated in prehistoric times in conjunction with 
hunting. From Neolithic times on it was gradually subordinated to 
agriculture and again became a large scale activity only in the 
Ch'ing dynasty. Fishing is mentioned as a subordinate activity in 
Shang. Emperor Shun is said to have engaged in it. The Chou Li 
gives the title of an official in charge of its supervision. Ssu- 
ma Ch'ien describes fishing and salt making as being the original 
main activities in Shantung which Kuan Chung used as the basis for 
Ch'i's enrichment. Fishing was important in all the eastern and 
riverine states of late antiquity. Commercial fish farming in 
ponds was carried out. Fish could be preserved by boning and dry­
ing. By Ch'in times fish oil was used for lamps.
Thereafter fishing was thoroughly subordinated to agriculture. 
Most fishermen were poor inhabitants of coastal areas, and govern­
ment took little notice of them compared to salt manufacturers.
In Ming times, given the threat of Japanese pirates, attempts were
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made to organize fishermen into groups of eight to ten boats which 
would cooperate in fishing and occasionally be used for grain 
transport, by analogy with the pao-chia system used on land. The 
Ch'ing saw the beginning of the modern fishing industry. The many 
new activities occurring on the coast stimulated the government to 
extend the organization of fishermen begun by Ming.
It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that earlier 
orders to establish provincial fishing administrations began to be 
carried out even fitfully. It was early in this century before
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the first modern fishing companies were established as joint state- 
private concerns by several regional governments. This was a pro­
gressive step in the process of assuring the people's livelihood.
Communications
A communications revolution is the most efficacious weapon for 
transforming a nation's economy. Modern communications make pos­
sible the full unification of a nation's economy. During Ch'ing 
the traditional land communications instruments, horse and 
wagon, which had their greatest development in the postal system, 
were revolutionized by the railroad. The first Chinese railroad 
was set up Just outside Peking over a one l_i_ track by an Englishman 
in 1866, but it was soon torn up because of popular fears. In I876 
another Englishman set up a 1.3 mile line between Wusung and Shang­
hai, but it was bought up and torn down by the government the next 
year. A horse-drawn line was assented to in I88O, the first rail 
line built by Chinese. It was motorized in 1882 by an English 
engineer.
Popular and Court opposition to railroads overwhelmed the mi­
nority who understood their value for both defense and commerce 
until the defeat by France in I885 increased the latter's number 
and influence. In I889 Chang Chih-tung called for construction of 
a line from Peking to Hankow. Such a route, he argued, would be 
secure from border dangers and would pass through several prov­
inces, enhancing their economies. It would be the most effective 
route for hurrying soldiers to deal with any internal rebellions 
and as an alternate to easterly water routes for supplying the 
capital. Finally, it could be built in several relatively inex­
pensive stages.
With the Court's assent, China's railroad era at last began 
when construction began on the 1,213 kilometer long Peking-Hankow 
line in the late l890‘s. It was completed some seven years later.
A Peking-Fengt'ien line had been completed earlier. A line south
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from Tientsin under Anglo-German control was not completed before 
the fall of the dynasty, but another line from Peking to Changchia- 
k'ou was finished using only Chinese capital and completely designed 
by Chinese engineers. Lines from Nanking to Shanghai (entirely 
under foreign control), Shanghai to Hangchow, a narrow gauge line 
from Shihchiachuang to T'aiylian, a line from K’aifeng to Loyang, 
and several lines in Manchuria and in the southeast were completed. 
In Taiwan, a line from Taipei to Tainan was not completed until 
after the Japanese takeover, though most of the work was done eai 
lier under Chinese auspices. In all, fourteen lines were completed 
under official auspices before the fall of the dynasty. Four 
private lines were in various stages of completion. In addition, 
the Japanese built the South Manchurian, the Russians the Chinese 
Eastern, the Germans a Shantung line, and the French a Yunnan- 
Vietnam line.
The two-thousand-year dominance of sail, the Chinese state's 
control over shipping and the domination of Chinese shipping by 
Chinese were all ended by the coming of the foreigners' steamships. 
Steamships first appeared on the China coast in the mid-l830's and 
on the rivers in the late l850's. By the l860's steamships were 
appearing regularly on the coast and along the Yangtze and English 
and American steamship companies had been formed in China. The 
3,000 traditional sailing vessels on the Yangtze were reduced to 
AOO by the late l860's because of this foreign modern competition.
In 1862 several Chinese merchants bought four steamships to 
use as grain transports, and in I868 Kiangsu officials built 
steamships for the same purpose. Both attempts were unsuccess­
ful. In 1872 Li Hung-chang won approval for China's first offi­
cial shipping line along the coast, and in 1873 a Yangtze line was 
established. The same year the official shipping line was re­
organized under merchant management. In I885 Sheng Hsuan-huai 
reorganized the line again as a joint state-private enterprise 
which it remained until into the republican era. There were also
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a number of other local joint state-private shipping lines.
Though the pioneering foreign shipping lines were overwhelmed 
by their Chinese competition, several new foreign lines were estab­
lished linking China to the outside world but with extensive routes 
within China as well. Most were English and Japanese. There were 
also American, German, French and Italian lines.
Steamships were being built in China by the l860's. During 
the first decade of this century the Kiangnan shipyard built nearly 
150 warships and merchantmen. Though not as large as the one at 
Kiangnan, the Foochow and Taku shipyards were of considerable size. 
These three facilities, built by Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang 
and Li Hung-chang respectively, were constructed only with great 
difficulty against many handicaps, but they served as the founda~ 
tion of the modern Chinese shipbuilding industry.
In 1878 the first modern post offices in the capital , Tientsin, 
Yent'ai, Niuchuang and Shanghai were established under the direc­
tion of an Englishman. At the turn of the century the system was 
extended down to the provincial and hsien level, and by the end of 
the dynasty an extensive local network had been established through 
agreements reached with several foreign post offices. The foreign 
post offices earlier set up within China did not, however, cease 
operations. After the Boxer Rebellion the Japanese started their 
own postal system which soon had over I60 offices. The French, 
Germans and Russians each had fourteen offices, the English eleven,
and the Americans only one.
/
The Chinese electrical business started in 1879 when Li Hung- 
chang had a Dane install a telegraph line between Tientsin and 
Taku. Within a few years it was extended down to Shanghai and 
made a Joint state-private enterprise. By the end of the dynasty 
a nationwide network of over 6OO stations linked by over 120,000 
J_i_ of line had been established. Undersea cables were also run 
along the coast and to Japan. By I9O5 wireless telegraph stations
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were being established as well.
The first telephones were installed in Shanghai in l88l by the 
English. The first Ch'ing government-run telephones, in Tientsin, 
were destroyed by the Boxers. Upon Sheng Hsuan-huai's advice tele­
phone service was placed under the telegraph administration. By 
1907 the network reached from the capital to Canton, and the Shang­
hai system had been bought out. That year both telephone and tele­
graph were placed under the newly established Postal Ministry.
Most of the telephone companies were under provincial management, 
but several, notably in Foochow, Wuch'ang and Hankow, were private­
ly managed.
Coinage and Monetary Institutions
Nurhachi issued his first coinage in I6I6. Two mints were es­
tablished immediately after the conquest. The earliest post-1644 
coins were blank on the reverse, but to discourage forgery the 
custom was soon established of having a Manchu language inscription 
on the reverse. The location of the provincial mint issuing the 
coin was also inscribed. In 1646 all Ming coins were called in for 
reminting, but in I685 their use was again permitted. During the 
Shun-chih reign the weight of the coins was intermittently in­
creased from 1.0 to 1.25 ch'ien and provincial mints closed to 
discourage forgers. During the K'ang-hsi reign provincial mints 
were intermittently closed to reduce the quantity of money in cir­
culation so as to preserve its value. Several regional mints were 
permitted during the Yung-cheng reign, but the weight of the coin 
was reduced to 1.2 ch' ien to discourage melting down.
Monetary discipline began to slip during the first part of 
the nineteenth century, and during the Hslen-feng reign a series 
of large denomination coins was ordered issued to meet the high 
military expenses of the time. But objections that such coins had 
never succeeded because they encouraged forgery led to modification 
of the order and only 100- and 50-cash coins were issued. Attempts
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to circulate iron coins were still less successful because of their 
inconvenient weight. During the rest of the century there were in­
termittent attempts to circulate heavier coins, on one occasion 
using imported copper. Near the end of the dynasty minting of 
coins with holes was discontinued, and for the first time holeless 
coins were circulated.
The Taiping Rebellion halted provincial coinage, and stoppage 
of copper imports drove up the value of existing coins and decreased 
the effective money supply, causing monetary disorder. Near the 
end of the century bronze dollar (yUan) coins were issued in the 
south to meet the money shortage, and they soon had national circu­
lation. These coins' greater initial value than the silver dollar 
stimulated their overproduction in the provinces and their conse­
quent depreciation in value.
Small denomination silver coins were minted regionally during 
the late nineteenth century, but the central authorities never suc­
ceeded in carrying out plans to do so themselves. As other nations 
went on to the gold standard their silver coins tended to drift 
into China where their varying values caused confusion. Provincial 
mints began coining silver dollars in response, and the central 
authorities eventually consolidated these operations into several 
regional mints.
As silver was the standard of value in commercial exchanges, 
blocks of the metal had traditionally circulated as money. But 
lack of standardization of the weights and degree of fineness of 
the blocks was further confused during Ch'ing by the increasing 
circulation of foreign silver coins. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century the government licensed private silversmiths so 
as to achieve a measure of standardization of blocks of silver.
Paper money was used in early and late Ch'ing. From K'ang-hsi 
to Chia-ch'ing silver and copper coinage predominated. In late 
Ming paper notes had decreased in circulation. There was a paper
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issue during the Shun-chih reign, but the bad precedents of the 
Sung, Yuan and Ming caused its halt within two decades. Paper 
notes based on silver and copper were again issued during the Hsien- 
feng reign, and their number gradually increased thereafter. There 
were also private and foreign notes in circulation. By the end of 
the dynasty the notes of the new state-established banks circulated 
in confused competition with those of local authorities.
During the late eighteenth century certain Shansi dyestuff 
merchants began to branch out into the business of discounting 
notes for other merchants and by mid-nineteenth century a number of 
merchants in other trades were doing the same thing. There were 
three major groups, each with many branches. Because of the diffi­
culty of transporting specie, merchants preferred to make payments 
to each other with notes issued or backed by these houses. By the 
1870's they were also handling the transmission of tax revenues for 
the government. They did much business with very limited capital­
ization and made large profits through turning over other people's 
money. Their organization was quite simple as they depended on 
their customers' trust for their business. They were partnerships 
or single proprietorships with unlimited liability. Their infor­
mality of structure was characteristically Oriental. Though they 
survived the loss of their government business to the new state 
banks after 1900, most were wiped out by the I9II revolution which 
made it difficult to call in their loans to meet the claims of 
their depositors.
Several money-changing houses in the Yangtze valley were able 
to compete successfully with the Shansi note houses by making 
profits from differences in exchange rates. The money changers of 
Shanghai dated back to the eighteenth century but grew in number 
and size after the mid-nineteenth century to 105 houses. The pan­
ic of 1882 ruined half of these. Some of them could pay high in­
terest to depositors because highly profitable short-term loans 
were made to opium traders, but ruinous competition among those
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engaged in this practice led to their collapse and affected those 
not engaged in it as well. Collapse of a foreign-promoted rubber 
speculative fever in 1909 ruined many more money changers.
From the l850's on a number of foreign banks opened in Shang­
hai. Chinese resentment at discrimination against them by these 
foreign banks led by I896 to the establishment of the first Chi­
nese-owned modern bank. From then until the end of the dynasty 
seventeen more modern banks were established, and in I906 the first 
state bank was set up and soon evolved into China's official central 
bank.
The Taxation System
To win popular acquiescence taxes were lightened after 1641+.
All surtaxes on land were abolished. Henceforth tax rates were 
ordered to be revised every decade by the central government and 
the tax schedules published, with copies at the local level for 
public inspection and comment. After several partial tax remis­
sions, the K'ang-hsi emperor froze the size of the tax census reg­
isters. The registers were kept at that level for the remainder 
of the dynasty. The Yung-cheng emperor combined the head and land 
taxes to simplify administration. There were several tax remissions 
during the Ch'ien-lung era because of government revenue surpluses.
the government's fiscal situation was completely reversed by 
the foreign exactions and domestic rebellions of the nineteenth 
century. Inhibited by the earlier, self-imposed limits on the tax 
system, informal exactions, including those on merchants, had to 
be resorted to. Such exactions on the rich salt and foreign trade 
merchants had been used in the Ch'ien-lung era. More profitable 
was the selling of gentry status and ultimately official office 
not only to rich merchants but to the gentry as well. The defeat 
of the Taiping Rebellion required letting the provinces exact a 
variety of local taxes. Hence by the end of the dynasty there was 
no longer a unified national tax system. Beginning as
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"contributions*' these new levies became indistinguishable from taxes. 
They removed in fact the prohibition on increasing land taxes.
These land tax increases went to local authorities, salt and excise 
increases to the central authority.
In anticipation of the end of revenues from opium imports in 
1907 preparations were made for a modern commercial tax code, but 
one was not put into effect before the end of the dynasty. The new 
military and educational responsibilities placed on the provinces 
after I895 caused still greater multiplication of taxes and greater 
divergency among provinces. Nationally, the maritime customs and 
salt taxes had to be dedicated to paying off foreign loans and in­
demnities, and attempts to replace this lost revenue with miscel­
laneous new taxes were generally unsuccessful. The land tax re­
mained most central, followed by the maritime customs, 1ikin, salt 
and ordinary excise taxes.
Private land included alienated banner fields and land held by 
minority peoples as well as ordinary privately held fields. Of­
ficial fields paid rent rather than tax. There were also imperial, 
imperial clan, banner, and garrison fields in the north and north­
west. There were schedules of punishment for officials who il­
legally acquired land. Tax holidays for newly opened land were 
available so long as it was registered, but the rich and powerful 
could easily corrupt local officials so as to keep land permanently 
off the tax rolls.
In early Ch'ing the size of the mou was redefined, but the new 
definition was only applied to newly opened land. Hence the mea­
sure varied chaotically from region to region. The land registers 
remained essentially those of the Ming all through the Ch'ing.
Local fears and inertia and the expense of a complete resurvey 
caused this. Hence except in name no equity in assessing taxes 
was possible. A variety of systems of billing landowners was used 
at different times and under different circumstances. Abuses, 
such as collecting taxes in advance and excess collection, were
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nevertheless numerous. The two annual collection periods were at 
different times in different regions.
The land tax subsumed five categories within it. The most im­
portant ones were a combined land and head tax levied in kind and 
cash at a ratio of eight to two but collected in different amounts 
in various provinces, and a grain transport tax levied in kind in 
proportion to a province's distance from the capital and sent to 
either the capital or T'ungchou to supply banner garrisons or of- 
f/i c i a 1 s.
In the l880's Liu Ming-ch'uan succeeded in compiling a land 
survey of Taiwan despite the armed opposition of some of the major 
landowners whom the reform was designed to force to pay a higher 
proportion of the land tax than they had done hitherto. So com­
plete a resurvey had not been carried out anywhere else during 
Ch'ing, and Liu only succeeded in Taiwan by personally supervising 
the entire operation with the aid of a few reliable assistants 
and, on one occasion, by fighting a pitched battle with his oppon­
ents. Nevertheless the reform made possible the completion of the 
Taipei-Keelung railroad and the opening of steamship routes to 
Hong Kong and Shanghai which, in turn, permitted the blossoming of 
Taiwan's economy.
Males from sixteen to sixty years of age, graded by wealth 
into three categories (with considerable provincial variations) 
owed a labor service tax commuted into money. The head tax was 
included in the land tax and was fixed at the census level of the 
early eighteenth century. This led the government to lose interest 
in keeping accurate census records. The pao-chia system, which 
gave some population information, was mainly designed for taxation 
and internal security purposes. Though local governments were 
supposed to hire labor service men, in early Ch'ing a limited 
number of men could be levied for militia duty. In the early 
nineteenth century such men were allowed to avoid taxfes on thirty 
mou of land, and hence this cannot be considered a true corvee.
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There was also a variety of locally levied corvees from which city 
residents and gentry were exempt and which could be commuted, giving 
local officials and clerks many opportunities for corrupt practices.
Though the early Ch'ing salt laws resembled those of the late 
Ming, trouble was postponed until the Yung-cheng reign by keeping 
the tax rate low. Rates were still kept low during the Ch'ien-lung 
reign, but the salt merchants were not well controlled and their ex­
ploitation of the people continued to grow worse through the end of 
the dynasty.
Some salt was entirely handled by officials, some partly or 
wholly by licensed merchants who often used their influence to pass 
their positions on hereditarily. From mid-Ch'ing on such merchants 
tended to have a free hand in disposing of their salt and to have 
all the tax associated with it pass through their hands. For thir­
teen years after 1792 free sale of salt by unlicensed merchants in 
some areas was permitted. The normal salt tax was divided into 
several components, assessed at different rates in different areas. 
In addition salt was subject to the 1ikin which averaged more than 
twice the normal tax rate and made salt prohibitively expensive in 
areas far removed from production centers. There was an elaborate 
hierarchy within the Salt Administration to oversee the trade.
Ordinary excise taxes of early Ch'ing resembled those of the 
Ming. From the Ch'ien-lung era on they steadily rose and were 
levied on goods traveling by sea as well as by land. After 18A2 
these taxes were labeled "ordinary" or "old" taxes to distinguish 
them from the new maritime customs in the treaty ports. After 
1901 those collected within 50 J_i_ of a port were placed under the 
maritime customs administration. The ordinary excises were col­
lected by appropriate officials from the circuit (tao) level on 
down. They were levied by category of goods at a nominal rate of 
5^, though in practice the rate varied widely by locality. This 
variation gave the foreigners an excuse to gain exemption for
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themselves until a uniform national rate was published, something 
the dynasty never succeeded in doing. Exemptions were also per­
mitted for goods needed in disaster areas and for some small scale 
shipments.
The 1ikin was first applied in 1853 in Yangchou to goods in 
transit along the Grand Canal at the rate of fifty cash per shih 
of grain. It was soon widely applied by the regional authorities 
fighting the Taiping rebels at a rate of 1^. Few merchants were 
affected, and it was understood to be only a temporary war tax.
But after the war the tax was extended to more goods, and the rate 
increased to as much as 5Z- Local control led to extensive corrup­
tion, and the nature of the tax greatly hindered the development 
of internal commerce, leading to repeated calls for its abolition.
In addition to fifteen categories of goods, 1 ikin was also assessed 
on seven more products, notably salt, tea and wine.
The early Ch'ing prohibition against foreign trade (to defend 
' against Cheng Ch'eng-kung and other pirates) was lifted in 1685, 
and four ports were opened of which Canton became the most impor­
tant. Its trade was supervised by a special imperial supervisor 
limited to a one-year term so as to discourage corruption. For­
eigners were restricted to Canton and were annoyed by the extra­
ordinary exactions which were also exacted against Chinese merchants 
at the other ports.
New maritime customs houses were established in the treaty 
ports after 18A2. The tariffs were collected by each nation's 
consular officials, and while this ended the old abuses, the ten­
dency of each consul to favor his own nation's merchants led to an 
agreement in I85I for the Ch'ing government to again administer 
the customs. Renewed abuses led to the establishment in I85A of 
an Anglo-French-Amerlcan directorate to administer the collections. 
Between 1862 and 1907 forty-eight customs stations were established, 
both on the coast and in the interior.
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By treaty the rate on imports was limited to but the ex­
emption of many goods and the tendency of prices expressed in silver 
to drop reduced the effective average rate to k%. The rate was in­
creased to 5% and the number of exemptions reduced when the customs 
revenue was dedicated to payment of the Boxer indemnity. The regu­
lations of 1902 exempted grain, precious*meta1s and specie currency, 
printed matter, goods for the use of the Ch'ing and foreign govern­
ments, travelers' personal goods and other minor goods. Before I858 
only opium and saltpeter were contraband. Thereafter the ban on 
opium was lifted, a ban on salt imports imposed, and certain mili­
tary goods imports permitted.
The rate on exports was also 5^. Specie and corns, printed 
and educational materials, and some other goods were exempt from 
duty. The export of weapons, medicine, salt, copper, iron, food 
(except for vegetable oils) was banned.
The Treaty of Peking with Russia in i860 allowed tax-free 
trade at three places. Later treaties gave Russia still more duty­
free or reduced-duty privileges. A treaty with Japan in 1905 gsve 
the same advantages to Sino-Korean trade as had been earlier 
granted to Russia. A treaty in I866 reduced tariffs for France, 
and a similar deal was made for the Burmese-Yunnan trade in a 
treaty with England in 189^.
Goods in internal commerce often paid in ordinary excises and 
likin a tax several times greater than their price. The treaty 
with England in I858 provided that English goods, after paying the 
maritime customs, pay only an additional tax of 2.5^ in lieu of 
these exactions. This advantage, provided only to foreign goods, 
placed severe handicaps on the development of native Chinese com­
merce and was the greatest reason for its inability to develop.
The duty placed on opium by an agreement in I887 became the largest 
single revenue producer for the maritime customs, an indication 
of the extent of the harm done by the English to our people. Mar­
itime customs revenue tripled in the last quarter of the nineteenth
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century and the first decade of this century, but with foreign goods 
penetrating every corner of our country, how could it not be impov- 
erished?
The Late Ch'ing Destitution of the People's Livelihood and the 
Explosion of the National Revolution
Ch'ing began to decay from the middle of the Ch'ien-lung reign. 
The quality of the emperors had begun to decline as early as the 
K'ang-hsi reign. The Manchu officials' avariciousness, always 
present, grew beyond bounds during the Ch'ien-lung era, as evidenced 
by the twenty-year career of Ho-shen whose private fortune was said 
to equal ten years of ordinary tax receipts. Local officials took 
their cue from their leaders and the quality of the Chinese offi­
cials also steadily deteriorated. In 1800 Hung Liang-chi wrote 
that the level of honesty and morale among officials had deterior­
ated noticeably during the previous several, decades and that clerks 
had become more numerous and avaricious, unchecked by equally 
avaricious officials.
The great increase in population had caused a turn for the worse 
in economic conditions. The population had exceeded 300,000,000 
by the latter part of the Ch'ien-lung era. Hung Liang-chi feared 
that population was greatly outstripping the land supply and that 
the situation was exacerbated by the maldistribution of land.
Prices, he claimed, had already increased significantly because of 
the pressure of increased demand on fixed supply.
A series of popular rebellions from the late eighteenth cen­
tury on had been ostensibly responses to official persecution, and 
the Manchus had not been able to put down the strongest of them 
without the aid of the local militia.
After China's first defeat at the hands of the foreigners in 
the Opium War, further defeats followed one after the other during 
the rest of the nineteenth century.
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There had been only indirect contact between Occident and 
Orient before Ming-Ch'ing times. Chinese silk making techniques 
had been transmitted to Byzantium in the sixth century A.D. The 
technique for making paper, though transmitted to Central Asia by 
the eighth century, did not reach Europe until the twelfth century. 
The magnetic compass reached Europe in 1302, some two centuries 
after its use for navigation was first recorded in China. Gunpowder 
was in use in China by the time of the Sung-Chin war in the 1120's 
but first appeared in Europe in 135^* Block printing began in mid- 
T'ang, movable-type printing during Northern Sung, but in Europe 
not until 1438. Hence it can be seen that China was not inferior 
to but rather a stimulus to the West. It is only in the last cen­
tury or two that the West has jumped ahead in commerce and science 
and, not realizing that we too have our learning, has treated us 
like Africa's savages.
By the time of the Opium War, the drain of silver had driven 
up the price of an ounce of silver to 1,600 cash. This disturbed 
both trade and tax collection. The loss of the Opium War caused 
still larger silver drains. Yet the T'ung-chih Restoration, co­
inciding as it did with the American Civil War, the start of the 
French Third Republic and Japan's Meiji Restoration, had a chance 
to make a true renovation of Chinese life, but this was spoiled by 
the obduracy of the Manchus, particularly the Dowager Express. Her 
and a minority of courtiers' ignorant behavior during the Boxer 
uprising is further evidence of this. Though the Ch'ing authori­
ties seemed to learn their lesson from the Boxer debacle, the 
reforms they backed were only superficial. Chang Chih-tung con­
cluded in the end that no fundamental change would be made.
The upheavals of the last half of the nineteenth century 
produced Mr. Sun Yat-sen, a great popular savior. He was born in 
1866 in Kwangtung province to a family which had fought for the 
Ming in the seventeenth century. It had vowed never to serve as 
officials under the Manchus and hence had devoted itself to farming
ever since. From childhood Sun had heard stories of the Taiping 
rebellion, whose leader was a Cantonese, and deeply admired the man 
and the movement. Because of the depth of foreign influence in 
Canton, Sun was able to learn English from a missionary at an early 
age. He was, therefore, suited by background and training to lead 
a revolution against the Manchus and, in the interests of the peas­
ant majority, to use Western as well as Chinese ideas.
Sun's determination to overthrow the Manchus was fixed in 1885 
in the aftermath of the loss of the war with France which in his 
view had demonstrated the regime's inability to either prepare for 
war or exploit the limited tactical success it had won in Vietnam. 
The inability of Li Hung-chang to accept Sun's advice in 189^ con­
firmed him in his view that a revolution against the Manchus was 
the only course which would save China. His organization of the 
Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) followed hard on the humili­
ating defeat by Japan. During the following decade and a half he 
extended his activities to overseas Chinese, traveled abroad and 
tried to unify all the indigenous anti-Ch'ing organizations within 
China under a common leadership.
The Hsing Chung Hui's successor organization, the T'ung Meng 
Hui (Association of the Joint Oath), was particularly successful 
among Chinese students overseas, especially in Japan. It was 
notable for the oath its members swore in writing not to abandon 
the goal of creating a new China nor to leave the organization un­
til that goal was achieved. Membership was open to all classes, 
and its officers were democratically elected.
Its constitution called for establishment of a republic after 
the overthrow of the Manchu government. Social and economic in­
stitutions were to be changed so that any increase in land values 
consequent upon republican reforms would revert to the nation. 
Ownership of land would thereby be equalized. In other words, the 
San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) were already em­
bodied in the constitution of the T'ung Meng Hui. These
200
principles were to be achieved in three stages: the stage of mili~
tary government, which would defeat the Manchus and foreign im~ 
perialists, and within three years set up local administrations 
to begin removing such abuses as opium smoking and foot binding; a 
six-year transitional stage during which representative government 
would be set up locally; and a final stage of full constitutional 
government.
The Three Principles were publicized in the T'ung Meng Hui's 
Min Pao (People's Journal), published in Tokyo from 1907 to 1910. 
The Three Principles, the journal argued, explained Europe's rise 
to dominance, but though China had to adopt the first two, it was 
by tradition closer than Europe to being able to resolve the prob­
lems of People's Livelihood.
By winning over members of the new army in Nanking and Wu
ch'ang. Sun and his associates were undermining the heart of the 
Manchus' power. While Sun was organizing support in America, his 
followers unsuccessfully attempted a revolution in Canton in 
April of 1910. The martyrs of this revolt nevertheless already 
demonstrated the Nationalist movement's later ability to bind to­
gether men from all classes and occupations. The Canton rising 
also helped inspire the successful revolution the following year 
which was able to take advantage of the disturbances associated 
with the government's railroad nationalization proposals.
Within three days after October 10, I9II, the revolutionaries 
were able to win the garrison of Wuch'ang to their side and take 
over the area, and the whole nation rapidly responded. Within a 
month Shanghai and Nanking were won over and with them the whole 
of the south. Sun Yat-sen was in Denver, Colorado at the time of 
the Wuch'ang uprising. He quickly returned to China by way of 
Europe and arrived in Shanghai in December. At the beginning of 
1912 he was installed as provisional president of the new republic. 
Though not all battles were over, he immediately set to work on 
such reforms as the abolition of opium use and footbinding and the
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unification 
ard for the 
of China
of the fiscal administration, thereby setting the stand- 
new order. Hence we call him the Father of our Republic
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Appendix A
Precis of Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1973-
Part I
THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST ENDURING STATE
Empires and Their Size
Empires tend to expand until their technological superiority
and politico-military efficiency are balanced off by the burdens of
«
increased size (delayed and more costly communications, a more com­
plex, costly and harsher bureaucracy). Size, however, also yields 
more and more various resources. In China these factors tending to 
limit size and cause fragmentation were not strong enough to create 
permanent disunity. The evolving tradition of unity and relative 
isolation from competing high civilizations in turn strengthened 
geographical and cultural unity. Geographical unity was also ulti­
mately encouraged by a revolution in transport and communications 
(Ch. 10).
Among the consequences of unity were manorial ism without feud­
alism, cities larger than Europe's but without Europe's autonomy, 
and absence of the cultural diversity which results from dividing 
a civilization into a competing system of states.
The Early Chinese Empire
Prior to Eastern Chou, the Yellow River valley was divided 
into local principalities. Its agriculture was dominantly slash 
and burn. Lords' estates were worked by slaves-serfs; the rest of 
' the land by peasant collectivities. The first land tax is recorded 
in Lu in 59^ B.C. The appearance during Eastern Chou of fallowing, 
manures, and iron tools lessened the number of workers per mou and
encouraged the dissolution of peasant collectivities. Land became
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private property and serfs became free peasants. This happened more 
quickly and thoroughly in Ch'in.
The first empire's rotational conscription of peasants for mili­
tary service and the related tax collection system were imperiled by 
the growth of huge estates owned by officials and merchants and 
worked by tenants or slaves. Hence Han Wu-ti attempted to reduce 
the aristocracy's size, tax trade and capital, confiscate estates 
(making the state the biggest landowner) and establish state monopo­
lies in salt, iron, and wine. The tradition was begun of executing 
the politically suspect and selecting bureaucrats from the lower 
classes. Though he realized it ran counter to the goals of his 
domestic policy, Wu-ti moved against the Hsiungnu. Public lands may 
have been allocated to cultivators in lifetime tenure. They were 
also used to reward officials, leading to the creation of new lati- 
fundia.
During Eastern Han, slaves, about 1^ to 10^ of the population, 
were likely too expensive to use as agricultural labor, but were at 
times used in manufacturing. Eastern Han was too indebted to estate 
owners to prevent them from quasi-enserfing most of the formerly 
free peasantry, as happened to colon! on contemporary Roman estates. 
The government's weakness and the collapse of conscription (ca. A6 
A.D.) forced local self-sufficiency. Walled defenses around the 
camps of great estates spread for the first time from the frontiers 
to the interior. Barbarians were invited inside the frontiers, as 
in Rome.
The Crisis of the Third Century A.D.
China's division into three kingdoms paralleled the division 
of the Roman empire into three parts. Ts'ao Ts'ao was the era's 
greatest innovator. His state colonies provided the government's 
fiscal base; his hereditary military households made up the core of 
the army. The state colonies were a public version of the mag­
nates' private estates. The stratification of society induced by the
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military households' ubiquity resembled late third-century Rome's 
creation of a caste society.
These innovations soon decayed. State colonists evaded their 
obligations by entering trade or by not registering. Chin assimi­
lated colony land into its state land and allocated it to cultiva­
tors. But this did not work well either, as the elite preferred to 
usurp land for livestock and pasturage which were still economically 
competitive with cereal agriculture in northeast China and were more 
prestigious.
China's situation was parallel to that of fifth-century Byzan­
tium. There were many more big estates in the Western Roman empire, 
which collapsed, than in the Eastern Roman empire, which did not.
As in Rome, in early fourth-century China barbarians were becoming 
increasingly sinicized and hence still more dangerous.
$ino-Barbarian Synthesis in North China
The armed camps in the interior of north China, though novel, 
still reflected the characteristically Chinese idea of a "properly 
ordered society." Ideally a camp's leader was a superior man whose 
deputies were senior local leaders supported by their own communi­
ties. This hierarchy was to be cemented by moral unity and legit­
imated by equity in resource allocation.
The Hsienpi and allied Hsiungnu victors in the fourth-century 
intramural barbarian conflicts initially tried to keep themselves 
as a separate military elite, living off the production of Chinese 
cities and farms. But they were steadily urbanized and drawn into 
large-scale farming and manufacture, often for the market, and 
melded with the richer Chinese families. The provinces were domin­
ated by local magnates who also were often hereditary local offi­
cials.
Attempts to control these landowners led by the late fifth- 
century to the Equitable Fields system, an attempt to limit large
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holdings to service tenure. Local loyalties were to be fragmented 
by basing registration on deliberately artificial units. For the 
upper elite this was usually just a "paper revolution," but in­
itially the state was merely attempting to establish the principle 
of central control over land. Middle landowners could evade limits 
by gaining additional allotments for their slaves.
By mid-sixth century, sinicization permitted the moving of the 
capital from the grazing-arable frontier south to Loyang. The use 
of professional tribal warriors was replaced by a local militia sys­
tem (similar to the Roman temones and capitula) which for the first 
time for the Toba Hsienpi combined farming and fighting. By 58I 
this system provided a force big and wel1-supported enough to re­
unify the empire. Sui Wen-ti, though deeply sinicized, was "not 
ethnically or spiritually fully Chinese."
The Middle Empire
Sul's soldier-peasant militia resembled that of the Byzantine 
Heradian dynasty. The Yangtze became the empire's granary, playing 
the role of Egypt in the Roman-Byzantine empire. The Grand Canal 
was China's Mediterranean. Eventually the canal system rendered 
obsolete the militia's self-supply system. Sul's and T'ang's mili­
tia were commoners registered in the Equitable Fields system. As 
in Byzantium, the health of the militia depended on the functioning 
of its Equitable Fields base. Both T'ang and Byzantium made in­
creasing use of body armor (T'ang as a defense against the powerful 
crossbow) and of elaborate drill maneuvers. Hence it was necessary 
to replace dependence on barbarians and mercenaries with the use of 
a tough, professional militia. /
Serious attempts to keep big estates from subverting the 
Equitable Fields system were made by limiting the size of office 
lands estates. But lack of land made it hard for the state to 
distribute even the legal quotas. Attempts to move local officials 
every three years (before they could develop local vested interests)
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kept them so insecure that they retained incentive to corruptly 
usurp land. Equitable Fields never worked in rice growing areas, 
hence migration south increased. Slaves, though still important in 
agriculture, were not allotted land during T'ang. They lacked sur­
names, could not marry free people, and there were lesser penalties 
for murdering them.
T'ang's eighth-century collapse was partly caused by reaching a 
point of diminishing returns in military campaigns beyond the em­
pire's bloated frontiers. By the late seventh century these exten­
sive campaigns had already disrupted militia schedules. Development 
of the canal system removed justification for a dispersed, self- 
supplying militia. Overissue of nominal honors (hitherto reserved 
for the militia) debased the militia's social status. After 67^ 
the militiamen lost tax-exempt status and hence membership became 
less attractive to the elite. Even before the An Lu-shan rebellion, 
rotating militia units had been replaced by frontier armies under 
permanent leaders. After 755 the loss of central control led to the 
breakdown of the Equitable Fields in a way parallel to the rise of 
European seigneuria1ization.
Manorial ism Without Feudalism
The Sung reunification was accompanied by an economic- 
technological revolution which cheapened the military and adminis­
trative costs of unity and so integrated society that fragmentation 
thereafter was rendered much less likely. Only then did China's 
evolution diverge from that of Europe.
China got manorial ism but without a feudal political-military 
superstructure. By the tenth century much of the peasantry had been 
enserfed on large private manors. That there was a distinction 
between serfs and free peasants is illustrated by a questionnaire 
circulated in ll80 by Chu Hsi, which has separate categories for 
tenant-serfs and "families cultivating land belonging to others." 
Admittedly few other contemporary documents make the distinction
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this clearly, but attempts (such as that by Tan Kyoji) to define 
free tenants as serfs not fully provided for by their masters cannot 
get around Chu's clear distinction between serfs and tenants.
Tenant-serfs are tenants bound to the soil. They appear in the 
records only in the tenth century. Several decrees in Sung and Yuan 
times attempted to mitigate bondage to the soil, but likely had 
little impact. Probably serfdom tended to grow harsher with time, 
with serfs bonded to masters, not the land. In parts of west China 
the state even helped enforce such bondage by ordering the repatria­
tion of fugitive tenant-serfs if they had been enticed away by other 
lords and their original masters were not cruel.
Tenant serfdom likely originated in several ways: (l) As in
Europe, by the partial liberation of slaves. This would account for 
the greater harshness of Sung than T'ang manorial ism. (2) Poor free 
peasants might be enserfed when they sold their land. (3) Coercion 
or inducement of free peasants into quasi-serfdom by offering them 
attractive terms. There was also a limited flow of peasants from 
serfdom to freedom through manumission.
There was much regional variation in the percentage of the popu­
lation in serfdom. Chetung, for example, had greater social equality 
because of its relatively infertile land. Serfs were usually not 
enrolled on population registers, and many of those registered (in 
some areas 70^) rented some land. But though it is not possible to 
estimate its role exactly, "the manor was the dominant institution 
in most of the Chinese countryside." This is Indirectly confirmed 
by the eleventh-century decision to entrust local government to 
units of from five to 250 households, led by the wealthiest members 
of each unit. This system was based on a rural hierarchy and only 
collapsed in the seventeenth century when manorial ism also collapsed.
Some manors were scattered; others were compact. Most fre­
quently both forms were combined: a compact demesne worked as a unit 
under a manager was associated with allotments run separately by
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rent- and service-paying tenants. Demesne workers were even regu­
lated by water clocks set up in the fields. Most irrigation projects 
were administered by manors individually or in combinations. Each 
tenant-serf family was normally an independent economic unit which 
might even trade in the market.
There were many differences from medieval European manorial ism. 
China had many free peasants, there was free sale of land, manorial 
justice was not legally recognized, and landowners were not members 
of a special military class. But the Chinese system could have con­
verged with Europe's if (as Li Kou actually proposed in 1052), land­
lords had been allowed to establish private armies and were given 
official rank for successfully routing local bandits. Even so, 
manorial ism may have siphoned off enough wealth from the state to 
account for Sung's "incapacity to survive unconquered."
Iron, Gunpowder and the Mongols
The Sung economic revolution permitted it to establish the 
greatest army the world had yet seen. By 1160 government arsenals 
were turning out 3>24 million weapons per year. Northern Sung had
300.000 soldiers in and near the capital, a like number on the Liao 
frontier and 450,000 on the Hsi Hsia frontier. Han would have been 
ruined by even one such army. Though it could afford such an army. 
Sung was nevertheless conquered piecemeal, mainly because its high 
technology was diffused across the frontiers to its enemies.
Sung was possibly using coke (coal was definitely used as fuel 
to heat the blast furnaces) to produce at least 40,000 and likely
125.000 tons of iron per year. This iron technology diffused to 
Liao and then Chin. The combination of abundant iron with barbar­
ian cavalry was too much for Sung. Liao did not total ly armor all 
its cavalry. Chin used armored halberd-carrying horsemen as shields 
for its bowmen. The Chinese were chronically short of horses.
The Chin conquest deprived Sung of its best iron and coal re­
sources. Worse, Chin let iron flow freely to the Mongols. The
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Mongols used 
airy shield 
move. They 
lances into
a variant on Chin's cavalry technique: their front cav- 
was divided into sections through which archers could 
also used improved stone throwers and evolved Sung fire- 
true guns.
The Supremacy of Logistics Under the Ming
Ming faced no serious external threats. Even the fifteenth- 
century Oirats wanted only trade and/or ransom of needed goods. By 
the sixteenth century, the "Japanese pirates" were mostly Chinese 
traders made outlaws by Ming's own regulations.
Ming and Ch'ing absorbed a relatively small proportion of 
China's GNP for administration and defense, likely only 15^ to 20^ 
which shows that the Sung jump in economic productivity had proved 
irreversible. Costs were further reduced by the civil service ex­
aminations, which enticed the elite to pay for its own preparation.
The Sung-Yuan military innovations were also maintained, but 
Ming made no fundamental military breakthroughs. Development of the 
cannon was hindered by metallurgical limits. A more fundamental 
cause of this stagnation was the lack of sustained competition with 
equals such as faced Europe and the daimyo of sixteenth-century 
Japan. Ming could successfully meet its limited barbarian competi­
tors with superior logistics mobilizing the resources of a vast 
empire.
The Ming founder could not afford to keep up the army (twice 
the size of Northern Sung's) which had conquered his empire, but 
feared the consequences of its demobilization. Hence he established 
the military as an hereditary caste settled in colonies composed of 
full-time soldiers and soldier-farmers who supported the former 
with one-half of their grain output. This system lightened the 
civilian tax burden. There was a tendency to increase the propor­
tion of soldier-farmers to soldiers and to supplement their support 
with grain transported to the colonies by merchants in exchange for
salt certificates. The merchants in turn tended to settle their own 
tenants on the frontiers, as the grain they produced was cheaper 
than grain transported from the interior. But after 1^92 all grain 
brought to the frontier was paid for with silver, and merchant fields 
disappeared.
The military colonies decayed during the fifteenth century.
They tended to attract Mongol raids, received less state support, 
and incurred greater burdens. Officers tended to turn colonies into 
their private manors, and the state acquiesced in this to assure ad­
equate grain. The fifteenth century also witnessed a partial, al­
beit in part inadvertent, pull-back from the frontier which proved 
irreversible. Thereafter reliance was placed on the rebuilt Great 
Wall which was now higher, had more towers, and was supported by 
cannon, with camps built right into its structure. The wall formed 
a double line in northern Shansi.
By the early fifteenth century the establishment of military 
colonies in Liaotung allowed closure of the sea supply route to the 
north, though it was briefly revived in the 1590's to meet Hideyo- 
shi's invasion of Korea. The new Grand Canal had four times the 
capacity of the sea route and permitted the supplying of Peking, the 
new capital. It also represented a technological breakthrough, 
with an elaborate system of locks using water from the Wen and Ssu 
rivers. The canal was thirteen Chinese feet deep and thirty-two 
feet wide. After 1500 canal traffic declined, mainly because the 
hereditary soldier labor force absconded. This was probably a con­
sequence of the decay of serfdom.
But Ming was not destroyed because of decay. It was merely an 
accident that ruined it a century and a half after internal decay 
began. The coincidence of the rise of the Manchus, internal re­
bellions and epidemics caused a decline of military manpower. The 
Manchus, by themselves no match for China, carried out their con­
quest by using Ming generals. Their infantry was vulnerable to 
firearms, hence the ability of the Three Feudatories to nearly
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reverse the conquest in 1673 to I683.
The Manchus deemphasized firearms within their own armies after 
the conquest. Muskets could still not match the crossbow. They 
also feared dispersal of firearms among the civilian population and 
tried to ban their use until the mid-eighteenth century when bandits 
began using them and ordinary civilians would have been defenseless 
without them. The Manchus accepted defeat in the Opium War because 
China, like Russia in the Crimean War, though too big to be con­
quered, feared the strain of continued war. In particular, the 
Grand Canal was vulnerable.
Part II
THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 
The Revolution in Farming
Between the eighth and twelfth centuries agriculture was revolu­
tionized. In the north better milling techniques led to wider use 
of wheat instead of millet. The most significant improvements were 
in the south's paddy-rice agriculture. The dam, sluice gate, noria 
and treadle watei pump led to manorial dominance, as only manors 
tended to have the resources to exploit these innovations. (Simil­
arly, the European manor of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was 
best able to exploit the ax, better plows and horse harness.) Po­
litical unity eased the spread of these new techniques as did 
printing of illustrated agricultural treatises such as the works of 
Lou Shou and Ch'en Fu and the Yuan figure Wang Chen.
The growing market for grain stimulated consolidation of the 
manorial system, just as the early nineteenth-century growth of 
international grain markets intensified Russian serfdom. There is 
some evidence of serfs paying money rents, though payment of a fixed 
quantity of grain was more usual. Some tenants, therefore, were 
directly tied to the market.
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On the land there was now better plowing and more manuring. A 
plow capable of turning over the sod had been developed in the north 
by the third century and was adapted for use in the wet fields of 
the south by the ninth century. A variety of new seeds, including 
quick-ripening types, had appeared. Seeds and cultivation tech­
niques were finely adjusted to differing soils. Increased possibili­
ties of marketing had stimulated crop specialization. Dovetailing 
of crops and double-cropping wiped out seasonal unemployment in many 
areas. Only the use of wind power in farming was to antedate this 
medieval economic revolution.
Though thirteenth-century China had the world's most sophisti­
cated agriculture, there was still much disparity among regions.
That Northern Sung's population of over 100,000,000 could grow to 
about 160,000,000 to 250,000,000 by I58O was the result of a more 
general use of Sung techniques.
The Revolution in Water Transport
During T'ang there were still difficulties in building all- 
weather roads, but by Sung times stone and brick were used to sur­
face not just intracity but intercity roads. The government post 
took eight to fourteen days to traverse the route from Ch'angan to 
Canton in T'ang and Sung times. Hence by mid-T'ang the statesman 
Liu Yen could receive information quickly enough to adjust central 
government policies to the shifting local prices of commodities.
The reports sent regularly from the capital by agents of late T'ang 
regional commandants evolved by Sung to the official gazette, "the 
world's first national newspaper."
The volume of shipping was "impressive." The 2,000 river ves­
sels built in mid-eighth century by the Salt and Iron Commission 
had alone a carrying capacity equal to one-third that of the mid­
eighteenth century British trading fleet. By Sung, junks were 
being built with iron nails, were waterproofed with t'ung oil, were 
fitted with watertight bulkheads, and carried sea anchors, axial
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rudders, sea floor sampling scoops, depth lines, compasses and rock­
ets for defense. After 1000 A.D. even foreign merchants preferred 
to travel in Chinese ships.
An estimate in 148? that inland water transport was 30^ to k0% 
cheaper than land transport, and that sea transport was 70% to 80^ 
cheaper than land transport probably holds for Sung times as well. 
But losses at sea were high, especially for smaller ships, and the 
northern seas were not reliably mastered until the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
The double canal lock was invented in the eleventh century.
Its use at the juncture of the Grand Canal and Yangtze at Chenchou 
saved 500 workers and 1,250,000 cash annually over the amount needed 
earlier to drag ships over ramps and permitted the use of ships of 
three times the carrying capacity as before.
Though shipping was largely a family enterprise, partnerships 
were also common. These were usually dissolved after each voyage, 
but some were more permanent. Some fleets were as large as eighty 
ships and were run by delegated managers. The Southern Sung policy 
of requisitioning ships for the navy induced combinations of up to 
sixty merchants to build ships in collective ownership, half the 
ships going to the government. Brokerage was the most efficient 
way to assure steady cargos for ships without engines (and hence on 
loose schedules). By Yuan there existed standard threeway contracts 
linking hirers, brokers and shipmasters.
The Revolution in Money and Credit
Ch'in and Han used copper money widely, but it tended to dis­
appear during the age of disunion, except during periods of politi­
cal stability. By the early sixth century use of cash was sporadic 
and confined largely to big cities even in the stabler south. By 
Sui times the economy was likely no more monetized than during Han.
The money shortage persisted into T'ang. Though at the peak
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of production 300,000 strings were minted annually in the early 
eighth century, the amount was reduced to 100,000 strings by 83^. 
Copper was in short supply. Because minting and transport cost 
twice the face value of coins, provincial mints were established, but 
these permitted lack of uniformity and debasement and hence problems 
in paying taxes in cash, which in turn required payment in other corn- 
mod ities.
By the eleventh century the volume of money was much greater 
and its use reached down into villages even for very modest trans­
actions which had been carried out via barter during T'ang. Sung 
coins were used as far away as Southeast Asia and Japan.
Why this monetary revolution? In part it was because "Inter­
national trade" among the Chinese states during the Ten Kingdom era 
disciplined their coinage policies. For example, when Min began to 
use lead coins, its trading partners had to follow suit to avoid 
loss of their copper for inferior Min lead. The copper shortage led 
to a grim search for new ores, the banning of copper utensils or 
decrees lowering their prices to keep people from melting coins to 
manufacture them. Even free coinage was tried, though this was 
ruined by debasement.
The use of iron, lead and even pottery coins to substitute for 
copper during the tenth century was really the beginnings of a 
primitive fiduciary currency: "Paper" money made of other materials.
Bills for the transfer of cash were known by T'ang times: food 
tickets issued to the militia, the eighth-century government-issued 
"flying cash" (based on the flow north of tax money and the flow 
south of money into the tea trade), deposit shops honoring deposi­
tors' checks for a fee, and the issue of promissory notes by gold 
and silversmith shops (which was very close to true money).
Sung initially acquiesced in Szechwan's use of iron currency 
and drained copper from the province. In 979 copper was permitted 
to return, but a subsequent fiat giving iron parity with copper
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led to the latter's disappearance which opened the way for sixteen 
officially recognized merchant houses to issue paper promissory 
notes. By 1072 abuses led to government takeover. The state's 
notes were issued against public money deposits, had three-year ex­
piration dates (because the paper would wear out within that period), 
and were fully convertible, except for a discount at issue. Expira­
tion dates were soon eliminated, and a cash reserve was set up as 
backing, but the notes were not yet inconvertible.
By mid-eleventh century the state succumbed to temptations to 
overissue paper to pay for the wars with Hsi Hsia. A note of 1000 
cash face value was worth only 9^0 to 960 cash by the 1070's. Under 
Chin notes almost completely displaced cash. The Mongols even is­
sued five- and two-cash notes. They used silver and gold as their 
reserve. By mid-thirteenth century removal of reserves to the Yuan 
capital from the provinces and overissue led to inflation, the cure 
for which was correctly diagnosed by one minister as being cuts in 
government spending.
During Southern Sung and in the contemporary north private paper 
was also very important as currency. There were commodity bills for 
tea, flour, bamboo and wine; wooden chits issued by tea houses and 
brothels, and the tax-free ordination licenses of monks. Credit 
was built into the production process; for example, in the twelfth 
century capitalists in the hemp cloth industry would advance loans 
to spinners in the countryside by way of brokers and collect their 
cloth later in the year.
The Revolution in Market Structure and Urbanization
In Han times, by requiring that some taxes be paid in specified 
commodities, the government drew even many isolated communities into 
the market, but nevertheless only the upper classes were signifi­
cantly affected by commerce. This narrowness of the commercial 
sector rendered it easy for government to control and even cruelly 
exploit merchants.
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This pattern continued on through the T'ang. But by late T'ang 
the limitations placed on official markets had stimulated the ap­
pearance of local unofficial markets which became numerous enough to 
oblige a slackening of official controls on the old markets. In 
turn, the new linkages of the rural economy to the market via trade 
in necessities was exploited and regulated by the state through the 
creation of an internal customs network.
The peasantry was becoming a "class of adaptable, rational, 
profit-oriented, petty entrepreneurs" engaged in commercial timber­
ing, oil pressing, sugar growing and processing, fish farming in 
ponds, etc. Such specialization often required the importation of 
food into non-food specializing rural regions. A network of local 
markets fed into three main regional markets: K'aifeng serving
north China; the Lake T'ai cities serving south China; the Ch'engtu 
plain cities serving Szechwan.
Commercialization, though incomplete (vide the quasi-serf 1ike 
status of much of the managerial class), could also be strikingly 
sophisticated. There were various business associations. Business 
functions (trade, warehousing, brokerage) became highly specialized. 
The wealthy tended to disperse their capital among specialized 
agents within this structure rather than concentrate it under their 
direct control. Yet there were some large individual operations, 
like that of the Southern Sung ironmonger Wang K'o whose establish­
ment of several thousand workers was comparable to the eighteenth 
century Urals iron works.
By the twelfth century there were enough large cities for crowd 
diseases to become important. About to 7-5% of the population 
(ca. 6,000,000 people) were in cities over 100,000. In all, at 
least 10^ of the population was urbanized. But because of the 
power of the imperial state these cities never developed the inde­
pendence of their later European counterparts.
Hence, unlike Europe, the manor and the urban market were kept
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from conflict. Indeed the market's existence rendered the manor more 
attractive for its potential productivity.
The period from 1300 to I9OO saw the end of the earlier trend 
toward the growth of great cities. By I900 a smaller proportion of 
the population lived in the largest cities, but there were many more 
small and medium-sized towns than earlier, thereby lessening the gap 
between town and country. Though one may explain urbanization as 
being caused by technological improvements in agricultural and non- 
agricultural segments of the economy, it is equally plausible to 
reverse the causation, and credit the appearance of large urban 
markets for stimulating agricultural growth.
The Revolution in Science and Technology
The invention of printing and wide dissemination of books (to a 
significant degree under state auspices) "made medieval China the 
most numerate as well as the most literate nation in the world."
In medicine, by the thirteenth century there was a conscious 
search for novelty. Old remedies were systematically questioned 
and often rejected for new ones. The state certified doctors by 
examinations and devoted much attention to matters of public health, 
like drainage systems in cities and quarantine rules during epidem­
ics. Local "officials often tried hard to raise the level of medi­
cal practice" by distributing medical texts. "Medicine was one 
field of science at least in medieval China where a gentleman might 
without fear of social stigma aspire to be an expert." Even tooth­
paste and the toothbrush were in use.
In the thirteenth century Ma Chih-chi gave the first descrip­
tion of eruptive typhus. Influenza was first described during the 
Sung, as was schistosomiasis, a disease caused by parasites which 
enter through the skin while working in irrigated rice fields. The 
spread of irrigated rice agriculture, accompanied by increased use 
of human manures, may have increased the risk of this disease which 
by the twentieth century affected 10% of the population south of
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the Yangtze. This may explain the "declining economic vigour of 
South China in later traditional times." The first Sung dissection 
was performed in 1045, and in 1113 an illustrated anatomy text was 
published whose drawings were tr.;nsmitted to the West by the Persian 
Rashid al-Din al-Hamdani. Mercury poisoning was recognized by the 
eleventh century. Malaria was linked to the influence of swamps. 
Some believed that infection was the cause of disease, hence the 
quarantine of Hangchow during the 1181 and 1187 epidemics. Others 
believed that prior body weakness was the cause. Previous medical 
theory was systematized, revised and linked to many more specific 
drugs and diseases than before.
Unlike the West during the seventeenth-century scientific revo­
lution in physics, however, the Chinese failed to resolve the in­
ternal inconsistencies in these theories, perhaps because medicine 
is much more complex than planetary motions. Though it seemed a 
more practical science, the Chinese were unlucky to have picked on 
medicine for such extensive work.
Mathematics in north China, under barbarian as well as Chinese 
rule, was linked to Taoist numerical mysticism. Li Yeh, who was a 
scholar in Shansi after the Mongol conquest, used location in an 
array (matrix) to indicate powers of an unknown. Southern mathemat­
ics was more practical. Indeterminate analysis was used for con­
structing calendars. A late thirteenth-century introduction to 
mathematics drew many of its examples from contemporary city life.
By Ming times nobody understood the advanced positional algebra 
of Chin and early Yuan, perhaps because of the intervening disrup­
tion of north China. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japan 
this early work showed its potential fruitfulness with Seki Kowa's 
invention of determinants and Ajime Chokuyen's development of cal­
culus, though the former used a written notation perhaps learned 
from the West.
In Sung astronomy much larger instruments yielded greater ac­
curacy, and a clockwork mechanism was invented. In metallurgy coal
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and perhaps coke were used in blast furnace technology. In military 
technology gunpowder was developed into a true explosive, flame­
throwers and poison gas were developed, and the Mongols used previous 
Chinese work and Chinese technologists to produce a true cannon. In 
textiles, a machine described in a 1313 work automatically spun silk 
and later hemp into thread. It is very like an eighteenth-century 
European machine described in Diderot's Encyclopedia. Further prog­
ress in textile machinery after Yuan was not blocked by inadequate 
science but by a "weakening of those economic and intellectual forces 
which make for invention and innovation."
Part I I I
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The Turning Point in the Fourteenth Century
For still "largely inexplicable" reasons the medieval economic 
revolution ended with a sharp economic decline between 1300 and 
1500 after which only a slow recovery occurred. From the mid­
fourteenth century on the economy's dynamism disappeared. Why? In 
part because the expanding frontier began to "fill up," in part be­
cause reduced overseas trade cut off supplies of foreign silver and 
reduced foreign contact encouraged society to become "inward look­
ing," in part because philosophers turned from the investigation of 
nature to introspection and intuition.
In 1290 the proportion of the population in the north reached 
its nadir, about 3% to 10^ of the total. Thereafter the proportion 
of northerners began to increase. This was a long-term trend, not 
just a response to the Mongol conquest. The south had begun to 
fill up, its old frontiers becoming densely enough settled to send 
out migrants themselves. By the eighteenth century there was no 
longer any place promising for migrants to move to, except for Man-s1 
churia which remained closed until i860.
Up until this point was reached, migration ta new regions
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would increase productivity in both the old and new regions, even 
without technological advances, as the new regions would relieve 
population pressure on the old settled ones and further stimulate 
the latter via trade. After 1300 increased production only kept 
pace with population growth. There was no real technological ad­
vance. Even the novel crops from the New World occupied only about 
JX of the total acreage. Soy cake was one of the few new types of 
ferti1izer.
Why was there no boom in production of the new fiber cotton big 
enough to break out of these limits? Feasibility of machine spin­
ning had already been demonstrated for hemp. A cotton-based indus­
trial revolution did not occur because the "relative glut of raw 
cotton . . . did not last long and could not, under the economic 
circumstances of late traditional China, be re-created."
By the sixteenth century cotton was in short supply in the 
lower Yangtze and by early Ch'ing the region had to import most of 
its supply from north China. After 1700, when cotton manufacture 
began in the north, the south had to turn to Manchuria and before 
the end of the century to India. There was no way to raise the al­
ready high domestic productivity in cotton agriculture. Hence 
China had no opportunity equivalent to Britain's access to New World 
cotton which permitted a tripling of production between 17^1 and 
1775. There were too many Chinese, and China's commercial network 
was too good to permit any local anomaly to develop into an indus­
trial revolution in cotton. Industrialization of cotton manufacture 
would have had to draw its supplies at the expense of handicraft 
cotton production, and this would have yielded no net increase in 
production.
The closure of foreign contacts overtly harmed Fukien and re­
moved its former intellectual stimuli. The works of Ptolemy and 
Euclid were known in Peking by the late thirteenth century and had 
been translated by early Ming but had "no lasting impact."
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Imports were first taxed in the mid-eighth century. The Court 
asserted priority of access to imports, but others could deal with 
foreign traders. In 979 Sung established a state monopoly over some 
imports but soon allowed officiaily licensed private trade in these 
goods. On balance, however, both Northern and Southern Sung encour­
aged foreign trade. The Mongols banned foreign trade totally by 
1309 but allowed a limited reopening in 131^- The Ming founder set 
up a purely tributary trade but tried to ban overseas travel by Chi­
nese. By the mid-fifteenth century even coastal shipping was banned. 
Within a century growth of illegal trade forced relaxation of the 
ban, but in the mid-seventeenth century it was reimposed and the 
Manchus initially continued the ban so as to isolate Coxinga (Cheng 
Ch'eng-kung) on Taiwan. The ban was again relaxed by the early 
eighteenth century and then gradually restored until by 1757 only 
Canton was open to foreign trade through the officially licensed 
Cohong monopoly.
Extension of the Grand Canal to Peking by 1A15 removed Ming's 
incentive to maintain its navy and its seaborne trade, especially in 
the flimsy (because cheap) and hence dangerous government vessels. 
The ban was maintained thereafter because the government feared de­
velopment of independent centers of power. But this policy was 
economically disastrous. The shortage of good money it engendered 
contributed to the post-fourteenth century recession. Earlier, the 
Mongols' "reckless issue" of inconvertible paper currency had 
drained silver into West Asia, further contributing to the early 
Ming liquidity crisis. Hence, without foreign trade, Ming had to 
stick with an inconvertible paper currency which must have greatly 
alienated the people. The situation was mitigated by the silver 
brought from Japan and South Asia by the semilegal and illegal 
foreign trade of early Ming and by New World silver in the sixteenth 
century.
But too much of southeast China's energy was wasted in dodging 
the authorities. Only the local gentry had sufficient power to
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defy the ban, and they connived in smuggling so thoroughly that they 
developed a vested interest in keeping the ban formally in effect.
In 15^7 to 15^9 the Chekiang governor Chu Huan was impeached for 
successfully enforcing the ban. There followed a great increase in 
"piracy," apparently attempts by small and middle merchants to break 
loose from the big (nerchants and gentry. The ban was finally lifted 
in 1567. The very size of the empire made the ban possible in the 
first place. States the size of those of Ten Kingdoms times could 
not have afforded such isolation.
The fourteenth century was also a divide in philosophy. Sung 
Neo-Confucianism asserted the world's reality against the Buddhist 
claim that it was an illusion. Hence it was good to study Nature. 
But then how to explain evil? If human nature and JJ. ^^3 ) were 
good, then some portion of ch'i ( ^ ) had to be bad or at least 
"unclear." This, however, drove j_i_ out of Nature and rendered phil­
osophy vulnerable to Wang Yang-ming's intuitionism which made "Na­
ture ... a derivative of man's consciousness." Hence, by the seven­
teenth century even practical scientists thought of knowledge "as 
an ordered progression from the empirical/analytical study of phe­
nomena to an intuitive grasp of the working of Mind or Spirit as the 
ultimate reality."
The seventeenth-century scientist Fang l-chih looked down on 
Western thought for never reaching this ultimate reality, and hence 
he did not take seriously its empirical/analytical side. Fang 
merged the mind of the individual and the mental aspect of the uni­
verse. This merger, he argued, made it possible to finally reach 
ultimate reality after the study of particular phenomena had en­
lightened the individual's mind. But such an assumption had the 
disastrous effect of enabling Chinese science to always be able to 
explain any puzzle by shortcircuiting the progression up to ultimate 
reality. Fang himself, however, was cautious about how much of the 
universal mind an individual's mind could link up with.
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The Disappearance of Serfdom
Manorial ism and serfdom were still dominant during Ming and 
early Ch'ing but with declining vigor. They disappeared during the 
eighteenth century. The manor lord was replaced by the landlord and 
pawnbroker; status relationships were replaced by financial rela­
tionships; the gentry ran rural projects as professional managers 
and not as interested landowners.
During early Ming very large manors were given to the new no­
bility, and it proved impossible to take these back. Manors also 
increased through exercise of private force and by voluntary commen­
dation (t'ou-hsien) to escape taxes. The extent of serfdom 
cannot be measured; tenants were sometimes treated like serfs. Only 
the official classes could legally hold serfs, hence others would 
hide their holdings.
There is evidence that by mid-Ming the manor lord was no longer 
obliged to aid his tenant-serfs in time of disaster. Does this make 
them mere tenants? Without a written bond, serf status was not 
legal. In the sixteenth century the master-serf relationship seems 
to have become more precarious, needing kindness by the master for 
it to be kept up. As local networks of markets grew more dense 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tenants and serfs 
tended to meet in them and forge a common class interest. Hence 
the seventeenth century peasant rebellions much more overtly aimed 
at "overthrowing the existing status order" than did those of the 
mid-fifteenth century and in fact really helped do so. In part 
this was because they coincided with the uprisings of roving ban­
dits in the northwest (though men like Litzu-ch'eng were not inter­
ested in a status revolution) which ultimately destroyed Ming.
The Manchus considered serfkeeping as socially dangerous be­
cause it encouraged murder of serfowners. In 1681 they banned 
selling of tenants along with the land. Land in any event was now 
less profitable than trade, pawnbroking and urban real estate. By 
the eighteenth century, land accounts for only 2% to 20^ of those
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great fortunes for which detailed breakdowns are available. By that 
time in many areas, such as Kiangsu, tenants habitually resisted pay­
ing rent. Pawnbroking was easier and more profitable.
With land less attractive, the Chinese bent toward equal inheri­
tance asserted itself and manors were gradually fragmented. Land- 
owners were increasingly drawn into the more numerous and attractive 
towns, weakening their control over sefs, especially as they tended 
to use local government officers at the lowest level to collect their 
rents. As in Tokugawa Japan,' free tenants proved to be more effi­
cient than serfs in irrigated rice agriculture, though there is no 
actual evidence of landowners freeing serfs for this reason. The 
south Chinese pattern was to separate rights to the subsoil from 
rights to the surface, and hence for long-term tenancy to become de 
facto permanent tenure. By the early twentieth century one-third to 
two-fifths of the lower Yangtze and four-fifths of the land in north 
China was farmed by tenants holding their land in permanent tenure.
The end of manorial ism contributed to a population explosion.
In 1580 there were about 200,000,000 Chinese and in I85O about 
Al0,000,000. This in turn contributed to increased social and geo­
graphical mobility and to the movement of rural power to institu­
tions or the rich in towns and cities. Serf females were often 
kept unmarried, as those who reared girls had to pay their lords 
for the privilege. Hence the end of serfdom increased the supply of 
females who had children. Though monasteries remained dispropor­
tionately wealthy, the number of monks leveled off before the end 
of the fifteenth century.
By the 1930's, according to Communist documents, it could take 
only three years to achieve landlord or rich peasant status. 
"Everywhere there was a constant competition, without benefit to 
society as a whole, in which the fortunes of individual peasant 
families continually rose and fell," producing a society "both 
egalitarian and riven with mutual jealousies." Even landless 
managers of clan, temple and association land could become wealthy.
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Until the mid-seventeenth century, landowners were still re­
sponsible for local public works. But their disappearance from the 
countryside led to takeover of these tasks by local clerks and vil 
lage officers, and later, in the eighteenth century, by local gentry. 
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Ming local 
administrative apparatus began to be dismantled piecemeal, region by 
region. Labor service supervisors and mutual-responsibi1ity tax 
collectors disappeared. Clerks became so corrupt that local rich 
men avoided service jobs. Since the early sixteenth century, service 
Jobs had often been performed by men from the poorer classes who 
could not stand up to the clerks but who had to be used because few­
er rich rural landlords were available.
The gentry were not drafted to be local managers. Hence magis­
trates had to consult with and defer to them. The gentry worked 
through lower-level professionals, as on the Rural Compact Boards, 
who were usually lower class and lived off squeeze. Gentry did not 
hold gentry status because they owned land, though such status 
might be reflected in land ownership. In order of ascending impor­
tance, local power resided in trade, finance, education and institu­
tional position.
Rural Markets and Rural Industries
Around the seventeenth century, market towns, especially in 
economically advanced areas, began to multiply faster than the popu 
lation increased. Judging from Shanghai county, this seems to 
correlate with the rise in interregional trade guilds in the county 
seats.
Large scale putting-out (as in the Sung hemp industry) disap­
peared by late Ming, apparently because the market mechanism was 
now so elaborate as to make it unnecessary, even for cotton manu­
facture. Though without capital, a peasant had daily access to a 
market to buy raw materials and sell his or her finished product. 
(The argument for the absence of putting-out is, it must be
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conceded, ex silentio.) The first evidence for putting-out in cotton 
comes from the late nineteenth century.
The cotton industry was based on subsidiary, seasonal labor, an 
"enormous reserve of unused productive capacity." Merchants operat­
ing through the market had "no direct involvement" in the production 
process. A rise in demand simply temporarily mobilized this unused 
potential, permitting no reward for technological innovators. In 
slumps, peasants could spend more time farming. Hence there were no 
penalties to drive the inefficient permanently out of the business. 
Four groups interacted in this mix of "organizational fragmentation 
and structural rigidity": cotton cloth merchants, contractors, arti­
sans and perhaps landlords of the places where the work was done.
Cotton's institutional arrangements appear to be typical of 
Chinese industry in general. Merchants were rarely involved in fi­
nancing production except in some very competitive markets or in 
fields where raw materials were very expensive. The raw material 
for silk was expensive and the looms for weaving it could be very 
elaborate, needing two or three men to operate. Hence when demand 
grew during the eighteenth century, twenty-loom shops became un­
competitive and putting-out evolved, financed by "account houses" 
which were isolated from producers by two or three levels of inter­
mediaries.
Though in general production increased, the separation of pro­
duction from commerce indicates that China was not evolving toward 
an industrial revolution.
truant i tat i ve Growth, Qualitative Standstill
Some Ming-Ch'ing industries operated on a massive scale: the 
porcelain works of Ching-te-chen and the ironworks on the Hupei- 
Shensi-Szechwan border which used charcoal rather than coke, trans­
ported ore and wood over long distances and employed thousands of 
workers. Then why was there no industrial revolution? The devel­
opment of the cotton, iron and silk industries shows there was no
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shortage of capital or restrictions on markets to account for the 
"drying up of mechanical invention."
Was industrialization aborted by political hazards and govern­
ment rapacity, causing the middle class to hide its capital by en 
tering the gentry? The government did occasionally "hunt and fish" 
the merchants. Yet officials often were involved in commercial 
life, at least indirectly through agents, and this led to a "symbi­
osis between bureaucrats and businessmen." By the nineteenth century 
guilds were taking on governmental roles, particularly during the 
Taiping crisis, as did the Ten Guilds of Hungchiang in western Hunan, 
almost all of whose leading members also held official rank. Such 
men represented an urban elite based on commerce and government more 
than on landholding and were not members of "a disadvantaged caste.
The Ch'ing government abandoned Ming's forced inconvertible 
paper currency. It opened new copper mines and imported Japanese 
copper. Paper money did reappear as demand for money increased, but 
it was the entirely private "cash bills" of money shops. The only 
drawback to the late imperial monetary system was its excessive mul­
tiplicity of forms which required an "army of assayers and ex­
changers," but this was preferable to a liquidity shortage.
Were enterprises too small-cale and shortlived? No. Though 
commercial law was mainly a matter of privately enforced custom 
within guilds and trust among non-friends was rare, up to a point 
contracts could be enforced in courts of law, and kinship ties and 
partnerships could support very large enterprises. Much use was 
made of networks of branch offices, as by the Shansi banks, which 
allowed large fortunes to be put to work quite flexibly. There are 
records of businesses lasting for centuries, as did a 240-year old 
Suchou drygoods store.
None of the conventional explanations of Europe's industrial 
revolution are controverted in China, but an industrial revolution 
nevertheless failed to occur, even though the Ming and Ch'ing
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economies still showed resourcefulness. New World crops were adopted 
the simpler Western contraptions (guns, clocks, telescopes, micro­
scopes) were imitated; zinc-smelting, multicolor printing, and sail­
ing in northern waters were perfected. The use of damp cellars for 
spinning cotton in the dry north was discovered. Cotton was manu­
factured nationwide. Welldigging spread into the north. The gybing 
sail windpump, the bulletproof vest and soybean cake fertilizer were 
invented. Entrepreneurship and new institutions (money shops, re­
mittance banks, denser market networks) were all present.
But it is also necessary to consider the availability of re­
sources, capital and labor. Many resources were drying up: wood, 
fuel (especially on the coast where weed and reed fields had been 
converted into paddy), fiber (though cotton gave more fiber per acre 
than hemp, good cotton land was also good food-growing land), good 
farmland and metals. Population growth and technological standstill 
exacerbated shortages. Even simple wooden machines became too 
costly for many peasants. The Yuan government had to donate wood to 
peasants so they might construct water pumps. The high cost of 
metal may have prevented the wide use of the Western cylinder and 
piston pump later on. Roads, though good, were often designed only 
for pedestrians and wheelbarrows because fodder land was so scarce 
that men were cheaper to use for transport than animals.
Waterways were so much cheaper than land routes that areas 
without waterway potential remained underdeveloped. Even eighteenth- 
century British-sty1e land transport improvements would not have 
made land transport competitive enough with water transport to make 
the improvements worthwhile. Backward landlocked areas remained 
backward for this reason and also because areas with water trans­
port attracted developmental interest away from them.
Because of the high degree of sophistication in water trans­
port only marginal improvements were possible. No big advance via 
simple improvements, like the American Erie Canal of 1825, was 
possible because such technology had long since been in use. Only
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a "large jump forward" into steam power could have made any signifi­
cant difference.
A similar "technological discontinuity" would have been needed 
in agriculture. Higher yields would only have been possible by in­
dustrial-age techniques like chemical fertilizers and pesticides and 
machinery. Even additional traditional inputs were often not 
available. In the 1930‘s Hopei and Shantung agriculture would have 
done better with more animal manure, but manure was in short supply 
because grazing land was scarce, and grazing land was scarce because 
a dense population needed more crop land.
Demographic pressure also brought increasingly poor land into 
use, reducing the proportion of the total in paddy. Hence figures 
showing static overall productivity may mask much higher productivi­
ty on the best land. According to Dwight Perkins' figures, agri­
cultural productivity rose from 140 to 22A catties per mou from 1368 
to 1600. By the 1770‘s it dropped to 200 c.p.m. and then rose again 
to 2k0 c.p.m. in mid-nineteenth century. The initial rise most 
likely represents mainly recovery from the Mongol devastation. From 
1600 to 1850 there was not much of a rise unless Perkins underesti­
mated the amount of land in use in I6OO, which would lower produc­
tivity for that date. This is possible because much arable land was 
concealed from the government during late Ming.
Yet yields in the 1920's were well above Europe's just before 
the industrial revolution; France got 9>5 bushels per acre of wheat 
around I8OO, but in the 1920's China got lA. Hence the Communist 
attempt during 1956 to 1959 to increase output by applying more 
traditional technology and labor increased neither yield per acre 
nor per worker. By mid-eighteenth century Chinese writers like 
Hung Liang-chi recognized that a point of diminishing returns had 
been reached. J. L. Buck has shown that in this century yields per 
acre are constant for all farm sizes, but yields per worker are 
higher on larger farms with fewer workers.
231
Why did the population keep growing? The population peaked in 
the twelfth century, fell until the fourteenth century, rose again 
until the late sixteenth century, dropped until I65O and has appar­
ently been rising since. From the twelfth to the nineteenth century 
the population increased threefold to around 400,000,000. Disease 
was the biggest check; there were epidemics in the periods from 1586 
to 1589 and from 1639 to 1644 and which led to a 35^ to 40% popula­
tion decline between 1585 and 1645. This eased land pressure until 
around I8OO. Cultivated land doubled in quantity from I6OO to I85O, 
but its average quality fell. There were no big epidemics from 1644 
to 1756 which allowed population to increase. Cholera epidemics 
began around 1820 to 1822, just when population pressure on the land 
again became critical.
Manchuria's population doubled from 1905 to 1940. From 1919 to 
1932 its land in use more than doubled and its cereal output in­
creased three and a half fold. This was done by traditional tech­
niques, except for the institutional novelty of the large land 
development company. Because initially Manchuria was well short of 
a point of diminishing returns in its agriculture, it could provide 
a base for industrialization under the Japanese in the 1930's.
The rest of China was "almost incapable of change through in­
ternally generated forces." For China to have tripled its cotton 
consumption as England did from 1741 into the 1770's, would have 
been beyond the entire planet's resources. The modern West's role 
in China has been to "ease and then break" this "high-level equi­
librium trap," at first through the treaty ports, especially Shang­
hai, and then by percolating new techniques into the interior. The 
new methods "made possible new combinations of traditional elements. 
Steamships on the major river and coastal routes stimulated busi^ 
ness for junks on subsidiary routes. The telegraph allowed tradi­
tional banks to form themselves into more efficient networks. Im­
ported cotton yarn was used in a new Fukien handweaving industry. 
Foreigners bought Hunan and Szechwan t'ung oil.
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Cone 1 us ion
Compared to China, early modern Europe enjoyed what Alexander 
Gerschenkron has called the "advantages of backwardness." China may 
have been too mature to progress rapidly. Late imperial China's 
complex hierarchy of urban centers may not have been a prelude to 
modernization but an alternative thereto. The disproportionate de­
velopment of the fewer Sung cities might have been better suited to 
encourage modernization, as was the case for the similarly dispro­
portionate position of early modern London and Paris in the economies 
of England and France.
Original contributions, in a Western language at least,to our 
knowledge may be claimed for these topics: (a) the origins of the
Equitable Fields; (b) the origins of Chinese paper money; (c) the 
role of the late Ming epidemics; (d) the structure of the late tra­
ditional cotton industry; (e) the argument that serfdom and serf­
like tenancy from Sung to early Ch'ing were not minor and that their 
disappearance led to the evolution of a new type of rural society;
(f) the thesis that between 800 and 1300 something akin to an econ­
omic revolution took place, after which growth slowed relative to 
China's earlier pace and that of contemporary Europe.
Chinese technological creativity has deep roots and its re­
awakening may astonish us. But industry must advance fast enough 
to let agriculture break out of its trap, and to do this industry 
must enter foreign trade. It can do so effectively, but if it does, 
it will disrupt the regime's control over thought and information.
We cannot tell if this will be "potentially lethal or merely 
troublesome."
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Appendix B
in Precis of Fu Chu-fu ( k.) and Li Ching-Translation
neng ( ^ ), Chungkuo fengchien shehui nei tzupenchuyi
yinsu ti me'ngya A ^ £
(The Sprouts of Capitalistic TactoVs Wifnin China's r€ 
Society). Shanghai: Jenmin ch'upanshe, 1956-
■euda1
WHAT ARE THE SPROUTS OF CAPITALISM?
Though it had its idiosyncracies, China's society went through 
all the stages prescribed by objective historical law. As Chairman 
Mao has pointed out, even without foreign intrusions after the mid­
nineteenth century, the sprouts of capitalism already existing with­
in China's feudal society would have slowly developed into full 
capitalism. Already present within Chinese society were money, 
production and consumption capital, capitalists and their agents, 
and proletarians. Commercial capital was already serving as the 
leading edge of capitalism. At first capitalist relations were mere­
ly localized, with labor subordinated only in form, not actuality, 
to capital. It is from such sprouts as these, as Engels points out, 
that capitalism eventually burgeons to become the central and unify­
ing factor in the economy.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S MERCANTILE ECONOMY 
DURING T'ANG AND SUNG
As Marx tells us, the mercantile stage is the necessary precon­
dition for capitalism. The mercantile economy involves production 
as well as trade. Trade was already somewhat developed by Warring 
States-Ch'in times, and there were large-scale accumulations of com­
mercial capital. Ssu-ma Ch'ien wrote that by Han "for a poor man 
to seek riches, agriculture is not as good as artisanship, and 
artisanship is not as good as trade" (Shih Chi, 129). Though for­
eign trade, by land and by sea, was highly developed, it was largely
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in luxury goods and isolated from the rest of the 
depended on guile and was subject to the whims of 
without roots and not only unable to serve as the 
ism, but was also a hindrance to society.
economy. Commerce 
the state. It was 
base for capital-
T'ang represented the peak of China's feudal economy. Though 
the feudal natural economy was still the most important sector, the 
mercantile sector, began to make great strides forward. By the mid­
eighth century T'ang's internal economy had in many respects tran­
scended its earlier forms. Markets were fixed and urbanized. 
Articles of everyday use now entered the market. Merchants special­
ized and were grouped in markets by specialty. Craftsmen also 
traded in their own products, at least locally. Middlemen with con­
siderable capital as well as money changers became numerous. Bills 
of exchange came into use. There were also rural markets operating 
down to the village level. The monetary system was shifting from a 
bronze-cloth basis to specie, particularly silver. Improvements in 
commercial and transportation techniques were mutually stimulative.
Foreign trade grew, particularly the land trade with the nearby 
states of Central Asia. Occasionally this trade drained so many 
goods from China that the state had to suspend it. A significant 
number of private fortunes were created. T'ang's sea trade provided 
the base for still more extensive development later on. Arabs were 
the most important people in this trade. Maritime excise taxes be­
came a significant source of government revenues.
Tea, which had become ubiquitous in its use by mid-T'ang, was 
a notable agricultural specialty. The "flying cash" paper notes 
were mostly used by the far-ranging tea merchants. Tea also now 
began to be exchanged for horses at the frontier markets. One T'ang 
source lists fifteen districts specializing in tea production. Most
J
he actual cultivators were hired laborers. They worked by the 
feds in large tea gardens owned by the rich, usually of the of- 
al class. We do not know whether most of these laborers were 
. 1 The skilled workers engaged in drying and processing the tea
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leaves were recruited from a wide area, and they were often paid in 
tea which they then sold after dispersing from the gardens. Their 
status still had a feudal aura about it.
Tea seems to have been the only product significantly commer­
cialized. Officially controlled artisans for the palace and army 
were still in the central position in the labor force. This practice 
went back to Chou times and had spread with the evolution of the 
economy. Production materials for these official artisans came from 
taxes in kind. Artisans served prescribed periods of apprenticeship 
with close supervision either directly or indirectly by the state.
State interference in the salt and iron industries after mid­
eighth century greatly restricted the private sector in these trades. 
This was because some of the state monopolies in these trades did 
not produce for the market and kept many of their techniques secret. 
Even in those activities like the salt trade, which produced for the 
market, the state's aims were primarily profit for itself and the 
subordination of commerce to agriculture. But because the scale of 
operations was so great, there was advance in the division of labor 
and increasing sophistication of techniques. Nor did state produc­
tion prevent a significant increase in the size of the private sec­
tor. Rural and urban commercial production were already separately 
organized.
In manufacture there was specialization by craft and region.
In textiles, silk, hemp and wool were distinct trades. The scale of 
manufacture was, however, comparable in smallness to that of the 
producers' guilds of medieval Europe, i.e., it was still pre­
capitalist in form. Little is known about the forms of management 
and status of labor of the large-scale private firms.
As would be expected in a period when feudalism was at its 
peak, the several forms of labor service tax constituted the most 
important forms of labor in the T'ang state industries, though at 
times hired labor was used to supplement it. Free labor existed,
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as is shown by the numerous names used for various kinds of hired 
laborers. Laborers were hired by the day, month, or by piece rate. 
Some artisans owned their own tools. Some traveled about offering 
themselves for hire. Some had their own fixed places of business. 
But, as Marx and Engels say was the case in medieval Europe, free 
labor was scattered and without power or cohesion, merely an aid to 
a feudal order in which a natural economy was still central and the 
state was still emphasizing agriculture.
Hence one may not yet speak of the sprouting of the factors of 
capitalism. Present, however, was the foundation for economic devel­
opment in the period from Sung to Ch'ing.
Late T'ang and Five Dynasties was a period of feudal chaos and 
warfare. Economic decay was not halted until the early Sung reuni­
fication and consequent pacification of village life provided a 
breathing space for society. Thereafter growth was renewed and the 
mercantile economy took a step forward.
Sung commerce was much greater in scale than T'ang's. The 
T'ang urban markets operated only during daylight hours and were 
closely supervised by the state. Locations of the markets and the 
type and quality of the goods sold were all specified. By Sung 
such restrictions were gone. Free markets operated day and night. 
There were also temple markets. Southern Sung went even further.. 
There were big urban markets thronged with both local and traveling 
merchants. Local trade, especially Southern Sung's, was also much 
more developed than during T'ang. Many rural markets which had been 
formally organized as garrison centers (chen sh i h "jP ) during 
Northern Sung, became significantly large urban centers, often county 
seats, by Southern Sung. These were also the loci for considerable 
accumulations of monetary capital.
Though the forms of state regulation of foreign trade still re­
sembled those of T'ang, the scale of the trade was much greater, 
reaching its peak during Southern Sung. Even by Northern Sung there
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were many more tax offices and sub-offices than during T'ang. Canton 
was still the biggest port, but by late Northern Sung and early 
Southern Sung Ch'Uanchou was beginning to become the new center, ul­
timately because of its nearness to Hangchow, the Southern Sung 
capital. It attracted merchants from more than fifty countries 
dealing in several hundred kinds of goods. Because imports exceeded 
exports, there was a monetary drain and a serious internal monetary 
crisis. Nevertheless a flourishing foreign trade continued through 
late Yuan. But because it was still controlled by feudal lords and 
rich merchants, this trade was not able to displace from centrality 
the feudal natural economy, and capital accumulation and the devel­
opment of internal commerce was still hindered.
Tea was still the chief commercialized agricultural product, 
but the scale of the trade greatly exceeded that of T'ang. The 
state took over marketing and even had its own tea plantations and 
processing plants, some using water power. Labor was still either 
conscripted or recruited and hence was still basically feudal.
There were many more varieties of tea than during T'ang, requiring 
specialized processing techniques. Tea was no longer a subsidiary 
agricultural product but the center of mass-use specialized industry.
Sugar became an important commercial item during Sung. Though 
still a part of agriculture, it was also becoming an article of in­
terregional trade. Its processing required specialized tools and 
shops of twenty and more workers, with some division of labor. There 
were other specialized trades during Sung but, unlike sugar and tea, 
they all produced for local markets only.
Sung handicraft industries were much advanced over T'ang's. 
Though we do not know the nature of labor relationships, there was 
division of labor. The scale of operations of both private and 
public mining and smelting was much greater in Sung than in T'ang.
By Northern Sung coal was used in smelting iron. Some smelters had 
as many as 500 or 600 workers. One public mint employed 300 day 
laborers and could turn out 10,000 strings of cash daily, 270,000
Istrings in a nine-month period. Of course this mint was completely 
feudal in its management. Private mints also flourished and there 
was no way to stop them. Private manufacture of bronze implements 
also flourished.
Silk weaving was carried out on a big scale. State enterprises 
were feudal in organization and larger than private ones. Both used 
division of labor. Printing was a new industry during Sung. Aside 
from the National Academy in the capital, there were printing centers 
in Chekiang, Szechwan and Fukien. In addition to books, printing 
was used to produce paper money and commodity bills. Not only did 
the new technique promote a higher level of culture, it also encour­
aged the division of labor.
Porcelain manufacture also became a large-scale industry during 
Sung. There were both state and private kilns. There was a big ex­
port trade in porcelain. So large-scale an industry must have re­
quired division of labor, but little evidence of this survives.
Shipbuilding was also more developed than in earlier times. 
State and private shipyards built large, complex vessels, using 
special skills and mechanical aids to supplement human muscle power. 
Though there was an extensive internal and external waterborn com­
merce, shipbuilding techniques were linked to military use and never 
strongly affected society at large.
All of the above are merely samples of the proliferation of 
commercially produced goods during Sung and illustrate the possi­
bility that existed for production capitalism by factory owners. 
State manufacture was still extremely important and still used con­
scripted craftsmen. Farmers and official slaves were still impor­
tant sources of labor. But hired labor was more generally in use 
than in T'ang, particularly when official labor was insufficient 
or during emergencies. Conscripted labor was in decline because of 
the inconvenience of bringing conscripts from a distance and dis­
turbing their businesses. Many would abscond. Hence conscripted
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labor was inefficient and costly to maintain. It was better to col­
lect a labor service tax and use it to hire men. This is what Wang 
An-shih proposed in his Service Avoidance Tax. There are many refer­
ences to private hired labor, buL most such laborers were not engaged 
in production and the methods of organizing hired laborers were 
tainted with feudalism.
Especially by Southern Sung, the mercantile economy was much 
more developed than during T'ang. Though still limited to urban 
areas and not affecting the bulk of the rural natural economy, it 
was nevertheless now large-scale. It involved not just accumulations 
of monetary capital but a diversified commercial output which pro­
duced the sprouts of capitalism and served as the historical precon­
dition for capitalism's development. There were already factories 
with systematic division of labor. Of course many factories were 
state-owned and hence completely feudal in nature, but quite a few 
were private and these produced a variety of commercial goods.
Hired laborers were becoming ever more numerous. It is possible to 
say that by Southern Sung in the Soochow-Hangchow region there were 
sprouts of capitalism in the cloth trade, though we still lack suf­
ficiently detailed materials to describe it adequately. Neverthe­
less the base was present for Ming-Ch'ing developments.
THE SPROUTS OF THE FACTORS OF CHINESE CAPITALISM 
DURING THE MING-CH'ING TRANSITION
Yuan represented a period of pause, with different sectors of 
the economy unequally affected. The policies of the early Ming 
centralized feudalism encouraged revival of commerce to a level 
above that of Southern Sung. The period from early Ming to mid- 
Ch'ing was the high point of feudal society's economic development, 
the period when sprouts of capitalism clearly appeared.
The lower Yangtze silk cloth trade was first to revive and show 
sprouts of capitalism. Even during Yuan much wage labor was being 
used in factories owned by the rich. Laborers worked long hours
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and were much weakened thereby. They were mobile and shifted jobs to 
get better wages. This shows that labor was commercialized, being 
bought and sold freely. By mid-Ming this phenomenon spread more wide­
ly down to the smaller commercial towns of the lower Yangtze and 
their surrounding agricultural areas. Small family weaving enter­
prises would frequently bring their products into the commercial 
towns to sell to traveling merchants. Some of these weavers prosper­
ed, expanded production and hired laborers, thus becoming capitalists 
in their own right. Commercial capital entered the production proc­
ess by making contracts in advance to buy small operators' output.
These sprouts developed further by late Ming as many officials, 
landowners and rich merchants began to invest in the trade. In ad­
dition many unsuccessful weavers were losing their production capital 
and were being forced to become wage laborers. In 1601 in Soochow 
there was an uprising of such laborers.
Cotton, which had come up from Lingnan during Yuan, became wide­
spread during Ming. By early Ming part of the land tax in kind was 
being paid in cotton. Cotton manufacture provided another task for 
cottage industry and advanced the mercantile economy. By mid-Ming 
cotton had become the most common clothing fiber. The trade center­
ed in the Sungchiang area, including Shanghai. By mid-nineteenth 
century about 1Q% of the rural population of this region was in­
volved in the cotton trade. By the eighteenth century 20^ to 30^ of 
the land in Chihli was devoted to cotton culture. By Yuan times 
there was already elaborate equipment for processing cotton, includ­
ing a two-man cotton gin. During Ming techniques continued to im­
prove. There were spinning machines run by foot treadles and capable 
of spinning three or four threads simultaneously.
In Ming-Ch'ing Sungchiang commercial capital was entering cot­
ton cloth production and gradually transforming itself into produc­
tion capital. Sungchiang was also a cotton merchandizing center.
The contract purchase system allowed rich merchants to dominate the
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local markets and oblige the actual producers to make what the mer­
chants wanted. A putting-out system also evolved in the cotton trade, 
with cloth being contracted out by a main house to various specialists 
for different stages of its processing. Finished cloth was also con­
tracted out to family workshops, which often possessed their own tools, 
to be sewn into stockings.
Mining and smelting also progressed. From early Ming a special 
tax of one-fifteenth was paid on such products. The amounts paid 
over the course of years show the great size and growth of this in­
dustry. The late Ming technological encyclopedia T'ien-kung k'ai-wu‘s 
narrative indicates that iron smelters were of considerable size.
Growth continued into Ch'ing. A Ch'ing era blast furnace in Kuangtung 
had 300 families living nearby and employed over 200 men to service 
the furnace. There were many large iron complexes in this area, 
each using detailed division of labor and large-scale blast furnaces 
working around the clock. Kuangtung iron and its products were ex­
ported as far as Hunan and the lower Yangtze. A similar scale and 
complexity of operations was achieved in other handicraft industries 
such as porcelain, salt, sugar, wine, paper and shipbuilding.
These sprouts of capitalism were also reflected in other sec­
tors of the economy. Conscription of labor in state enterprises 
gradually disappeared. In early Ming there were still over 230,000 
hired state craftsmen. By mid-Ming many were defaulting on their 
quota of labor and were being allowed to pay a tax in lieu of such 
labor. By late Ming such default continued and because the continu­
ing expansion of the commercial sector rendered conscripted labor's 
productivity ever less than that of hired labor, the dynasty went 
fully over to the use of a labor exemption tax and then increased 
its rate, using the proceeds to hire labor.
The spread of commercialization increased the avariciousness 
of the ruling strata. A monetary economy was fully dominant by 
Ming times. Taxes and rents were collected and computed in money, 
not kind, after mid-Ming. Peasants now had to sell their crops in
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the market to get cash to pay their taxes. They also began to buy 
necessities in the market as well, thereby beginning the destruction 
of the natural economy and creating regional specialization. The 
raising of silkworms and mulberry trees was one notable specialty, 
particularly in Chekiang and Szechwan. Most of the profits from such 
specialties went into the hands of rich landlords.
Tea held a special place in China's agricultural economy. Its 
production increased at an unprecedented rate during Ming-Ch'ing, 
During Ming it was an important source of state revenues. The gov­
ernment set up many offices to manage its production and distribu­
tion. Under state auspices production increased greatly and spread 
to new regions. Much tea was exported to the northwest in exchange 
for horses, and from the seventeenth century until the l880's in­
creasing amounts were sold to Europe and America.
Sugar production also increased in amount and variety. By 
Ch'ing, Canton was its center, with as much land devoted to it as to 
grain in some areas. Dyeing and dyestuff production increased along 
with the cloth trade. Indigo was the most common dyestuff, its cul­
ture spreading from Fukien all through the empire. Production of 
vegetable oils also spread. Tobacco appeared in late Ming, coming 
from Luzon to Fukien and then becoming much more diffused as the 
habit of smoking took root during early Ch'ing. A variety of fruits 
were also increasingly grown for the market.
After mid-Ming hired agricultural labor in commercialized areas 
became comparatively common and relations between landlords and 
peasants changed. By late Ming many peasants were forced by feudal 
exploitation and usurious exploitation by commercial capital to go 
out and sell their labor, either by the year or month, in order to 
live. Many worked in commercial agriculture. Such laborers were 
related to landowners by a cash nexus, as is shown by the increas­
ingly numerous complaints about their productivity made by land­
owners.
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Though such evidence indicates that commercialization of life 
was somewhat developed in comparatively advanced areas, this only 
represented the beginnings of the transformation of a predominantly 
feudal natural economy. Small-scale farming and artisanship were 
still the dominant forms of economic organization. Nevertheless the 
scale and complexity of urbanization were much greater than before 
Ming. There were many smaller cities apart from the capitals, with 
rich inhabitants possessing capital on a capitalistic scale. Mer­
chants were dealing in materials of production, both manufactured and 
agricultural, not just finished goods. This was a fundamental dis­
tinction from the commerce of previous eras.
Money was becoming increasingly indispensible, especially for 
the elites. By mid-Ming there were seventeen and more families with 
capital of from 500,000 to 1,000,000 cash. Many of the rich invest­
ed in the commercial sector and by their oppression of small crafts­
men and farmers further concentrated wealth. Several dozen large 
commercial cities developed. Peking and Nanking were economic as 
well as political centers. Other cities were regional economic 
centers specializing in various products like silk, cotton, and 
porcelain.
CONCLUSION
From the above we may conclude the following: (l) Though T'ang
was the height of feudal development, it also saw the establishment 
of commerce and commercial production to a sufficient degree to 
serve as the base for later sprouts of capitalism. (2) Sung's (es­
pecially Southern Sung's) commercial economy was more developed 
than T'ang's. Commerce was already yielding rather large-scale ac­
cumulations of monetary capital. There were large manufacturing 
enterprises, with division of labor and with hired labor becoming 
daily more evident. These all reflect the steady proliferation of 
petty commercial producers. Perhaps in a few areas (Soochow- 
Hangchow) in Southern Sung, the sprouts of capitalism had already
Vo
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appeared. (3) During Ming-Ch'ing, the feudal natural economy still 
held the dominant place in Chinese society, but the commercial econ­
omy had risen to a high level from the T'ang-Sung base.
In the Soochow-Hangchow silk trade, Sungchiang's cotton looms, 
and in the metals, porcelain, papermaking and shipbuilding handi­
crafts trades in various areas, the elements of capitalism had al­
ready sprouted and developed. In these trades, on one hand petty 
commercial producers differentiated Into capitalist enterprise owners 
and hired laborers and, on the other hand, merchants managed produc­
tion directly via delegated commercial capital.
This high level of commercial development and the sprouts of 
capitalism in some handicrafts were also reflected in other aspects 
of China's social economy, most importantly in official manufactur­
ing's substitution of the hired labor for the conscripted labor sys­
tem, the development of cottage manufacture in agriculture and the 
gradual increase in hired labor, commercial capital's rapid increase 
and participation in commercial production, the concentration of 
monetary wealth in a few men's hands, and the appearance of important 
economically specialized regions. All these are related to the 
sprouts of capitalism in important industries.
But we must forcefully point out that the development of China's 
feudal social economy was extremely uneven; the sprouts of capitalism 
appeared in only a few regions and industries where the commercial 
economy was highly developed. For the most part villages were still 
in the grip of a feudal natural economy. Though China's feudal sys­
tem had begun to loosen in late Ming, the economic links between 
small-scale agriculture and handicrafts were still extremely close, 
and these became a serious obstacle to the general spread of the 
commercial economy.
Aside from this, the rulers of China's feudal monopoly system 
were still quite strong. Official industries continued to exist 
and develop. Various sorts of taxes and feudal management and
245
oppression were all at that time serious obstacles on the road to 
development of privately managed industries. All of these are the 
basic reasons for the failure of capitalism to develop and for primi­
tive capital accumulation to be delayed in its appearance. During 
Ming-Ch'ing, though sprouts of capitalism developed within Chinese 
feudal society, the historical basis for development to a capitalist 
society was not prepared. Hence by mid-nineteenth century the whole 
of the feudal system of production had not yet been destroyed.
Of course this does not mean that China's feudal society was 
incapable of developing into a capitalist society. The sprouts of 
Chinese capitalism were slowly progressing. If there had been no 
capitalist intrusion from abroad, China too would certainly have 
been able to slowly develop from a feudal to a capitalist society.
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DYNASTIC TABLE
(Keyed to Chou Chin-sheng's periodization of Chinese economic history)
PERIODS AND DYNASTIES DATES
I. The Mythical Period
1. The Yellow Emperor (Huang Ti ) trad. 2697~2596 B.C.
[Traditionally viewed as the ancestor 
of the Chinese race. Traditions vary 
as to his predecessors, but most in­
clude thf "culture hero" rulers Fu- 
hsi4;^ ^ 2852-2738) and
Shen-nung ^ (trad. 2737“2696) 
among them.]
2. [Four mythical rulers] trad. 2597-2357 B.C.
3. Yao ^ trad. 2356-2256 B.C.
4. Shun trad. 2255-2206 B.C.
5. YU trad. 2205-2198 B.C.
6. Hsia Dynasty ^
[Said to have been founded by
Yu's son.]
trad. 2197-1766 B.C.
11. The Founding Period
1 . Shang-Yin trad. 1766-1122 B.C.
(perhaps actually 
only c. 1500-c.1100)
Shang
Yin [Name changed when
trad. 1766-1400
capital moved] trad. 1400-1122
2. Western Chou trad. 1121-770
III. The Age of Metamorphosis
1. Eastern Chou 770-249
Spring and Autumn (Ch'un-ch* iu)^ 
Warring States (Chan-kuo)
770-403
403-220
IV. The Flourishing Epoch
1. Ch'in 221-205
2. Western (or Former) Han (or )-;^ 205 B.C.-8 A.D.
3. Hsin (Wang Mang) ) 9-24 A.D.
V. The Age of Troubles
1 . Eastern (or Latter) Han (or )^^ 25-22025-220
DYNASTIC TABLE (cont'd)
The Age of Troubles (cont'd)
2.
1 . 
2. 
3.
Three Kingdoms
Shu (Han) f' )
Wei
Wu ^
Chin ^ __
Western Chin^p
Eastern Chin^^ [in South China]
Southern and Northern (Wnasties 
(Nan Pei Ch'ao\^,) J.L )
Southern Dynasties:
Liu-Sun^
Ch' i ^
Liang ^
Ch'en
Northern Dynasties:
The Sixteen Kingdoms 
(Shih-1 iu kuo 
Northern Wei Jk 
Western Wei 
Eastern Wei ^
Northern Ch'i 
Northern Chou
The Age of Reestablishment
Su i
T' 
a. e Dyn
angFive dynasties (Wu 
[in North China] 
Later Liang ^
Ta i )
[Turkic]
[Turkic]
[Turkic]
Later T'ang 
Later Chin (Tsin)
Later Han : J|
Later Chou ^
b. Ten Kingdoms ^Shih kuo -f' ) [in
various places in South China, except 
for Northern Han.]
Wu ^ [capital at.Yang-chou]
Southern T'ang [capital at
Nanking] ^ ^
— ^.......... , [middle Yangtze]
Ch'u [in H^nan]
Former Shu j^i i/Q in Szechwan]
, ^ . n S:
Wu-Yueh ^ [capital at Hangchow]
Later Shu [in zechwan]
220-265
220-265
220-265
222-280
265-^30
265-316
317-^20
420-478
479-501
502-556
557-588
304-439
386-534
535-557
534-550
550-577
557-581
581/9-618 
618-906. ■
907-960
907-922
923-935
936-946
947-950
951-959
902-937
937-975
907-963
927-951
907-925
934-965
907-978
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DYNASTIC TABLE (cont'd)
VI. The Age of Reestablishment (cont'd)
[capita], at Foochow] 909-944
Southern Han vf) [capital at Canton] 907-971 
Northern Han y 'f:, [in Northern Shansi] 951-979
VII. The Age of Renewal
1. Sung 960-1279
Northern Sung Jb 960-1126
Southern Sung 1127-1279
VIII. The Age of Destitution [overlaps Age of Renewa1]
1 . Western Hsia \iyj ^ [Tangut] 1038-1227
2. Liao [Khitan] ^ 916-1125
Western Liao (Qara Khi ta i) 1126-1211
3. Chin ^ [Jurched] 1115-1234
4. Yuan [Mongol] 1234/79-1368
IX. The Age of Renewal
1 . Ming ij/j 1368-1644
X. The Age of Fermentation
I. Ch'ing [Manchu] 1644-1911
XI. The Republic (Minkuo ) 1912-
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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Chinese weights and measures have varied, often over considerable 
ranges, at different times during the past three millenia. Even in 
relatively recent times there has been wide variation among differ­
ent regions during the same period. The metric and English equiva­
lents given here are for recent times only, and are intended only to 
make rough comparisons possible. They must NOT be used as the basis 
for quantitative calculations, even for recent times. For purposes 
of calculation consult a good history of Chinese weights and measures 
and make whatever allowances seem prudent for regional and local 
variations.
1 . Li near Measures
Chinese unit Metric equivalent English equivalent
fen '4
10 fen = 1 ts'un J
10 ts'un = 1 ch'ih X.
10 ch' i h = 1 chang Ji,
3.3 mni.
3.3 cm.
33 cm.
3.3 m.
0.131 in.
0.109 ft.
1.094 ft.
10.94 ft.
150 chang = I 1i 0.5 km. 0.33 miles
2. Areal Measures
Chinese unit Metric equivalent English equivalent
li M
10 1 i = 1 fen /)
10 fen = 1 mu ,
100 mu = 1 ch ‘ i ng
6.1 sq. m.
.6lA4 are 
6.144 ares
6.14 hectares
7.34 sq. yd. 
74.43 sq. yd.
.1647 acre
16.47 acres
3. Cubic Measures
Chinese unit Metric equivalent English equivalent
sheng
10 sheng = 1 tou ^
10 tou = 1 tan (or shih)>^ 
[not to be confused with 
the homophonous unit of 
weight. Cf. below]
1 1iter
10 1iters
100 liters
.908 quart
1.14 pecks
2.85 bushels
A. Weight Measures
Chinese unit Metric equivalent English equiva1ent
1iang"tael"*
16 1 iang = 1 chin /f 
"catty"*
100 chin = 1 tan or
"picul"*
*Commonly used "pidgin
31.25 g.
.5 kg.
50 kg.
English" terms during
1.1 oz.
1.102 lb.
110.23 lb.
the nineteenth century
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Temuchin . Cf. Chingis Khan
Tenancy. Cf. Landlordism 
Teng, ancient state of , 43
Textiles, modern manufacture of, 161, 164, 172, 182, I83 
Three Kingdoms Era. Cf. San Kuo 
The "Three Offices". Cf. San ssu 
Tientsin , 162, 171JT5t
T'ien fu (field tax) , 31, 56, 65, 66-67, 71, 74-75, 85,
91, 117, 122-123, 126, 141-142, 191-193 
T' ienkung k'aiwu ,241
Tin, 42, 103
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Ting fu (head ,tax)T 193 
Ting ki 1 n >'£ , 101
Toba , 69
Tobacco, 242
Tombs, 51, 59
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 211
Trans-Siberian railroad, 160
"Treasure ships". Cf. Pao ch'uan
"Tribute" (tax in kind). Cf. Kung
Tribute missions, 128-129, 133, 140
Troubles, ag-^of, 16, 18, 63-7I
Ts'ai Ching^<,^, 97, 107
Ts'ao Ts'ao /y., W, 70, 204
Tseng Kuo-fanj| m §, 161-164, I87
Tseng Tzu W ^ ,34
Tso Tsung-t'angj;^ J, I87
Tsu Chung-chih jL, 66
Tu Fu M , 86
Tunhuang , 48, 80
T'un t'ieh (garrison fields, military colonies) 1^ , 50, 64, 66, 
69, 76, 129, 176, 204-205, 210-211
Tung Cho ^ ^
Tung Chung-snu ^ 'i'f , 50
T'ung-chih Restoration , 161-162, I98
T'ung hang ji] . Cf. Hang ' ' n A
T'ung Meng Hui (Association of the Joint Oath) 1^ ^ , I99
200
T'ung Wen Kuan (School for Translators) j^] >L , 162 
Turks, Eastern, 17
Unequal treaties, I80
Urban life and urbanization, 59, 69, 81-82, 83, 217-218, 226,
232, 236, 243
Usury. Cf. Credit 
Valentinus, 66
Vietnam, 45, 65, I80, 199- Cf. also Annam
Voluntary labor service law (of Wang An-shih). Cf. Mu yi fa
Wang An-shih Z , I9, 53, 90-96, 97, 107, 109, 170, 239
Wang Mang A ^ , 16, 47, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 60-62
Wang Wen-su.iiC^ , 136
War and Peace Factions, Sung, 109
Warfare, methods of, I9
Warlords. Cf. ChUnfa
Warring States Era. Cf. Chan Kuo
Warships, 83, 134, 162. 1B7
Wei, ancient state of, 37, 45
Wei Chung-hsien ^ ^ , 147
Wei (dynasty)^ , 51, 65-66
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Weights and measures, k~j
Well-field system., Cf. Ching t'ien
Wen (Han emperor) ^ , 55, 57
Wen (Northern Ch'i emperor)X-> 69
Wen (Sui emperor) , 78, 79, 8l, 84, 86, 206
Western Hsia (dynasty) ^ , 103, 109, HO, 111, 209, 216
Western Liaov-tfi^ ,111
White registers. Cf. Pai chi
Wine, 29, 52, 56, 61, 68, 83, 85, 107, 115, 117, 120, 144, 195
Works, Board of. Cf. Kung pu
Written language, 23, TT
Wu, ancient state of ^ , 41, 42
Wuch'ang ^ , 148, 200 ^
Wu Ching ^ , 136
Wu (dynasty) ^ , 64-65
Wu or Wu-ti (Han emperor)j^v^ , 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 
57-59, 93, 204 
Wuhan Uprising, 172, 200 
Wu hsing (five elements) , 60
Wu San-kuei^ 3-, 148, 157
Wusung , 185
Wu Tai (Five dynasties) X » '6, 90, 215, 236 
Wu-wei ^ 7^ , 35
Yangchou HI, 68, 79, 80-82, 86, 89, 134, 195 
Yang Chu ^ , 35
Yang (Sui emperor) , 79, 80, 8l , 84, 86 
Yangshao'fCj^ , 21
Yangtze River f ^2, 44, 55, 63, 89, 97, 179, 206
Yang Yao^| i:,, 110
Yang Yen||^ , 74, 75, 93
Yao (legendary emperor) S , 22, 6l
Yao (labor service tax) , 193
Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ji Jf if ^ , 111-113
Yellow Emperor^ Y , 21, 22, 23
Yellow registers. Cf. Huang chi
Yellow River. Cf. Huang Ho
Yellow Turbans. Cf. Huang chin
Yen, ancient state of, jfc , 4l, 43
Yenanj:^ ^ , 147
Yenching jtL , 111, 112, 114, 120
Yen Fu , I70, I7I
Yent'ai y(:f ^ , I87
Yen Tzu , 38 ,
Yen-Yun (terr i tor ies) , 9I
Yi (barbarian tribe) ^ ,^57"58, 60
Yichou^ »•)-) , 68
Yi t' iao pien (Single Whip Tax) ^ , 125, 126, 141-142
Yi ts 'ang (Righteous Granaries) ^ , 78, 99, II8, 123, 130
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Yin ting (silver "shoe") > 10^
Yin-yang fXf§ > ^0
Ying-tsung (Sung emperor) \-f~ , 91
Yung-cheng (Ch'ing emperor)^ jx. , 136, 188, I9I
Yung-lo (Ming emperor) 4|^ . 125, 127-128, 133, 13^, 1A4
Yli(founder of Hsia dynasty) , 2^, 60 .
Yu 1 in ts 'e (fish-scale register) ^ ^ , 129, 1^1, 1^2, 143
Ytipei ts 'anq (preparation granaries) 0^'m ^ > 129, 131
Yuan (dynasty) , 16, 102, 111-115, 118-12^ 127, 209-210,
216, 222, 239
Yuan (dollar) , I89 
Yuan Shih (Yuan History) , 112
YUeh, ancient state of,^,;^^ , 30
Yunnan^ , 144, I96
Zero, concept of, 82, 100
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